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In 2016, 1.37 million children received subsidies under the U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services’ $8.7 billion Child Care Development Fund, though 
care is often low-quality. One way a state can incentivize providers to offer higher 
quality care is by providing larger child care subsidies to higher quality providers 
through a tiered reimbursement system. This research used a sequential explanatory 
equal status mixed method design to answer the question, Does Maryland’s tiered 
reimbursement system incentivize child care providers to attain a rating on 
Maryland’s Quality Rating and Improvement System (QRIS) that results in a higher 
reimbursement rate?  
The first stage of research consisted of multilevel logistic regressions to 
determine the association between child care centers’ and family child care providers’ 
reliance on subsidy payments and whether the provider was rated highly enough on 
Maryland’s QRIS (called Maryland EXCELS) to receive an incentive payment. The 
 
  
regressions used administrative data from the Maryland State Department of 
Education and demographic data from the U.S. Census. The analyses included all 
providers in Maryland that received payments from Maryland’s Child Care Subsidy 
Program in January 2018. The second stage of research consisted of 14 interviews 
with child care center directors across five counties to understand how they made 
decisions about which EXCELS rating to attain, how tiered reimbursements factored 
into their decisions, and general experiences with EXCELS. 
Results from my quantitative research found that for both child care centers 
and family providers, a greater subsidy density (i.e., number of children receiving a 
child care subsidy divided by the provider’s licensed capacity) was associated with a 
greater likelihood of a provider being rated higher quality (level 3 or higher in 
EXCELS) and receiving a tiered child care payment. However, results of my 
qualitative research found that few center directors reported that EXCELS payments 
factored into their decision on what EXCELS level to reach and none of the centers 
were singularly motivated by the bonuses. Rather, directors reported being 
intrinsically motivated to improve EXCELS ratings or motivated by technical 
assistance providers. Challenges to improving EXCELS ratings included a lack of 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
High-quality early care and education programs, particularly preschool, can 
improve children’s school readiness, especially for disadvantaged children (Karoly & 
Auger, 2016; Phillips et al., 2017). However, not all early care and education 
programs are high-quality, nor are all programs equally effective (Phillips et al., 
2017). In fact, low-income children receiving child care subsidies funded by the 
federal Child Care Development Fund (CCDF) are often served by lower quality 
providers (Jones-Branch, Torquati, Raikes, & Pope Edwards, 2004; Raikes, Raikes, & 
Wilcox, 2005). Two ways to incentivize early care and education providers to 
improve their quality are the supports available through participation in states’ 
Quality Rating and Improvement Systems (QRIS) and through tiered child care 
subsidy reimbursements that are tied to QRIS ratings. QRIS are state-run rating 
systems designed to assess, improve, and communicate the quality of early care and 
education providers. Tiered reimbursement systems are state-run systems that provide 
higher child care subsidies to higher quality providers, often based on reaching 
particular rating levels on their state’s QRIS. Thirty-nine states have at least one 
QRIS (QRIS Compendium, 2017) and 38 states have a tiered reimbursement system 
(Schulman & Blank, 2016). 
In general, incentive systems are based on the underlying assumption that 
people are entirely self-interested (Bowles, 2016). While the developers of QRIS and 
tiered reimbursement systems would likely agree that the child care workforce is not 
entirely self-interested, aspects of the systems are based in this basic economic 





in part, because parents will choose high-quality providers. Tiered reimbursement 
systems assume that child care center directors and family child care providers will 
respond to financial incentives by changing their behavior and improving their 
quality. 
This chapter describes my research question and my contribution to the field, 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) CCDF, the general 
theory behind QRIS, and tiered reimbursement systems across the United States. 
Chapter 2 discusses literature around child care subsidies, QRIS, parental search for 
child care, and tiered reimbursement systems; incentive systems, in general; 
education incentives and parental choice in K–12 education; and health care ratings, 
patient choice, and incentives. Chapter 3 describes Maryland’s QRIS—called 
Maryland EXCELS—and Maryland’s Child Care Subsidy Program (CCSP), which is 
partially funded by the CCDF. Chapter 4 details my research design, data sources, 
and methods. Chapter 5 discusses descriptive results on providers’ participation in 
Maryland EXCELS and the CCSP and results from the quantitative and qualitative 
analyses. Chapter 6 integrates the quantitative and qualitative results and discusses 
limitations, future research, and policy implications.  
Research Question and Contributions 
To understand whether tiered reimbursement systems work as theory predicts 
in a single state, I conducted a two-stage mixed methods study to answer the research 
question, Does Maryland’s tiered reimbursement system incentivize child care 
providers to attain a rating on Maryland’s QRIS that results in a higher 





which I analyzed quantitative data, used the results to select the child care center 
directors for my qualitative data collection, analyzed the qualitative data, and, finally, 
interpreted all of the data together (Creswell, Plano Clark, Gutman, & Hanson, 2003). 
In the first stage of my research, I conducted multilevel logistic regressions to 
determine the association between centers’ and family child care providers’ reliance 
on child care subsidy payments and whether the provider had a rating on Maryland 
EXCELS of 3 or higher, which results in a tiered payment and being a “higher 
quality” provider.1 Reasons that my quantitative analysis might not show a positive 
association between reliance on child care subsidy payments and the likelihood of 
being a higher quality provider include (1) providers are not aware of the tiered 
payments, (2) the incentive amount is too small, (3) providers lack capacity to meet 
the higher quality standards, and (4) providers have intrinsic motivation to meet 
higher quality standards.  
To better understand how these mechanisms may work, in the second stage of 
my research, I interviewed 14 child care center directors in five counties. Interview 
topics included their knowledge of the tiered reimbursement system (to understand 
the first possible mechanism); the EXCELS rating level they would like to meet, how 
they settled on that goal, and challenges to improving their EXCELS rating (to 
understand the second and third possible mechanisms); and how tiered 
reimbursements factored into their decision (to understand the fourth possible 
mechanism). If my quantitative analysis found that incentives work as theory 
                                                 
1 In this research study, a “higher quality” provider in Maryland is defined as a provider that is rated 






predicted, the qualitative data would provide additional detail as to why it might have 
worked, including data on the supports that providers found helpful.  
Maryland is a good case to study due to its relatively low subsidy rate, its 
relatively large incentive at level 3 of its QRIS, and its requirement that providers be 
enrolled in its QRIS to receive subsidy payments. Historically, Maryland has had 
relatively low subsidy reimbursement rates: in 2016 it was one of 13 states that had 
rates that were at least 33 percent lower than the 75th percentile of market rate for 4-
year-olds served in centers (as described below, CCDF guidance is to set rates at the 
75th percentile of market rate) (Schulman & Blank, 2016). Specifically, in 2016, 
Maryland’s reimbursement rate for a 4-year-old in a center in a particular region was 
$546, $325, less than the $871 at the 75th percentile of market rate.2 With lower 
relative subsidy reimbursement rates than most states, providers in Maryland may be 
especially in need of the tiered payment.  
Like only seven other states, Maryland offers its first tiered payment at level 3 
of its QRIS, as opposed to level 1 or 2. Among those eight states, Maryland offers the 
highest level 3 tiered payment: 22 percent for child care centers serving children 
under age 2 (QRIS Compendium, 2017). Hence, Maryland offers a relatively large 
tiered payment for reaching level 3 and nothing until level 3 is reached. Finally, 
Maryland is one of eight states that requires that at least some providers participate in 
its QRIS in order to serve children receiving child care subsidy. In Maryland, all 
providers that serve children in its CCSP are required to participate in its QRIS. The 
                                                 
2 These specific amounts are for reimbursements in the counties of Anne Arundel, Calvert, Carroll, 





requirement to participate in Maryland EXCELS removes selection bias into the 
QRIS among providers who serve children in the CCSP. The lack of selection bias 
combined with the sharp incentive at level 3 makes Maryland an ideal case to study 
whether its tiered reimbursement incentivizes providers participating in the CCSP to 
reach level 3.  
However, the same factors that make Maryland an important case to study 
also make Maryland an outlier. If I found that Maryland’s tiered reimbursement 
system served as an incentive to improve quality, the few states with tiered 
reimbursement systems similar to Maryland may also have systems that work 
similarly well. Positive and negative results from Maryland would be less applicable 
to most states. For example, if the results are positive, the incentive may work due to 
factors that other states do not have, such as mandatory participation and lack of 
tiered payments for reaching lower levels of a QRIS. If results are positive, states may 
want to conduct their own analyses and, depending on their results, consider a system 
that is similar to Maryland’s. On the other hand, if I found that Maryland’s system did 
not incentivize providers to reach level 3, it is possible that systems that offered tiered 
payments at levels 1 and 2 would, ultimately, incentivize providers to reach higher 
quality levels. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, Maryland’s validation study of EXCELS found 
that independent observation tools did not differentiate among EXCELS ratings 
(Swanson et al., 2017). Maryland’s validation study did not assess the association 
between rating levels and child outcomes, though validation studies of other states’ 





gains for children (Tout et al., 2017). I assumed that the goal of MSDE’s tiered child 
care reimbursement system is to improve the subsidized quality of care in Maryland 
as measured by EXCELS rating. That is, whether or not the care in a level 3 provider 
is demonstrably better than care in a level 2 provider, Maryland’s tiered 
reimbursement system provides an incentive for a level 2 provider to improve to a 
level 3. Therefore, my research analyzed whether the incentive encouraged providers 
to become “higher quality” and attain a rating that resulted in a tiered reimbursement. 
Despite tiered reimbursement systems existing for two decades, there is very little 
research on how providers respond to the systems (Adams et al., 2003; Gormley & 
Lucas, 2000; Greenberg et al., 2018), and no research analyzing how providers in a 
single state respond to tiered reimbursement systems that are tied to a QRIS. My 
research is the first in-depth look at how a tiered reimbursement system functions in a 
single state and it is an important contribution to the field by determining whether a 
tiered reimbursement system functions as theory predicts. The goal of tiered 
reimbursement systems is to improve the quality of early care and education for 
disadvantaged children. If Maryland’s systems does not meet that goal, Maryland and 
other similar states should reconsider the structure of their tiered subsidy system or 
consider if non-financial supports, such as technical assistance, would result in an 
increase in the number of higher quality providers.  
Additionally, my research will contribute to the larger field of public incentive 
systems designed to improve the quality of a service. As will be discussed in my 
literature review, there is research on the effectiveness of systems that provide 





include sanctions for poor performance. In both health care and K–12 education, 
performance is based on outcomes (e.g., hospital re-admission rate, student test 
scores, graduation rates). There are not readily available outcomes for the child care 
field, and Maryland’s QRIS is based entirely on inputs that the Maryland State 
Department of Education (MSDE) believes will influence child outcomes. Given 
ongoing interest in paying for performance (e.g., Social Impact Partnership to Pay for 
Results Act) and recent interest in evidence-based policy-making from the federal 
level (e.g., Commission on Evidence-Based Policymaking and evidence standards in 
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, as authorized by the Every Student 
Succeeds Act), state and local governments may take a fresh look at a wide wage of 
program logic models and determine where incentives could be used most efficiently 
to improve outcomes. Depending on the challenges around creating an outcome-
based incentive system for a particular program, governments may determine an 
incentive system aimed, at least in part, at improving inputs is the best option.  
For example, effective transition planning is essential for adolescents 
returning from juvenile justice facilities to public schools (Griller Clark, Mathur, 
Brock, O’Cummings, & Milligan, 2016). While one could imagine a system in which 
the juvenile justice facilities were held accountable for whether their formerly 
incarcerated individuals graduated, one can easily imagine that most factors affecting 
graduation rates would be outside of the facilities’ control. Instead, a state could 
provide a monetary incentive to juvenile justice facilities that created evidence-based 





research will contribute to the knowledge of how individuals think about and react to 
input-based incentive systems. 
Child Care and Development Fund 
In an average month of fiscal year 2016, HHS’ $5.68 billion CCDF supported 
approximately 823,600 families and 1,370,700 children (Office of Child care, 2016a; 
Office of Child Care, 2018a). The goals of the CCDF are to “promote economic self-
sufficiency and to help children succeed in school and life through affordable, high-
quality early care and afterschool programs” (Office of Child Care, 2016b). States use 
CCDF funds to provide vouchers to low-income families to help pay for child care 
while parents work or attend school or job training. In most states, including 
Maryland, the vouchers do not cover the full cost of care, as families are charged a 
co-payment, depending on family income, provider type, and child age. In 2016, 10 
states (Maryland was not one of them) did not require any co-payments from families 
with income under 100 percent of the federal poverty guidelines (Halder & Tran, 
2018).  
States determine the amount of the voucher and the amount is informed by a 
market rate survey conducted every two years. The CCDF program guide states to set 
vouchers at an amount that would allow recipients to access care at the 75th percentile 
of market rate prices (i.e., the voucher and co-pay would cover the price of 75 percent 
of providers), though states have considerable discretion when setting voucher 
amounts. As states receive a set amount of money through CCDF and state budgets, a 
state must decide whether to serve more children with smaller vouchers or fewer 





their reimbursement rates at the 75th percentile dropped from 22 to one. Further, in 13 
states, the reimbursement rate for four-year-olds in center-based care was at least 33 
percent lower than the 75th percentile of the market rate (Schulman & Blank, 2016). 
A U.S. Government Accountability Study (2016) found that in the average month in 
2011–12, approximately 8.6 million children were eligible for subsidies under the 
CCDF program based on state policies and about 1.5 million children actually 
received subsidies. 
Quality Rating and Improvement Systems 
In the late 1990s, states began to incentivize child care providers funded 
through the CCDF to improve quality through the use of tiered reimbursement 
payments that typically paid higher rates for accredited providers. States realized how 
difficult it was for providers to become accredited, and by 2005 10 states had adopted 
statewide QRIS to assess, improve, and communicate providers’ quality of care.  
Low-quality child care providers could proliferate for a number of reasons, 
including well-meaning providers not knowing how to improve their services and 
parents’ inability to discern a low-quality provider from a high-quality provider. The 
former possibility is a challenge to the “supply” of the child care market functioning 
properly: some providers would improve their quality if they had assistance to do so. 
The latter possibility is a challenge to the “demand” of the child care market 
functioning properly: parents do not have the information necessary to seek and 
demand high-quality child care.  
QRIS are accountability systems designed to improve the quality of child care 





improvement, and making quality transparent to providers and parents. QRIS are 
designed with the end goal of better preparing children for school, but unlike K–12 
accountability systems, QRIS do not include child outcomes as part of the 
accountability. Rather, the systems focus on assessing and improving structural 
inputs, such as staff qualifications, curriculum, and the length of the day (Zellman & 
Perlman, 2008). Zellman and Perlman (2008) developed the logic model in Figure 1., 
which emphasizes the market-based aspects of the QRIS system: Inputs and initial 
outcomes include providers being assessed and developing improvement plans, initial 
and intermediate outcomes include parents learning about and using ratings, and 
longer-term outcomes include improving formerly low-quality providers and closing 
persistently low-quality providers that become undersubscribed. 
QRIS could also work to increase the supply of higher quality providers 
through the organizational theory of isomorphism—the idea that organizations, 
including nonprofits, mimic each other and become more similar over time 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 2983; Leiter, 2008). Normative isomorphism may be especially 
relevant to child care providers responding to a QRIS in that a QRIS creates a 
structure for professionalization of the child care market (i.e., quality ratings). That is, 
as child care providers notice other providers participating in and increasing levels in 
a QRIS, providers may feel the need to mimic one another. Isomorphism could also 






Figure 1. Quality Rating and Improvement System Logic Model 
 
Source: Zellman & Perlman, 2008. 
 
QRIS were an important part of the Barack Obama administration’s early 
learning policies and programs. The U.S. Department of Education (ED) and HHS 
co-administered the Race to the Top-Early Learning Challenge (RTT-ELC) grant 
program, which awarded 4-year grants totaling almost $1 billion dollars to 19 states 
to improve early learning programs for young children. Maryland received an RTT-





grantees. As part of their grants, states designed or improved QRIS and, through 
2016, compared with the year before grant receipt, the 19 RTT-ELC grantees had 
increased the number of early learning programs in their QRIS by 92 percent (from 
37,630 to almost 72,000) and increased the number of programs in the top tiers of 
their QRIS by 162 percent (from 9,025 to almost 24,000) (Caron et al., 2017). In its 
RTT-ELC application, Maryland defined its “top tiers” of EXCELS as levels 4 and 5 
(MSDE, 2016a). 
QRIS are voluntary systems, though, as of 2017, Maryland and seven other 
states required that certain providers participate in their QRIS to receive child care 
subsidy payments. Whereas some of the seven states only required child care centers 
(and not family child care providers) to participate to receive subsidies and others 
only required participation if a child care provider received a certain amount of funds, 
as of July 2015, Maryland required that all of its providers participate in Maryland 
EXCELS to receive child care subsidy payments.  
QRIS rate providers on a number of factors, such as staff qualifications, 
curricula, and health and safety indicators. In fact, in August 2017, the American 
Academy of Pediatrics issued a policy statement on the importance of high-quality 
early education and child care and included a recommendation for pediatricians to 
support QRIS in their state and encourage the inclusion of robust child health and 
safety standards (Donoghue & AAP Council on Early Childhood, 2017). There are 
three common ways for states to rate providers: In a block structure all of the quality 
elements in one level must be met before a provider may receive the next level’s 





their total points correspond to a rating. A hybrid structure assigns a weight to each 
indicator based on evidence of the indicator’s relationship to quality and multiplies 
the weight by the level achieved in a block structure (i.e., a level of 3 and a weight of 
1.5 equals 4.5 points). Currently, 39 states have at least one QRIS (there are 3 local 
QRIS in Florida), with 17 states using a block system, 6 states using a points system, 
and 16 states using a hybrid system (QRIS Compendium, 2017). 
A recent study examining QRIS implementation in seven Midwest states 
found that each state offered at least one incentive for providers to participate in the 
QRIS and most states offered more than one incentive (Faria, Greenberg, Hawkinson, 
& Metzger, 2016). Like Maryland, five states linked QRIS participation and rating to 
a tiered child care subsidy reimbursement rate and four states offered a one-time cash 
award for receiving a high rating or increasing a rating level. 
As elaborated on in the following chapter, research on QRIS has found that 
QRIS capture meaningful differences in provider quality; provider quality increased 
over time, but, generally, QRIS ratings were not associated with developmental gains 
for children. However, none of the studies had large enough child-level sample sizes 
across all possible ratings, indicating that small sample sizes may have contributed to 
the inability to detect differences in child outcomes between rating levels. Given that 
the published research on QRIS covers relatively newly implemented systems, it is 
possible that more mature systems’ ratings will be associated with developmental 
gains for children. Even if higher rated providers do not increase children’s measured 
outcomes, compared to lower rated providers, higher rated providers often meet 





increased family engagement—important outcomes in and of themselves. Because 
QRIS are the current tools that states use to measure and improve the quality of child 
care and early learning programs, my research takes the importance of QRIS as a 
policy mechanism as a given, and I focus on how tiered child care reimbursement 
systems function in the current QRIS environment. 
Tiered Child Care Reimbursement Systems 
 One way to incentivize quality is to offer higher child care reimbursement 
rates (i.e., tiered payments) to providers that are higher quality. In 2016, 38 states 
provided tiered payments, often based on a provider’s ratings in its state’s QRIS 
(Schulman and Blank, 2016). Across the states, tiered reimbursement rates vary by 
the age of the child, the type of provider, and the provider’s rating. As will be 
described in detail in Chapter 3, Maryland offers different tiered reimbursement rates 
for child care centers and family child care providers, different rates for children 
under age 2 and age 2 and older, and different rates depending the provider’s rating. 
While a particular provider would only need to know the rates associated with their 
type of provider and their rating level, the additional payments are percentages of a 
base rate and are not especially easy to calculate without a calculator. The systems are 
quite complex and states need to spend resources to ensure that providers understand 
how the tiered system functions. 
The differences between base rates and tiered rates vary widely across states. 
For center-based care provided to 4-year-olds, the difference between the highest and 
lowest tiered reimbursement rates in a state varied from $31 in New Jersey to $350 in 





reimbursement rates in a state varied from 5 percent in Connecticut and Hawaii to 74 
percent in Oklahoma (Schulman & Blank, 2016). For center-based care provided to 4-
year-olds in Maryland in 2016, the difference in reimbursement rate between the base 
rate and highest tier was $142,3 with 14 states having larger differences than 
Maryland (Schulman & Blank, 2016). 
In 2017, eight states with tiered reimbursement systems, including Maryland, 
did not offer a higher reimbursement to providers until a provider reached at least a 
level 3 on the state’s QRIS (some of these states had 4-level QRIS and others, like 
Maryland, had 5-level QRIS). Of these eight states, Maryland offered its centers 
serving infants the largest percentage increase for reaching level 3: 22 percent. Two 
of the eight states offered percentage increases of five percent for reaching level 3. 
Four states offered tiered payments of 5 percent for providers simply reaching level 1 
in their QRIS (QRIS Compendium, 2017). Therefore, Maryland is unique in offering 
such a sharp incentive for providers to reach a level 3 on its QRIS, making it an 
important state to study. 
Even with the tiered child care reimbursement rates, only six states’ highest 
reimbursement rates exceed the 75th percentile for the cost of child care in their state 
and 10 states’ highest reimbursement rates are at least 25 percent below the cost to 
provide care at the 75th percentile in their state (Schulman and Blank, 2016). While 
tiered payments could be used to help defray the cost of increasing quality, Schulman 
and Blank (2016) note that the minimal rate difference may not cover these costs. To 
                                                 
3 This specific amount is for reimbursements in the counties of Anne Arundel, Calvert, Carroll, 





address this line of inquiry, my interviews will include questions about how providers 
use their tiered subsidy payments. 
Summary 
This study is an important contribution to the literature on how to improve the 
quality of early care and education. There is little research, and no state-level 
research, on whether tiered child care subsidy reimbursements function as theory 
predicts. Research shows the importance for children, especially disadvantaged 
children, to receive high-quality early care and education (Karoly & Auger, 2016; 
Phillips et al., 2017). Through the CCDF, the federal government provides over $5.5 
billion for child care, and it is necessary to understand actions states can take to 






Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 While there is little research on how child care providers respond to tiered 
child care subsidy reimbursements, there is research on the quality of care and 
outcomes for children that participated in subsidized child care, QRIS, and how 
parents search for child care. As explained below, each of these topics informs the 
theory behind tiered reimbursement systems. In addition to discussing the literature 
on child care, this chapter discusses research on incentive systems, in general, and the 
effectiveness of incentives in the K–12 education and health care fields and parent 
and patient choice in those fields. 
Early Care and Education 
 While children, especially those eligible to receive subsidized care, that 
receive high-quality early care and education experience positive outcomes (Karoly & 
Auger, 2016; Phillips et al., 2017), many children that receive subsidized care are not 
receiving care from high-quality providers (Jones-Branch, Torquati, Raikes, & Pope 
Edwards, 2004; Raikes, Raikes, & Wilcox, 2005). Likely due to the lack of quality 
care, Herbst and Tekin (2010) found that subsidy receipt was associated with reduced 
school readiness. One strategy a state can employ to improve the quality of early care 
and education is through a QRIS. QRIS have been found to improve the quality of 
care (Karoly, 2014; Tout et al., 2017), though research tends to find that parents do 
not choose care based primarily on a provider’s quality or rating on a QRIS 
(Dechausay & Anzelone, 2016; Kim & Fram, 2009). If parents are not demanding 
high-quality care, then a state’s tiered child care subsidy reimbursement system 





reviewed in this section covers quality of care and outcomes for children that 
participated in subsidized child care, QRIS, how parents search for child care, and 
concludes with research on tiered reimbursement systems. 
Subsidy Use, Quality of Care, and Outcomes  
Research indicates that center-based care is of higher quality than in-home 
care (Bassok, Fitzpatrick, Greenberg, & Loeb, 2016) and that disadvantaged 
communities—geographically defined by zip codes—are more likely to have low-
quality center-based care (Bassok & Gaslo, 2016; Hatfield et al., 2015). Researchers 
have found that subsidy receipt is associated with enrollment in child care centers, 
which results in parents choosing higher-quality care than non-participants (Krafft, 
Davis, & Tout, 2017; Rigby et al., 2007; Ryan, Rigby, & Brooks-Gunn, 2011). 
However, this does not mean that children using subsidies are in especially high-
quality care. Ryan et al. (2011) found that families that used their subsidies for center-
based care purchased lower quality center-based care than comparable non-
participants, though families that purchased family-based care purchased higher 
quality care that non-participants. Similarly, Chipty (1995) found that increases in 
subsidy use increases the quality of family-based day care. 
  Multiple researchers have found that centers that serve children receiving 
subsidies are of lower quality (Jones-Branch, Torquati, Raikes, & Pope Edwards, 
2004; Raikes, Raikes, & Wilcox, 2005). In a descriptive study on the associations 
between child care funding and quality in North Carolina (as rated by the state’s 
QRIS), researchers found that centers that received above average CCDF funds were 





regardless of community affluence (Hatfield et al., 2015). However, the quality of 
centers that received below-average CCDF funds differed by community affluence, 
with centers in communities of less affluence having lower quality than centers in 
communities of higher affluence (Hatfield et al., 2015). Hatfield et al. (2015) suggest 
that a qualitative study could help understand why programs respond differently to 
QRIS. 
Other research has found that subsidy receipt before kindergarten is associated 
with reduced school readiness. Herbst and Tekin (2010) found that subsidy receipt 
was associated with lower reading and math scores and greater behavior problems at 
kindergarten entry. One explanation to which their data lent some support was that 
children who received subsidies have intense exposure to low-quality care (Herbst & 
Tekin, 2010). A study specifically of young children with or at risk for special needs 
that used propensity score matching found that subsidized care had significant 
negative effects on early literacy and numeracy, and no effects on communication, 
impulsivity, hyperactivity, or prosocial behavior (Sullivan et al. 2018). 
Quality Rating and Improvement Systems 
With the understanding of the importance of quality early care (Karoly & 
Auger, 2016; Phillips et al, 2017), state policy-makers designed QRIS to improve the 
quality of early care in their states. Recent research found that the implementation of 
a QRIS induced a shift from parental care to non-parental child care settings, though 
the impacts differed by mother’s education level. Specifically, mothers with a high 
school education or less were more likely to shift to informal child care, while 





and family-based programs (Herbst, 2016). One explanation that Herbst offered for 
this result was that QRIS participation could lead programs to increase prices, 
resulting in a market that prices low-income parents out of the formal child care 
market. He notes that universally raising the child care subsidy may not solve the 
issue and suggests that tiered reimbursement may be preferable. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, QRIS take a variety of structures, and 
researchers have examined how the structure underpinning QRIS relates to overall 
ratings. Using a hypothetical QRIS model with sample data, researchers found that 
the distribution of ratings is significantly related to the structure. For example, the 
researchers found that fewer than 20 percent of programs achieved a rating of 3 or 4 
(the highest rating) in a block structure, but over 70 percent of programs achieved a 
rating of 3 or 4 in a points or hybrid structure (Tout, Chien, Rothenber, & Li, 2014). 
Other researchers used California’s QRIS data to run simulations and found that the 
distribution of rating levels varies by rating approach (American Institutes for 
Research & RAND, 2015). Similarly, researchers found that when Michigan made a 
change to its QRIS rating calculation, approximately one-third of programs had a 
higher self-assessment rating under the new version (Michigan’s QRIS is comprised 
of a self-assessment and an independent observation) (Faria, Hawkinson, Greenberg, 
Howard, & Brown, 2015). 
Most research on QRIS focuses on validating the systems and determining 
whether higher-rated programs are, in fact, of better quality and whether those 
programs produce better outcomes for children. In a review of 14 QRIS validation 





found that the studies provided evidence that the ratings in QRIS captured meaningful 
differences in program quality, program quality increased over time (though the 
studies could not attribute the improvement to the existence of the QRIS), and QRIS 
ratings, generally, were not associated with developmental gains for children.  
Tout et al. (2017) synthesized 10 validation studies, conducted between 2014 
and 2017 using RTT-ELC funds, and found similar findings to Karoly (2014). 
Specifically, in the nine validation studies that examined the relationship between 
QRIS rating and observed quality, programs with higher QRIS ratings tended to be 
rated higher on independent observations, though differences were small, and not 
significant on all measures that states used. Seven validation studies (not Maryland’s) 
analyzed whether QRIS ratings were associated with outcome measures of child 
development. Given the research on the role that QRIS structures play in ratings, it is 
not surprising that results were not consistent across states and measures. However, 
results tended to find associations between QRIS and child development. The 
social/emotional domain produced the most positive associations with QRIS score. 
However, Tout et al. noted that none of the states’ validation studies had large enough 
sample sizes across all possible ratings, indicating that small sample sizes may have 
contributed to the inability to detect differences between rating levels. Findings that 
improved quality may not lead to improved child outcomes echoes Flodgren et al.’s 
(2011) findings that health care incentives did not improve patient outcomes.  
Maryland’s validation study of EXCELS examined whether programs with 
higher EXCELS ratings demonstrated higher quality on a variety of observation tools, 





Environment Rating Scale-Revised (ECERS-R), and Family Child Care Environment 
Rating Scale-Revised (FCCERS-R). The study found that the CLASS did not 
differentiate among Maryland EXCELS levels. Specifically, programs rated at all 
EXCELS levels scored similarly well on the CLASS negative climate, emotional 
support, and classroom organization factors and scored similarly poorly on 
instructional support. Fewer than half of the Environmental Rating Scale (ERS) 
subscales differentiated among Maryland EXCELS levels. Due to the lack of 
differentiation, the authors of the validation study recommended that MSDE consider 
collapsing Maryland EXCELS levels four and five into one level. Unlike the 
validation studies mentioned above, Maryland’s validation study did not examine the 
association between EXCELS ratings and child outcomes (Swanson et al., 2017).  
Parental Search for Child Care 
 QRIS are 4- or 5-level rating systems that are, by design, easy for parents to 
understand. If parents cared about “quality” and believed that the QRIS properly rated 
quality, one would expect that parents would use QRIS in making determinations 
about child care. However, research shows that parents choose their child care 
provider for a wide variety of reasons, only one of which is “quality.” The nationally 
representative 2012 National Household Education Survey of Early Childhood 
Program Participation (ECPP) of parents of children not yet in kindergarten found 
that, among parents who tried to find child care, the following factors most often 
rated as “very important” when selecting care arrangements: reliability (88 percent of 
respondents), learning activities (81 percent), time with other children (71 percent) 





children in care group (46 percent of respondents said this was “very important”), 
cost (49 percent), and location (59 percent). With the exception of “reliability,” 
parents who were below the poverty threshold rated each factor about 10–15 
percentage points higher than their peers above the poverty threshold. Parents in 
poverty most often rated learning activities as very important (92 percent, compared 
with 78 percent for their peers) and least often rated number of children in care group 
as important (54 percent compared to 45 percent) (Mamedova & Redford, 2015).  
The 2012 ECPP results indicate that parents value a number of factors when 
deciding on a program, and quality (e.g., “learning activities”) is only one of many 
factors—especially for parents in poverty. In fact, a latent class and multinomial 
logistic regression analysis of the 2005 round of the ECPP identified four classes of 
parents based on their scores on seven indicators of child care priority: (1) rank all 
seven indicators as very important (35 percent), (2) emphasize learning and quality-
focused factors (37 percent), (3) prioritize practicality factors (18 percent), and (4) do 
not rank any indicators as highly important (Kim & Fram, 2009). Further, the study 
found that, after controlling for socio-demographic factors, parents that emphasized 
learning factors were more likely to choose a child care center, while parents that 
emphasized practicality factors were more likely to choose family child care or friend 
and neighbor care. 
The 2012 National Survey of Early Care and Education (NSECE) found that 
almost two-thirds of parents who searched for care considered more than one 
program. Over half of these parents used friends and family as a source of 





community service or resource and referral list (15 percent) or the yellow pages, 
newspapers or bulletin boards (14 percent). When choosing care, around thirty 
percent of parents of preschool children considered the type of care (35 percent), fees 
charged (33 percent), content of the program (31 percent), and hours of care (29 
percent); only 6 percent of parents considered the licensing status of the programs 
(NSECE Project Team, 2014a). Findings from the NSECE indicate that parents 
considered many factors when choosing care and their primary mode to collect 
information on care was through friends and family. 
Studies in Minnesota and Indiana have similar findings to the national studies. 
The Minnesota study found that parents of children in QRIS-rated programs most 
frequently learned about the program from a relative, friend, coworker, or neighbor 
(one-third of respondents). Twenty-eight percent of parents reported their primary 
reason for choosing their child care program was that the program was of high-quality 
and 15 percent reported their primary reason was that the program was close to home 
(Tout et al., 2011). The Indiana study found that around 90 percent of parents with 
children ages 0 to 6 reported that the level of trust (92 percent) and the level of 
comfort (89 percent) with the child care program was very important when choosing 
a program. Only one-third of parents reported it was important that the program was 
close to home. Additionally, two-thirds of parents reported that the QRIS rating 
would be “important” or “very important” when making future care decisions and 
about half of the parents reported they would be willing to pay more for a higher-





Despite Indiana parents reporting that a QRIS rating would be important in 
their decision-making process, in practice, parents tended not to choose programs 
with QRIS ratings. A recent experiment in Indiana tested whether parents on the 
CCDF waitlist would be more likely to use a QRIS-rated program if they were (a) 
provided with a redesigned packet and individualized child care referrals or (b) 
received the same packet as in (a), but also received a personal phone call. The 
experiment found that the brochure, alone, did not increase the overall percentage of 
families who chose a QRIS-rated program, though the packet and the personal call 
increased the percentage of families who chose a QRIS-rated program by 2.1 
percentage points (a 17 percent increase) (Dechausay & Anzelone, 2016). 
A study in North Carolina found that providers experienced reduced 
enrollments three to five years after receiving a lower quality rating on the ERS, a 
component that factors into a provider’s QRIS rating. The authors interpreted this 
result to mean that parents were less willing to enroll children with providers that 
received a lower ERS rating and, likely, had a lower QRIS rating (Bassok, Dee, & 
Latham, 2017).  
Taken together, the literature indicates that the quality of care (e.g., the 
content of a program or its learning activities) matters to parents, but parents also care 
about other factors when making their choice of care. Additionally, parents often rely 
on friends and family as their primary source of information about programs. With 
the exception of Bassok, Dee, and Latham (2017), research indicates that the demand 
side of the QRIS logic model is not working as theory predicted and parents are not, 





care will only be improved through the supply side of the QRIS logic model: state 
support and tiered reimbursements.  
Child Care Tiered Reimbursement Systems 
Despite researchers noting the importance of studying the relationship 
between a state’s tiered reimbursement system and the quality of care for children 
receiving subsidies, including how the relationship may differ by provider type (e.g., 
Adams, Snyder, & Tout, 2003; Blau, 2007; Forry, Daneri, & Howarth, 2013; Rigby et 
al., 2007), there is little published research analyzing this question. Greenberg et al. 
(2018) used regression models to analyze whether state subsidy payment rates and 
provider-friendly policies that increased the level and stability of funding and reduced 
administrative costs were associated with increased provider quality. Two of the 
policies analyzed were each state’s use of a tiered reimbursement system and the 
differences between reimbursement rates in the lowest and highest tiers. The authors 
ran separate models for child care centers and family child care providers and 
analyzed whether policies were associated with an increased quality rating, as 
measured by a state’s QRIS, national accreditation bodies, and child care resource 
and referral agencies. Policy data were from 2012 HHS administrative data and 
quality data where from the 2012 NSECE. The authors found that a center simply 
residing in a state with a tiered reimbursement system was not associated with a 
quality rating, but a $100 difference between payments in the lowest and highest tiers 
of a tiered reimbursement was associated with 63 percent higher likelihood of centers 
earning a quality rating. Results were similar for family child care providers, though 





highest tiers was associated with a tripling of the likelihood of earning a quality 
rating. Cannon et al. (2017) recommended that states adequately invest in tiered 
reimbursement systems to ensure that the incremental reimbursement tied to each 
rating level covers the cost of higher quality care. Given the dearth of research on 
tiered reimbursement systems, states would also need to invest in evaluations to 
understand whether their tiered reimbursement system is appropriately funded. 
In 2000, before it was common for states to have tiered reimbursement 
systems, 18 states (not Maryland) offered higher child care subsidy reimbursement 
rates for child care providers that were nationally accredited. The rate differential 
ranged from 5 to 20 percent across states. A study that examined data from child care 
centers in 10 states that applied for accreditation from the National Association for 
the Education of Young Children (NAEYC) found mixed results (positive or null) for 
whether the introduction of the differential reimbursement rates resulted in an 
increase in the number of centers applying for accreditation. The authors note that 
sometimes financial incentives were not enough on their own and many of the states 
offered workshops and on-site support to help with the accreditation process 
(Gormley & Lucas, 2000). Another study that included interviews with a small 
sample of providers indicated that the cost of advancing in a tiered reimbursement 
system may not be worth the extra payment (Adams et al., 2003). 
Incentive Systems 
 There is a deep literature base on performance incentives, and this short 
review will focus on whether incentive systems, in general, and performance based 





performance, whether incentives crowd out intrinsic motivation, and what size 
incentives produce the desired outcomes. In general, incentive systems have been 
found to improve the measured performance (Cameron, Banko, & Pierce, 2001; Shaw 
& Gupta, 2015; Strechter et al., 2010). For example, a RAND study of nine PBAS—
one of which was QRIS—found that “under the right circumstances, a PBAS can be 
an effective strategy for improving the delivery of services to the public” (Strechter et 
al., 2010, p. xviii). The “right circumstances” include a widely held goal, measures 
that are unambiguous, measures that organizations have control over, meaningful 
incentives, and support for improvement. In contrast, Strechter et al. (2010) found 
that potential pitfalls to successful PBAS include unrealistic timelines and failure to 
communicate the incentive system to those involved. Strechter et al. also note that 
incentives, as opposed to sanctions, are more commonly used when participation in a 
PBAS in voluntary. 
 While there is some research that incentives could crowd out intrinsic 
motivation, in general, research syntheses have found that incentives do not hurt 
intrinsic motivation (Cameron, Banko, & Pierce, 2001; Shaw & Gupta, 2015). In 
addition to the general findings across incentive systems, Cameron, Banko, and 
Pierce (2001) found that when rewards are offered for meeting or surpassing a score 
on a task of high interest, there was a positive effect on task interest. The authors 
hypothesized that, “one possible explanation for the positive effect of this type of 
reward contingency is that rewards signify competence, self-efficacy, or ability at the 
task, and people enjoy doing activities that reflect their competence” (p. 23). James 





“controlling,” one’s intrinsic motivation could be crowded out by the incentive. 
James showed that if incentives are too large or if the intrinsic motivation is also the 
source of the incentive (e.g., an agent is intrinsically motivated to act in the interest of 
the principal, who then introduces incentives), the incentive system could be seen as 
“controlling.” The model also showed that the higher one’s intrinsic motivation, the 
harder it is for an incentive system to crowd out one’s intrinsic motivation. As many 
child care providers may be intrinsically motivated to provide quality care to young 
children, these finding indicate that it is unlikely that their intrinsic motivation to 
provide quality care would be crowded out by the tiered reimbursement system. In 
fact, if they wanted to be viewed as competent, highly-skilled child care providers, 
the tiered reimbursement system gives the opportunity to be viewed as such. 
 While incentives that are too large could crowd out intrinsic motivation, 
literature on performance payments for individuals in large organizations found that 
pay increases need be at least 5 percent to achieve positive behavior responses (Mitra, 
Tenhiala, & Shaw, 2016). Further, Strechter et al. (2010) note that the size of the 
incentive in a PBAS is important, as it needs to be large enough to support the effort 
involved with meeting the desired performance, but not so large that the incentive 
outweighs the value obtained from the desired performance. These guidelines are 
rather wide, and my research on tiered reimbursements will add to the literature on 






Education Incentives and Parental Choice in K–12 Education 
 While there is little research on monetary incentives for the early care and 
education field, incentives have been more widely studied in the K–12 education 
field, including “stick” incentives such as school accountability and “carrot” 
incentives such as additional payments to teachers who become National Board 
certified. After discussing research on a small number of the K–12 incentives, this 
section discusses the research on how parents choose a school for their child. Just as 
policy-makers hope that parents use QRIS ratings to make child care decisions, 
policy-makers hope that parents use school report cards to make schooling decisions.  
Incentives 
Federal and state governments provide a wide range of incentives to the 
education field, ranging from school accountability (e.g., if a school does not perform 
well, the state will intervene) to teacher incentives (e.g., pay a teacher more to work 
in a hard-to-staff school or subject, pay more to become National Board certified, or 
offer bonus payments based on a teacher evaluation system) to student incentives 
(e.g., pay students for grades). When analyzing whether the incentive system 
“worked,” researchers and policy makers are interested in whether the system resulted 
in the intended behavior (e.g., better schools, as measured through test scores; better 
qualified teachers; or higher student grades) and whether there were unintended 
negative consequences.  
Unintended negative consequences could take a variety of forms. For instance, 
under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), as amended by the No 





Progress (AYP; predominately based on falling short on math or reading tests) for 
two consecutive years had a number of consequences befall them. A study of 
Wisconsin schools that failed to meet AYP due to performance in a specific subject 
(i.e., math or reading) showed strong improvement in that subject the following year, 
though no positive effect in the other subject the following year. While this result 
showed that schools responded appropriately to the incentive (i.e., focus on the 
subject in which you performed poorly), a policy-maker would likely have preferred 
that the school work (close to) equally hard on both subjects. Also against the likely 
wishes of policy-makers, the study found evidence that the schools focused on 
marginal students around the cutoffs in subject areas (Chakrabarti, 2014). The AYP 
accountability system is a classic example of “what gets measured, gets done.” 
At the individual level, some states or school districts provide incentives to 
K–12 teachers that are National Board certified. A study of a policy in Washington 
that awarded bonuses to National Board-certified teachers in high-poverty schools 
found that the policy increased the percentage of such teachers in high-poverty 
schools by about 4 to 8 percent for the first five years (Cowan & Goldhaber, 2018). 
However, as can happen when paying for “inputs,” the policy did not result in 
increased student test scores. Thus, the incentive increased the desired input, but the 
policy-makers’ likely overall goal was not attained. 
 A study of financial incentives for students found that paying second grade 
students to read books significantly increased the reading achievement for English-
speaking students. However, the study also found that monetary incentives for good 





did not improve student outcomes. The author speculated the mixed results could be 
do the immediate reward for an input (i.e., reading a book) as opposed to needing to 
study over a number of weeks to receive a reward for an output (i.e., assessment or 
grades) (Fryer, 2011). While some scholars worry that providing children with 
monetary incentives for school work may harm intrinsic motivation (e.g., Bowles, 
2016; Kohn, 1996), Fryer and Allan (2011) contend that their research did not show a 
loss of motivation, though there was same fade-out of the effects of the second grade 
reading program one year after it ended. Fryer and Allan also advised that, for 
incentive programs to work, “don’t be cheap” (p. 20). 
Parental Choice 
 The ESEA, as amended by NCLB, included accountability provisions that 
allowed students to transfer to a higher performing school (in the same school 
district) if they attended a school that did not make AYP on reading or mathematics 
tests for two consecutive years. In 2006–07, almost 7 million students were eligible to 
transfer schools, yet only one percent of students did so. One reason for the low 
transfer rate was that parents were unaware of their choice, despite districts having 
notified parents: In a sample of parents in eight urban districts, only 20 percent of 
parents of students eligible to transfer schools indicated they had been notified of the 
option (U.S. Department of Education, 2009).  
Even when aware of the choice to change schools, a parent cannot make an 
informed choice about her child’s school if she cannot find or understand schools’ 
accountability data. Since the 2001 authorization of the ESEA, states and districts 





standardized test scores, graduation rates, school safety data) for every school. 
Almost a decade after states and districts were required to issue report cards, a study 
found that parents did not find the report cards easy to understand (Garcia, 2011). A 
2018 survey found that over 40 percent of parents had not looked for school or 
district reports cards in the past 12 months. Of those, 40 percent were not aware the 
resources existed and about one-third did not where to find the report cards. The 
report went on to say that, in 2017, many report cards were written at a reading level 
requiring some college to understand; only nine states translated their report cards 
into a language other than English (Data Quality Campaign, 2018a).  
The ESEA requires certain data elements to be present on school report cards, 
but states have discretion in how the data are reported. A 2018 survey found that 
parents reported that a school’s overall performance rating, like an A–F letter grade, 
helps them make decisions related to their child’s education (Data Quality Campaign, 
2018b). A recent randomized controlled trial presented hypothetical school data in a 
variety of formats to parents to understand how the depth and organization of 
information was related to parents’ understanding of the information, the satisfaction 
with the data display, and the (hypothetical) elementary school choice parents made 
for their child. The results indicated that parents chose academically higher-
performing schools if the schools were sorted by academic performance, used A–F 
icons, or used simpler displays with less information (Glazerman et al., 2018). 
Similarly, a study in Charlotte-Mecklenburg found that parents were more likely to 
choose a school with higher tests scores when presented only with information on 





admission (Hastings, Van Weelden, & Weinstein, 2007). The authors concluded that 
the effect was due to lowered information costs. This research indicates that parents 
need easy-to-understand information and an overall performance rating helps that 
with their understanding. A QRIS, with its summative start or check rating system, 
should be easy for parents to understand.  
 There is also research from the K–12 literature that finds that academic quality 
or report card data is only one factor that parents use when choosing a school. For 
example, Olsen and Hendry (2012) conducted a one-year case study that included 
interviews with parents and participant observation at a foreign language immersion 
magnet school in Baton Rouge, Louisiana to understand the school choice process. 
The authors concluded that parents did not make objective, data-driven decisions 
about schools. Rather, parents obtained information from a wide range of informal 
networks and sought to understand the school’s curriculum and the degree of student 
diversity. Similarly, a 2017 survey of black and Latino parents found that, in addition 
to a child’s report card, over 60 percent of parents thought that teachers’ and other 
parents’ opinions of the school was a “very important” piece of information in 
determining if the school was effectively education their child (Leadership 
Conference Education Fund, 2017). 
Health Care Ratings, Patient Choice, and Incentives 
The health care market has standard metrics (e.g., hospitals’ mortality rates 
and readmission rates) that, if made public, could allow patients to choose care based 
on quality of outcomes. In theory, consumers will select higher quality care, health 





will be more high-quality health care. In support of theory, Pope (2009) found that as 
hospitals increased their rank in the US News and World Report hospital rankings, 
hospitals experienced an increase in non-emergency, Medicare patient volume. A 
study in the Netherlands found that angioplasty patients were more likely to choose 
higher-rated hospitals based on a variety of measures available on a single website 
(Varkevisser, van der Geest, & Schut, 2012). These two studies indicate that patients 
consider quality when choosing a hospital and a study in England found that a 
hospital’s quality was positively associated with the quality of its rivals for about half 
of 16 quality measures (there were no significant negative associations) (Gravelle, 
Santos, & Siciliani, 2014). This last finding indicates that hospitals are competing 
with each other.  
In addition to evidence that consumers choose hospitals based on quality, 
there is evidence that consumers choose health plans based on quality ratings. For 
example, a study of ratings disseminated by the National Committee for Quality 
Assurance to employees choosing a health plan found that the ratings had a 
meaningful influence on employees’ choices, particularly for individuals choosing a 
plan for a first time (Jin & Sorensen, 2005). Similarly, a study of HMO report cards 
in 1999 and 2000 to 40 million Medicare enrollees found that consumers used both 
the report cards and market-based sources when choosing an HMO (Dafny & 
Dranove, 2008).  
 While it appears that patients may be “demanding” high-quality health care, 
policy makers have tried to increase the “supply” of high-quality care through 





majority of the studies found partial or positive effects of financial incentives on 
measures of quality (Peterson et al., 2006). Similarly, a Cochrane Collaboration 
systematic review found that financial incentives generally improved aspects of care, 
but there was little evidence for improved patient outcomes (Flodgren et al., 2011). 
After reviewing the evidence on incentives and describing new incentives under the 
Affordable Care Act, Doran, Maurer, and Ryan (2017) note that it will be crucial to 
continue improving the design of incentive programs. 
 Taken together, the research on health care markets indicates that patients use 
available metrics when choosing their health program, programs are aware of this and 
compete with one another on metrics, incentives tend to increase the quality of care, 
but incentives may not improve patient outcomes. There are multiple reasons to 
suspect, though, that the health care market and the child care market are quite 
different from one another. One reason that people may value ratings more for health 
care than ratings for child care is the potentially severe and immediate consequences 
to choosing a lower-quality health care program (e.g., death or longer 
hospitalizations). Families could choose a lower-quality child care provider, realize 
their “error” by observing their child in the provider’s care, and move the child to a 
new provider before lasting damage was caused to their child. As noted below, 
families choose care, in part, for convenience factors, because they will have to use 
this care arrangement multiple times per week for months. Patients do not frequent 
health care programs with this regularity, so convenience is less of a factor (of course, 
convenience is a key factor for emergency procedures). Because needing child care is 





child care recommendations. Medical needs are often more personalized and a patient 
may not have friends or family with their same medical condition from whom to seek 
advice, thus heightening the importance of independent rating systems. 
Summary 
 The research reviewed in this chapter makes clear the importance of providing 
high-quality care to disadvantaged children and that QRIS are improving providers’ 
quality of care. While QRIS are improving the quality of care, research tends to 
indicate that the demand side of the QRIS logic model is not working as theory 
predicted and parents are not, in fact, demanding high-quality care. If parents are not 
demanding high-quality care, care will only be improved through the supply side of 
the QRIS logic model: state support and tiered reimbursements, and there is very 
limited research on tiered reimbursement systems. However, there is a deep literature 
base on performance incentives, including in the health care field, which leads one to 
be optimistic as to the effect of a tiered reimbursement system on improving quality 
of care. Importantly, literature on intrinsic motivation indicates that child care 
providers’ intrinsic motivation to provide quality care would not be crowded out by 
the tiered reimbursement system. And, if a provider wanted to be viewed as 
competent and highly-skilled, the tiered reimbursement system gives the opportunity 






Chapter 3: Key Features of Maryland EXCELS and 
Maryland’s Tiered Reimbursement System 
This chapter describes the key features of Maryland’s QRIS, called Maryland 
EXCELS and Maryland’s tiered reimbursement system. Descriptions of Maryland 
EXCELS, particularly the technical assistance available to the providers, were 
informed by interviews with three MSDE officials and seven technical assistance 
providers covering each of the counties included in my qualitative analysis. 
Maryland EXCELS 
Between 2009 and 2011, MSDE’s Division of Early Childhood Development 
worked with experts to develop Maryland EXCELS, a QRIS for child care centers 
and family child care providers. Maryland EXCELS contains standards that cover 
five core “disciplines”: Licensing and Compliance (3 standards), Staff Qualifications 
and Professional Development (1 standard), Accreditation and Rating Scales (3 
standards), Developmentally Appropriate Learning and Practice (9 standards), and 
Administrative Policies and Practices (15 standards).4 Requirements to meet each 
standard increase for each of the five EXCELS levels. A provider’s ratings on each of 
the five disciplines are available to the public on the Maryland EXCELS website, 
though a provider’s overall rating is equal to the lowest of its individual ratings. 
Recall that about 44 percent of QRIS are block systems, like Maryland EXCELS. 
While there are fewer standards in the first three disciplines than the last two, 
there are some key features of the first three disciplines that are important to note. A 
                                                 
4 Standards for child care centers, family child care providers, and school-age only centers are 
available at https://www.marylandexcels.org/commitment-to-quality/maryland-excels-standards/. 






provider will receive a rating of 1 in Licensing and Compliance (and for their overall 
rating) if the provider has more than one inspection in the last 12 months with 
findings of non-compliance in Injurious Treatment; Child Protection; Supervision; or 
Capacity, Group Size, and Staffing. Once 12 months has passed from the non-
compliant inspection, the provider can re-publish its EXCELS ratings. The Staff 
Qualifications and Professional Development standard requires that, beginning at 
level 2, 60 percent of lead staff hold certain credentials, with the type of credential 
(tied to training, formal education, and experience) increasing at each level.5 Finally, 
Accreditation and Rating Scales standards require that a level 4 provider complete an 
accreditation self-study and request a validation visit from an accreditor. Only fully 
accredited providers may be rated level 5 in Accreditation and Rating Scales. 
Participation Requirements 
 One of the requirements of the four-year $50 million RTT-ELC grant that 
MSDE received in 2012 was to create a timeline for ensuring children of high needs 
were receiving high-quality care. According to an MSDE official, a small group of 
stakeholders, including presidents of child care associations, discussed what “high-
quality” meant and what was a reasonable timeline to ensure kids were enrolled in 
high-quality care. One MSDE official explained that it was important to require that 
children receiving CCSP subsidies attend a provider that is committed to quality. 
While being enrolled in EXCELS does not guarantee a provider’s commitment to 
quality, providers do have to meet standards that go beyond licensing and 
                                                 
5 MSDE issues Maryland Child Care Staff Credentials for seven different levels (1–4, 4+, 5–6). An 





compliance. The MSDE official felt the requirement to be enrolled in a provider 
participating in EXCELS would result in children having a greater chance at 
receiving developmentally appropriate education and being prepared to enter 
kindergarten. The small committee discussed various timelines, some as long as eight 
years, before deciding that it made sense to require providers that received CCSP 
reimbursements be enrolled in Maryland EXCELS almost as soon as the system was 
fully functional. The stakeholders urged the requirement be implemented “sooner, not 
later,” and in 2012 MSDE announced that, beginning on July 1, 2015, providers 
needed to be enrolled in Maryland EXCELS in order to receive a CCSP 
reimbursement for child care services. Louisiana, Maine, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
Washington, and Wisconsin have similar requirements and Nebraska requires that 
providers be enrolled in their QRIS once they serve a significantly large number of 
children who receive subsidies (QRIS Compendium, 2017).  
As Maryland EXCELS went “live” on July 1, 2013, MSDE and its partners 
had two years to ensure that all providers that received CCSP reimbursements—or 
who may want to receive them in the future—were enrolled in Maryland EXCELS 
before the new requirement went into effect on July 1, 2015. Multiple MSDE officials 
and technical assistance providers reported that some providers initially thought 
Maryland EXCELS was “just one more thing to do” and the requirement to be 
enrolled to receive CCSP reimbursements would go away. MSDE’s effort focused on 
“getting everyone in,” and, within a year after launch, over 3,379 providers were 
enrolled in Maryland EXCELS, beating its goal by about 2,000 providers (MSDE, 





official, almost 90 percent of all providers that were receiving subsidies were enrolled 
in EXCELS.  
Once enrolled in Maryland EXCELS, providers have one year to meet 
standards in each discipline (which requires uploading documents to a secure 
website) and “publish” their quality rating on the public EXCELS website. If a 
provider does not publish its rating after one year, MSDE changes the provider’s 
status to “non-participating” in Maryland EXCELS and the provider can no longer 
receive CCSP reimbursements (though if the provider uploaded documents and 
published its rating, it would be in “participating” status again). An MSDE official 
acknowledged that with the focus on enrolling providers in Maryland EXCELS, some 
providers did not “know what they were getting into.” The official explained that 
other states required providers to participate in an orientation prior to enrolling in 
their QRIS. With the July 2015 deadline looming, MSDE did not have that luxury to 
ensure understanding of the entire system. Consequently, numerous providers did not 
understand the process to publish a rating within a year of enrollment and were 
moved to “non-participating” status one year after enrolling in Maryland EXCELS. 
MSDE and their Quality Assurance Specialists (QAS) worked quickly to help these 
providers publish a rating to ensure families in the CCSP did not endure a disruption 
in care. Now, QAS annually remind providers of the need to renew their published 
rating, but some providers will still not publish their rating and be moved to non-
participating status. QAS report that they quickly work with providers who call for 
assistance to move back to participating status, as no one wants care to be disrupted 






Aside from the requirement that providers receiving CCSP reimbursements 
participate in Maryland EXCELS, MSDE also offered one-time bonuses to 
incentivize participation and improved quality. Between July 2013 (when Maryland 
EXCELS began) and December 2015, and again between October 2018 and 
September 2019, MSDE offered increasingly larger one-time bonuses to providers 
upon attainment of EXCELS levels. The amount of the bonus depended on whether 
the provider was a child care center or a family child care provider and the provider’s 
licensed capacity. For example, a family child care provider’s one-time bonus for 
reaching Level 3 was $300 and a center with licensed capacity of over 100 would 
receive $1,200. The bonus for family child care providers was $1,000 for a level 5 
rating and the bonus for a center with a licensed capacity of over 100 was $4,500 (see 
Table 1; Maryland EXCELS, 2014). For the most recent time period, MSDE gave the 
level 5 bonuses to providers that republished at a level 5. In 2014, Maryland was one 
of the 25 states that provided a quality award or bonus (QRIS Compendium, 2017).  

























1 $50 $50 $50 $100 $150 
2 $150 $200 $250 $500 $750 
3 $300 $400 $400 $800 $1,200 
4 $500 $800 $1,000 $2,000 $3,000 
5 $800 $1,000 $1,500 $3,000 $4,500 





As of 2017, 72 percent of Maryland’s licensed child care centers participated 
in EXCELS and 40 percent of licensed family child care providers participated. 
Twelve state QRIS had higher participation rates for licensed child care centers and 
14 state QRIS had higher participation rates for licensed family child care providers 
(Tout et al., 2018).  
Technical Assistance 
Maryland helps child care providers improve quality by providing face-to-face 
and online training and technical assistance to improve quality and meet EXCELS 
standards. MSDE supports three types of technical assistance providers: Program 
Coordinators, QAS, and Technical Assistance Specialists employed by regional Child 
Care Resource Centers (CCRCs). In October 2017, Maryland had 28 Program 
Coordinators, whose role is to help providers navigate the EXCELS website, review 
all materials submitted to meet a certain standard, verify or ask for additional 
information, and provide a rating based on submitted material (MSDE, 2017a). 
Beginning in fall 2018, Program Coordinators began to review materials for the 
highest EXCELS level the documents could achieve, instead of only reviewing the 
documents against the EXCELS level standards the provider was aiming to meet. For 
example, even if a provider was trying to move from a level 2 to a level 3 (and did not 
have staffing levels necessary to move to a level 4 or level 5), Program Coordinators 
would review parent handbooks and staff handbooks to see whether the materials met 
level 4 or level 5 standards. A QAS reported she was excited to see how providers 






In May 2018, Maryland supported 15 QAS, each assigned to specific 
jurisdictions (MSDE, 2018a). According to interviewed QAS, their role is to provide 
training on how, specifically, providers can meet EXCELS standards. QAS provide 
this training though monthly workgroups and one-on-one telephone or in-person (i.e., 
“house call”) support. Interviewed QAS tended to provide stories and share 
experiences about working with family child care providers—which all QAS felt 
needed more assistance and “hand-holding” than centers. Some family providers do 
not have access to computers, scanners, or high-speed internet, making the monthly 
workgroups especially important. One QAS relayed a story about a family provider 
who wrote out all answers by hand and the QAS would type and scan materials for 
the provider. 
While technological challenges were relatively easy to overcome, QAS 
reported that they needed to build trust with the family providers and “if you go 
negative on them, they shut down.” Multiple QAS shared examples of building trust 
by discussing EXCELS standards for discipline policies. Family providers—who may 
not have had a written discipline policy—would struggle to write a policy to level 1 
EXCELS standards. QAS provided examples of good discipline policies and asked 
the providers what they currently do when a child acts out. A QAS reported that she 
tries “to get them to the aha moment by asking them questions….Tell them, ‘you 
know how to do this.…Answer the question like you would on a tour. Write it down. 
That’s your words and it is meaningful to you and you can speak to it.’” In describing 
how QAS begin the conversations with providers, QAS used supportive and 





you,” and “I am going to be [your] biggest cheerleader and I am going to explain this 
to you, so you are not sitting by yourself in your house staring at a computer screen 
and not having a clue about what to do.” 
Using some of its CCDF funds, MSDE contracts with the Maryland Family 
Network (MFN) to administer the Maryland Child Care Resource Network 
(MCCRN), which consists of a centralized child care referral service plus 12 
statewide regional offices. MCCRN provides training to child care providers and the 
child care workforce to help them improve the quality of care they provide. Trainings 
and workshops are offered in-person and on-line. Annually, about 28,000 individuals 
(not an unduplicated count) attend in-person trainings and workshops and individuals 
complete 3,000 on-line workshops (Maryland Family Network, 2018). Among other 
topics, trainings cover all licensing requirements, learning domains that support 
kindergarten readiness, caring for children with disabilities, behavioral concerns, and 
serving high-need children, such as those who parents are deployed or incarcerated. 
MCCRN, through its local CCRCs, provide one-on-one technical assistance to 
help providers use research-based practices that will improve the quality of child care. 
According to interviewees, CCRC technical assistance often included spending many 
hours with a provider (often a family child care provider) to help them understand and 
implement research-based practices. Such training is “intimate” in that the provider 
spends time in the provider’s home, understanding their program, modeling research-
based practices, and helping the provider implement the practices. The goal of such 
technical assistance is to have the provider sustain the practice and not need further 





1,000 technical assistance cases (i.e., a series of quality improvement activities with a 
single provider) (Maryland Family Network, 2018). 
Interviewees reported that QAS and CCRC staff try to coordinate technical 
assistance and have the CCRC technical assistance providers help improve quality 
and the QAS focus on how to document that quality to meet EXCELS standards. 
While the technical assistance provided by CCRCs is not solely focused on meeting 
EXCELS quality standards, the technical assistance providers are aware of EXCELS 
standards. And, to the extent that QAS are providing models of discipline or inclusion 
policies and contracts to providers, they are providing similar information that a 
CCRC technical assistance provider may provide. EXCELS recently developed its 
own trainings on discipline and inclusion, and how to meet EXCELS standards in 
these areas. Despite coordination among the technical assistance providers, a CCRC 
official was aware of a few instances in which a provider would receive assistance on 
the same issue from a QAS, a CCRC technical assistant, as well as a Program 
Coordinator. Given the limited resources to serve over 8,500 providers—almost 4,400 
of which participated in EXCELS in January 2018—interviewees acknowledged a 
need to continue to better coordinate support. 
Monitoring  
Another role of a QAS is to conduct scheduled monitoring visits to providers 
participating in EXCELS to assess whether the provider is meeting EXCELS 
standards for about 10 observable standards. The QAS use the provider’s uploaded 
materials and observe whether the policies are being implemented as stated; 





their region and submit a report to MSDE. MSDE then shares the report with the 
provider and the provider’s regional QAS. The regional QAS will then help the 
provider create an improvement plan to increase quality. Monitoring visits started in 
2017 with QAS monitoring 25 providers (chosen at random) every other month, 
increasing to 45 providers per cohort the following year.  
Monitoring visits are important because, as multiple interviewees noted, 
EXCELS is a paper-based on-line system. One interviewee noted, “providers can 
write what they want,” and another commented that without monitoring, “it is hard to 
say that a schedule or lesson plan is great and being implemented well.” Additionally, 
an MSDE official noted that a challenge of the EXCELS system—and any QRIS 
system—is getting providers to truly embrace quality improvement. The MSDE 
official stated that, “QRIS is like teaching to the test,” and believed that providers are 
doing wonderful things if they meet standards, but providers should not only focus on 
the measured standards. 
Parent Outreach and Advertising  
The MCCRN also operates LOCATE, a telephone referral service to help 
parents find and evaluate child care. According to an MFN official, a referral 
specialist takes about 20 minutes to ask questions to ascertain the caller’s needs, 
explain different types of child care, provide guidelines for selecting quality care (not 
specifically related to EXCELS), and, then, conduct a search of their database to 
develop a list of five to ten child care providers that fit the caller’s needs. If any of the 
providers are in EXCELS, the referral specialist will then explain EXCELS to the 





credentialing, and EXCELS databases, as well as results from an optional annual 
database questionnaire that asks providers other things that parents may want to know 
when choosing a provider. For example, the questionnaire includes questions on fees, 
hours of operation, the education background of the provider, languages spoken, 
schools near the provider, experience with children with disabilities, whether other 
people live in a home-based provider, or if there are pets in a family child care  
provider’s home. The MFN official stressed that the referral specialists do not make 
recommendations. Annually, LOCATE helps about 4,600 parents seeking child care 
for about 6,500 children (Maryland Family Network, 2018). 
In addition to LOCATE referral specialists telling families who call the 
referral service about EXCELS, MSDE and its QAS are working to help parents 
understand Maryland EXCELS. According to interviewees, MSDE’s marketing and 
outreach campaign has included staffing information booths at county fairs, preschool 
fairs, and health expos; partnering with the Baltimore Orioles and minor league 
baseball teams; advertising on billboards, buses, and radio; and providing window 
stickers and yard signs to EXCELS participants. One QAS related a story of staffing a 
booth at a preschool fair where she offered help to parents who looked “shell-
shocked” from visiting all of the booths. She explained EXCELS to the parents, and 
noted that all of the providers that were wearing red ribbons were participating in 
EXCELS. She advised parents to go and visit a provider to see if it is the right fit, but 
that EXCELS can help parents make this “hard” choice. This same QAS went on to 
explain that MSDE intentionally rolled out EXCELS in two phases (i.e., focus on the 





providers were enrolled in EXCELS and parents could find providers that met their 
needs. However, as will be discussed in more detail in the Results Chapter, 
interviewed center directors thought that very few of the parents at their centers were 
aware of or understood EXCELS. 
Maryland’s Child Care Subsidy Program 
In each month of fiscal year 2016 Maryland served approximately 18,500 
families and 24,600 children through its CCSP, which is how Maryland administers 
the $88 million in federal funds it received though the CCDF (Office of Child Care, 
2018a; Office of Child Care, 2016c). Families may use vouchers to pay for care in a 
licensed child care center, registered family child care home, or informal care (e.g., 
care by a relative, non-relative care in the child’s home, or care provided by a non-
relative in their own home for less than 20 hours a month). In 2016, 3 percent of 
children served by Maryland’s CCSP received care in informal care settings (i.e., the 
child’s home), 34 percent received care in a family child care home, and 63 percent 
received care in a child care center. Compared with the national average, children in 
Maryland were less likely to be in a center: 63 percent of children were served by 
centers in Maryland and 72 percent of children were served by centers across the 
nation (Office of Child Care, 2018b). Note that Maryland requires that any provider 
who serves a single non-relative child be licensed by the state. Some states do not 
require family child care providers to be licensed until they serve four or more 
children (Rigby, Ryan, & Brooks-Gunn, 2007). 
Based on a family’s income, the number of children in child care, the ages of 





(i.e., informal, child care center, or family child care provider), Maryland determines 
the maximum voucher amount and any co-payment that the family must pay the 
provider. A provider may only receive a payment from the state that is equal to (or 
less than) the fee charged to private-pay families. Additionally, providers are allowed 
to charge families for the difference between the total amount of the voucher and co-
pay and the price the provider charges for private-pay families.  
While the CCDF program encourages states to set vouchers at the 75th 
percentile of market rate prices, Maryland decided to serve more children with 
smaller vouchers and its voucher rates were set at the 9th percentile of market rate 
prices from June 2016 to June 2018 (i.e., the rate covers 9 percent of providers; 
MSDE, 2016b). Beginning in July 2018, Maryland increased its payment rate to, at a 
minimum per subsidy payment region, the 20th percentile of market rate prices. In 
Baltimore City, the payment rate is set as high as the 46th percentile of market rate 
prices for infants and toddlers in home-based child care. Additionally, 2018 state 
legislation required that the percentile of subsidy reimbursement, at minimum per 
subsidy payment region, reach the 30th percentile in 2020, the 45th percentile in 2021, 
and the 60th percentile in 2022 (MSDE, 2018b). As an example of what these 
percentiles mean, for a 4-year-old in a center in Baltimore City, the 9th percentile is 
$540 (per month), the 20th percentile is $549, the 45th percentile is $645, the 60th 
percentile is $686, and the 75th percentile is $760 (MSDE, 2017b). Based on the 2017 
market rate survey, by 2022, the difference between Baltimore City’s subsidy rate for 
a 4-year-old in a child care center and the HHS recommended rate would be $74, a 





Maryland’s Tiered Reimbursement System 
Maryland has offered its tiered reimbursement to providers since 2001. 
Beginning on July 1, 2013, the tiered reimbursements were based on Maryland 
EXCELS. Child care centers and family child care providers6 that are rated level 3, 4, 
or 5 receive a certain percentage of additional payment from the state (see Figure 2). 
According to a MSDE official, the tiered payments (called EXCELS payments in 
Maryland) for family child care providers are smaller than for child care centers 
because MSDE expected that money would go further for a family child care 
provider. In Maryland there are no restrictions on what a provider may do with the 
additional money, though MSDE encourages providers to put the money back into the 
program, including by offsetting the cost of child care for families receiving a 
subsidy, providing salary and benefits enhancements to staff, or making quality 
improvements to the program (MSDE, 2013). 
As an example of how the EXCELS payment works, a child care center with a 
rating of 5 would receive an additional 26 percent of the maximum voucher for a 
child 2 years of age or older (provided the total amount does not exceed the fee 
charged to private-pay families). The exact amounts of the tiered payment vary by 
location. In 2016, a center serving a 4-year-old with the highest rating in Prince 
George’s County, Maryland would receive an additional $142,7 or 26 percent more 
than the base rate. This bonus would bring the total payment to $687 per month, 
                                                 
6 Informal care (e.g., care by a relative, non-relative care in the child’s home, or care provided by a 
non-relative in their own home for less than 20 hours a month) is not included in Maryland EXCELS 
and Maryland’s tiered rating system. 
7 The dollar amounts reported are specific to Maryland’s Region W, which includes Ann Arundel, 





which is still 21 percent below the cost to provide care at the 75th percentile ($871) 
(Schulman & Blank, 2016). 
Table 2. Maryland’s Tiered Payment Schedule 
Tiered Payments Maryland EXCELS Level 
  Level 3 Level 4 Level 5 
Family Child Care       
Under 2 years of age 11% 22% 29% 
2 years of age and 
over 
10% 21% 28% 
Child Care Center       
Under 2 years of age 22% 37% 44% 
2 years of age and 
over 
10% 19% 26% 
Source: MSDE (2013). 
 
Unlike some states, Maryland does not provide tiered payments until a 
provider reaches level 3 (as opposed to providing smaller tiered payments to lower-
quality providers, perhaps to incentivize participation in the state’s QRIS). According 
to an MSDE official, at the time this decision was made, MSDE felt that the EXCELS 
level 3 standards were indicative of a provider striving for quality. For providers that 
did not want to proceed on a path to accreditation (which is required as part of the 
levels 4 and 5 EXCELS standards), level 3 indicated a meaningful difference in 
quality from level 2.  
QAS reported that their work used to focus on enrolling providers in EXCELS 
and now it has shifted to focus on improving the quality of providers already in 
EXCELS. One way they are trying to incentivize providers to improve quality is by 
ensuring providers are aware of EXCELS payments. MSDE and QAS send out emails 





workshops or when providing one-on-one technical assistance. However, one QAS 
reported that the outreach is most effective when it is personalized:  
We’ll go into the system and tell them the actual amount [of EXCELS payment 
they could receive]. …‘Do you see that column [on your statement] that says 
EXCLES and there is nothing there? There’s a dollar amount that goes in 
automatically once you publish as a level 3.’ That astounds them. …Until they 
see a dollar amount, it does not connect.  
 
Other QAS noted that the tiered reimbursement system prior to EXCELS did not 
automatically provide tiered payments and some providers may still have bad 
memories of that system. Additionally, MSDE changed to a centralized subsidy 
system in 2013 and some providers did not initially get paid on time. While all of the 
“bumps in the road” with subsidy and tiered payments have been smoothed out, an 
MSDE official acknowledged that they had more work to do to ensure that providers 
are aware that the challenges have been addressed. 
Summary 
 
 Maryland has relatively low subsidy reimbursement rates which likely impede 
providers’ ability to provide high-quality care. In the coming years Maryland intends 
to substantially increase their reimbursement rates. While the rates have remained 
low, Maryland has not stood by idly. To help improve the quality of care, Maryland 
has operated EXCELS for more than five years and, since July 2015, required 
providers that receive CCSP payments participate in EXCELS. To encourage 
participation and improvement in EXCELS, Maryland has offered extensive technical 
assistance to providers, including ensuring providers serving children in the CCSP are 





methodology to study whether Maryland’s tiered reimbursement system works as 






Chapter 4: Research Design, Data Sources, and Methods 
Based on prior research on QRIS and how parents search for child care, I 
assumed that parents were not using Maryland EXCELS to demand higher quality 
care (i.e., a child care provider with a rating of 3 or higher in EXCELS). Therefore, 
child care providers would only be incentivized to improve quality through state 
support and tiered subsidy reimbursements. State support includes training, technical 
assistance, and financial incentives to individual child care workers to improve their 
qualifications. While state support is available to all providers, tiered reimbursements 
are only incentives for providers who serve children receiving child care subsidies. 
Many of the standards in the five EXCELS domains have a fixed cost, regardless of 
the number of children that are served (e.g., working towards accreditation status by 
conducting self-assessments of quality, implementing developmentally appropriate 
curriculum, and implementing high-quality administrative policies). Though the costs 
to meet other standards are not fixed (e.g., the cost of employing higher-quality staff 
will increase as more staff need to be employed and some aspects of developmentally 
appropriate learning activities have per child costs), my hypothesis was that, after 
controlling for provider and zip code demographic characteristics, providers serving a 
higher proportion of children receiving subsidies (i.e., providers with higher “subsidy 
densities”) would be more likely to have an EXCELS rating of level 3 or higher (i.e., 
a rating that would result in a tiered reimbursement and a center being of “higher 
quality”). By serving a higher proportion of children receiving subsidies, providers 
would receive relatively larger increase in their CCSP payments, enabling them to 





Although Maryland’s validation study of EXCELS found that independent 
observation tools did not differentiate among EXCELS ratings, I assumed that the 
goal of MSDE’s tiered child care reimbursement system is to improve the subsidized 
quality of care in Maryland as measured by EXCELS rating. That is, whether or not 
the care in a level 3 provider is demonstrably better than care in a level 2 provider, 
Maryland’s tiered reimbursement system provides an incentive for a level 2 provider 
to improve to a level 3. Therefore, my research analyzed whether the incentive 
encouraged providers to attain a rating that resulted in a tiered reimbursement.  
Research Design 
I conducted a two-stage mixed methods study to answer the research question, 
Does Maryland’s tiered reimbursement system incentivize child care providers to 
attain a rating on Maryland’s QRIS that results in a higher reimbursement rate? In 
the first stage of my research, I conducted multilevel analyses to determine the 
association between centers’ and family child care providers’ reliance on CCSP 
payments and whether the provider had an EXCELS rating of 3 or higher. In the 
second stage of my research, I interviewed child care center directors in five counties 
to understand how they made decisions about which EXCELS rating to attain, how 
tiered reimbursements factored into their decisions, supports they used to improve 
their EXCELS rating, and challenges to improving their EXCELS rating.  
Leech and Onwuegbuzie (2009) define mixed methods research studies as 
those that collect, analyze, and interpret quantitative and qualitative data in a single 
study. My research is a sequential explanatory equal status design, in which I 





my qualitative data collection, analyzed the qualitative data, and, finally, interpreted 
all of the data together (Creswell, Plano Clark, Gutman, & Hanson, 2003). My 
research is an “equal status” design because I did not preference either the 
quantitative or qualitative stages of my study. Rather, I interpreted all of the data 
together to answer my research question.  
Though my quantitative data included all licensed child care providers in 
Maryland—and my regressions included all providers receiving CCSP payments in 
January 2018—the design is not strong enough to make a generalizable causal 
inference on its own. However, when combined with the qualitative analysis, the 
interview data allowed me to “triangulate” my results (Greene, Caracelli, & Graham, 
1989). My interviews enabled me to understand how child care directors considered 
the tiered reimbursements when determining what EXCELS level to attain. A second 
reason for my qualitative research, therefore, was to “expand” upon the quantitative 
results and help me understand why directors chose the EXCELS level they chose—
reasons that may not be directly tied to the tiered reimbursements (Bryman, 2006). 
The results of my qualitative research can be used by another researcher to conduct a 
representative survey to draw more generalizable conclusions about the processes 
underlying improvement among Maryland’s child care providers (Yin, 2009). 
Quantitative Data and Analysis 
 During the first major stage of the study, I solicited data from MSDE, 
identified relevant census-based data, and constructed an analytic strategy for 





hypothesis, including a set of models that would allow me to test the robustness of my 
results to different model specifications.  
Quantitative Data Sources 
 MSDE provided me with administrative data for all providers that were 
licensed by MSDE’s Division of Early Childhood in January 2018. For all licensed 
providers, I received data on their address, county, and year first licensed. For all 
licensed providers, for each of July 2013, January and July 2014, January and July 
2015, January and July 2016, January and July 2017, and January 2018, I received 
licensed capacity (by five age groups), EXCELS participation, overall EXCELS 
rating, EXCELS rating by domain, number of children using the CCSP (by under 2 
and age 2 and over), subsidy payments (dollar value; by under 2 and age 2 and over), 
and EXCELS payments (dollar value; by under 2 and age 2 and over). Though MSDE 
provided me with five categories for licensed capacity, in my analyses I combined the 
first two (6 weeks–17 months and 18–23 months) and last three (2–5 years, 5–15 
years, and 16+), to represent the age groups with different EXCELS payments. To 
create the covariate licensed slots/children under 5, for each zip code I totaled the 
number of licensed slots in the first three categories (i.e., 6 weeks–5 years, not yet in 
kindergarten) and divided it by the number of children under age 5 living in the zip 
code. This variable over-represented the number of slots/child, as the numerator 
included slots licensed for 5-year-old children still in preschool, but the denominator 
does not include children aged 5. I created a dummy variable for school-age only 
providers (i.e., before and after school providers), by identifying providers that were 





the auspice of the providers (i.e., for-profit, non-profit, or government-run), nor could 
it identify which providers were Head Start grantees. Table 3 contains the data 
sources for my zip code covariates, mostly from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2016 
American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year estimates.  
Table 3 
Zip Code Covariates and Census Data Tables  
Zip Code Covariates Data Table 
Count and percent of the population that is 
under 5, 5–9, and 10–14 
3 variables 
Table S0101 
Percent of the population that is under 5 and 
in poverty within the previous 12 months 
Table S1701 
 
Percent of the population birth to 14 that is 
white, black, Asian, and Hispanic 
4 variables 
Tables B01001B; D; H; I 




Percent of females ages 20 to 64, with 
children under age 6 in labor force 
Table S2301 
 
Unemployment rate Table S2301 
Percent of population in urban area (v. rural 
area) 
2010 U.S. Census Table P2 
Note. Unless specified, all data tables are from the 2016 ACS 5-year estimates. 
 
Regression Analyses 
To quantitatively test my hypothesis that tiered reimbursements incentivize 
providers to reach EXCELS level 3, I conducted two-level logistic regressions, with 
providers (level 1) nested within counties (level 2), separately for child care centers 
and family child care providers. It is necessary to nest providers within counties to 
account for the unobserved county-level characteristics that affect quality outcomes 
(e.g., counties in Maryland have different MSDE-funded technical assistance contacts 
and counties have different cost-of-living-adjusted CCSP reimbursement rates). The 





provider i in county j had an EXCELS rating of level 3 or higher, the independent 
(continuous) variable (𝑋1) is a provider’s subsidy density, and a host of provider and 
location (i.e., demographic characteristics of zip codes) covariates controlled for 
observed differences between providers. My use of zip codes as a provider’s 
“community” or “service area” was consistent with similar analyses by Bassok and 
Gaslo (2016) and Hatfield et al. (2015). The models below were informed by 
discussions I had with staff from the MSDE to better understand how the CCSP and 
EXCELS operates. 
The independent variable of interest is the percentage of children a provider 
serves that receive a subsidy and my analysis is restricted to providers with subsidy 
density greater than 0 in January 2018. As providers that do not receive CCSP funds 
are not required to participate in EXCELS, those that chose to participate in EXCELS 
may be quite different than providers that do not participate in EXCELS, as well as 
different from providers that serve children in the CCSP. Subsidy density is defined 
as the percentage of licensed slots filled by children in the CCSP. For most providers, 
this study’s definition of subsidy density is likely lower than if the variable could 
have been calculated with a denominator of enrollment. For 21 child care centers and 
230 family child care providers, my definition of CCSP density is over 1.0 and 
certainly higher than if the variable could have been calculated with a denominator of 
enrollment.8 A provider could enroll more children than its licensed capacity if all 
children are not attending for five full days each week (e.g., some children may attend 
on Monday and Wednesday and another group of children may attend on Tuesday 
                                                 





and Thursday). However, MSDE does not collect data on enrollment, so licensed 
slots is the best available option to use as a denominator to create the subsidy density 
variable. I also created subsidy density variables for January 2018 for the two age 
categories with differing tiered reimbursement rates: younger than 2 years and 2 years 
and older.  
It is necessary to conduct analyses separately for child care centers and family 
child care providers because provider types have very different business models and 
the tiered reimbursement rates are structured differently for the provider types (see 
Table 2). Because tiered reimbursements are larger for child care centers, I 
hypothesized that child care centers would be more sensitive to the incentives than 
family child care providers. Tiered subsidies are over twice as large for child care 
centers serving children under 2 compared with children age 2 and over (22 percent 
tiered reimbursement compared with a 10 percent tiered reimbursement for EXCELS 
level 3 centers), so I hypothesized that centers serving higher proportions of children 
under 2 will be more incentivized to improve quality.  
The basic model (1) is a two-level model that nests providers in counties and 
does not include any covariates. Model (2) is a two-level model and includes provider 
covariates (i.e., year first licensed, time enrolled in EXCELS, licensed capacity by 
age group, and a dummy for a school-age only provider; 𝑿2). It is necessary to 
control for when a provider is first licensed and the time enrolled in EXCELS as it 
takes time to progress through EXCELS. For example, a newly-licensed provider that 
just enrolled in EXCELS would need time to complete all of the paperwork and ERS 





programs have slightly different EXCELS standards and MSDE officials and TA 
providers noted that challenges that school-age programs have in increasing their 
EXCELS ratings. Therefore, it is necessary control for whether a program is a school-
age program.  
Model (3), the main model, adds zip code covariates (i.e., licensed slots/child, 
under 5 poverty, race/ethnicity, females with at least a bachelor’s degree, mothers in 
labor force, unemployment rate, and percent rural; 𝑿3) at level 1 (see Table 4). As 
QRIS theory assumes there is a market for care, the covariate of licensed slots/child is 
a proxy for the availability of licensed slots in a zip code. Theory would predict that if 
there are fewer licensed slots/child, there is less incentive for the providers to improve 
care, as parents have fewer options. The other zip code covariates I include are 
common to those included by other researchers that have found that disadvantaged 
communities are more likely to have lower quality care (Bassok & Gaslo, 2016; 
Hatfield et al., 2015). While level 2 of the model is unspecified, it does control for 
unobserved differences in county characteristics that might influence relationships 
associated with centers and zip code locations. The estimating equation for model (3) 
is: 
Level 1: 𝜂𝑖𝑗 =  𝛽0𝑗 +  𝛽1𝑗𝑋1𝑖𝑗 (𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦) +  𝜷2𝑗𝑿𝑞𝑖𝑗 (𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠) +
𝜷3𝑗𝑿𝑞𝑖𝑗 (𝑍𝑖𝑝 𝐶𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑐𝑠) 
Level 2: 𝛽0𝑗 = 𝛾00 +  𝑢0𝑗 
Model (3) addressed whether, on average across all providers of the same 
type, serving a higher percentage of children receiving subsidies was associated with 





reimbursements also vary by the age of the children served in child care centers, in 
model (4), I replaced the subsidy density variable with variables that represent 
subsidy density, by the age bands with different reimbursement rates: under 2 years 
and 2 years and older. Finally, in model (5), I replaced the subsidy density variable 
with three variables that represented combinations of a provider having a subsidy 
density that was above or below the average subsidy density for providers and for 
whether the provider was located in a zip code with above or below average child 
poverty. Model (5) included dummy variables for (a) providers with high density 
located in high-poverty zip codes, (b) providers with low density located in high-
poverty zip codes, and (c) providers with high density located in low-poverty zip 
codes. Based on Hatfield et al.’s (2015) study of the associations between child care 
funding and QRIS ratings in North Carolina, I expected that providers with below 
average subsidy densities that were located in high-poverty areas would be less likely 
than centers with below average subsidy densities that were located in low-poverty 
areas to be rated at EXCELS level 3 or above. 
All models were run using the xtlogit command, grouping at the county level, 







Independent Variables Included in Models 










Level 1 (𝛽0𝑗) X X X X X 
Subsidy density X X X   
Subsidy density, by age band (2 variables)    X  
High/low subsidy density (dummy) x 
High/low child poverty (dummy) 
    X 
Provider covariates 
Year provider first licensed  X X X X 
Length of EXCELS participation  X X X X 
Licensed capacity, by age group  X X X X 
School-age provider (dummy variable)9  X X  X 
Zip-code covariates 
Licensed slots per child under 5   X X X 
Under 5 poverty (%)   X X  
Race/ethnicity (%)   X X X 
Females with at least a BA (%)   X X X 
Mothers in labor force (%)   X X X 
Unemployment rate   X X X 
Urban v. rural (% rural)   X X X 
Level 2 (𝛾00) X X X X X 
 
Robustness Analyses 
I ran six robustness analyses with different key independent variables (see 
Table 5). In model (6), I capped subsidy density at 1.0. While it is possible for a 
provider to have a subsidy density of over 1.0, this capped independent variable will 
reduce the pull of outliers and may help correct for any data errors. In fact, one of the 
child care center directors I interviewed worked at a center that was part of a small 
franchise of three centers. She told me each of two locations had about 50 percent of 
children participating in the CCSP, but MSDE administrative data showed that one of 
the centers had zero children participating in the CCSP and the other center had more 
                                                 






children in the CCSP than it was licensed to serve. When I asked MSDE about this 
oddity, MSDE responded that it was not typical, nor expected, for a franchise to 
combine CCSP counts into a single center.  
Table 5 
Key Independent Variables in Robustness Models 
Model Independent Variable 
(6) Subsidy density – capped at 1.0 
(7) Avg. subsidy density 
(8) Avg. subsidy density – capped at 1.0 
(9) ln subsidy dollars 
(10) ln avg. subsidy dollars 
(11) High/low subsidy dollars x high/low child poverty 
 
In model (7), I created an average subsidy density variable that averaged 
subsidy density for those providers that served at least 1 child in the CCSP program 
in each of July 2015, January and July 2016, January and July 2017, and January 
2018. Model (8) caps the average subsidy density variable at 1.0. I chose July 2015 as 
the earliest month because that was the month that, in order to receive CCSP 
payments, providers must have been enrolled in EXCELS. The dependent variable 
remains whether a provider is higher quality in January 2018. A provider likely made 
decisions that affected its January 2018 EXCELS rating thinking about the typical 
number of children receiving CCSP, not only the number of children expected to 
receive CCSP in January 2018. The draw-back to models (7) and (8) is that the 
sample is smaller than models (3) and (6), as only providers that served children 
receiving CCSP for all six time periods are included in the analyses. 
Capping subsidy density at 1.0 in model (6) reduced the subsidy density of 21 





for centers was 4.5 and the maximum uncapped subsidy density for family child care 
providers was 8.0. Over 25 percent of family child care providers had subsidy 
densities of at least 1.0 in January 2018. 
Models (9) and (10) use as the independent variable, respectively, the natural 
log of subsidy dollars received (not including EXCELS payments) and the natural log 
of the average subsidy dollars received from the same months as model (7). Similar to 
model (5), model (11) included dummy variables for (a) providers with high subsidy 
dollars located in high-poverty zip codes, (b) providers with low subsidy dollars 
located in high-poverty zip codes, and (c) providers with high subsidy dollars located 
in low-poverty zip codes. The advantage to using subsidy density as the key 
independent variable is that it indicates providers’ relative reliance on the CCSP, 
regardless of the licensed capacity of the provider. However, as providers may be 
more aware of the exact dollar amount of their monthly tuition that is due to children 
participating in the CCSP, it is worth examining whether the results are similar when 
using the natural log of subsidy dollars and subsidy density. See Appendix Table A.1 
and A.2 for raw and group-mean centered key independent variables for child care 
centers and Appendix Tables A.3 and A.4 for raw and group-mean centered key 
independent variables for family child care providers, respectively. 
Qualitative Data and Analysis 
During the second major stage of the study, I developed a semi-structured 
interview protocol, identified and recruited center directors to interview, and 
developed an analytic strategy to analyze the interview data. The identification of 





stage of this study. The semi-structured protocols were informed by interviews with 
three staff at the MSDE and seven technical assistance providers to better understand 
Maryland EXCELS, including the supports provided by technical assistance 
providers, and Maryland’s tiered reimbursement system.10 The final protocol 
incorporated suggestions from my dissertation committee, HHS staff that work on the 
CCDF, and MSDE staff, as well as insights gained from a pilot interview with one 
center director. 
Identification and Recruitment of Interview Sample 
I focused on child care center directors because 70 percent of children in the 
CCSP in January 2018 received care in centers. Because in-person interviews, 
compared with telephone or on-line interviews, better allow one to develop a rapport 
with interview subjects, I conducted in-person interviews in five counties in central 
Maryland: Anne Arundel, Charles, Howard, Montgomery and Prince George’s 
Counties. The economic, racial, and ethnic demographics of those counties (and the 
children who are eligible to be enrolled in the CCSP program) represent Maryland’s 
diversity (see Table 6). Together, the five counties comprise almost half of 
Maryland’s population. These five counties account for 45 percent of all centers that 
received CCSP reimbursements in January 2018 and 44 percent of providers 
receiving CCSP payments that were rated level 3 or higher (see Tables 9 and 12). 
  
                                                 
10 Before conducting any interviews or collecting administrative data from MSDE, I gained 





Table 6  
Demographic Characteristics of Maryland and Select Counties 














58% 75% 46% 58% 58% 20% 
Percentage 
black 
30% 17% 46% 19% 17% 65% 
Percentage 
Asian 
6% 4% 4% 18% 14% 4% 
Percentage 
Hispanic 




15% 7% 15% 7% 10% 15% 
Total 
population 
5,774,000 538,000 147,000 287,000 972,000 863,000 
Note. Race and total population from 2010 U.S. Census; Poverty rate from 2015 American Community 
Survey 5-year estimates. 
 
 Because my quantitative analyses found that a center’s subsidy density was 
positively and significantly associated with the likelihood that a child care center 
would be higher quality, I aimed to conduct more interviews with centers that were 
on the higher end of the distribution for subsidy density. While my regressions found 
that centers at the higher end of the distributions were more likely to be of high 
quality, centers along the entire distribution were rated high quality and, of course, 
some providers on the higher end of the subsidy density distributions were not of high 
quality. Therefore, my original goal was to interview eight center directors that led 
lower quality centers and 10 directors of higher quality centers. With the exception of 
two centers that were higher quality, for each higher quality center, I identified a 
center with an EXCELS rating of 1 or 2 in its same zip code, that had participated in 





centers with high subsidy density situated in high-poverty zip codes were more likely 
than similar centers with low subsidy density and in a low-poverty zip code to be 
higher quality, I also aimed to select providers located in zip codes with various 
poverty levels. Additionally, centers that only served school-age children were less 
likely to be higher quality centers; therefore, I identified two sets of centers providing 
care to school-age children only.11  
Ten of the 18 center directors had email addresses listed on their websites, and 
I sent them an introductory email with the MSDE letter of support as an attachment 
(see Appendix B). For seven centers, I could not find an email address, and I mailed 
the same introductory letter and MSDE’s letter of support. One of the center’s I 
planned to interview was part of a large afterschool organization and my initial 
contact was via a telephone call to the organization. A few days after the initial 
contact, I called each center director. Until I received a confirmation or decline, I 
called each center every few days, for a minimum of 10 calls. Of the initial 18 
centers, one owner declined because his center director who was knowledgeable 
about EXCELS just left and he was too busy; one director declined because she was 
too busy and she did not serve many children in the CCSP; and four directors were 
ultimately unresponsive in scheduling an interview. To replace the two centers that 
outright declined to participate, I recruited an additional two centers to participate, 
though I had to contact three centers to find two that would participate (one center 
director declined because she was working on an application for a Head Start grant 
                                                 
11 One of the sets of afterschool programs were in different schools, but run by the same 
organization. Thus, I only contacted and interviewed one person at the organization-level to 





and did not have time). After scheduling an interview with one center director at a 
franchise location, she suggested I also contact someone at the larger organization, 
and I ended up interviewing her, as well.  
The final sample consisted of 14 interviews with three school-age child care 
providers with multiple locations (only one of which was a for-profit provider), one 
corporate child care provider with multiple locations, and 10 child care center 
directors (one of which was a non-profit provider)12 (see Table 7). Of the 10 child 
care center directors, two were directors of individual corporate child care center 
locations, four were directors or owners in small franchises (three or four locations), 
and four were directors or owners of single-location child care centers. Specifically, I 
spoke with two owners of small franchises and two owners of single-location centers. 
Of the 10 child care center directors, seven were rated EXCELS level 3 or higher and 
three were rated EXCELS level 1 or 2 at the time of the interviews (conducted in 
September–November 2018). The school-age providers and the corporate provider 
had individual centers that, collectively, had ratings across the EXCELS continuum, 
though one school-age provider did not have any higher quality centers. Almost all of 
the individual centers had a subsidy density of at least 24 percent. In contrast, across 
all school-age centers, relatively few children received child care subsidy, though a 
few locations had high percentages of children on subsidy. Across all of the corporate 
provider’s locations, less than 3 percent of children receive child care subsidy (i.e., 
most locations were in the first quartile of subsidy density).  
                                                 
12 I did not consider auspice when selecting interviewees. While MSDE could not provide me with 
information on providers’ auspices, the 2012 NSECE estimated that 32 percent of child care centers 
were for-profit, 50 percent were not-for-profit, 14 percent were run by a government agency, and about 





Table 7 also includes the characteristics of centers whose directors did not 
participate in an interview. Compared with interview participants, non-participants 
tended to have lower EXCELS ratings, with five of the non-participating center 
directors from centers rated 1 or 2 and two from centers rated 3. Though my original 
goal was to interview two centers in the same zip code, this goal was relaxed as 
center directors declined or did not respond to calls. The final sample included only 
two sets of child care centers in the same zip code. (In Table 7, the horizontal lines 





Table 7  
Center and Location Characteristics for Potential Center Director Interview Sample 










Center Director 1 Y 3 3 3 Charles 
Center Director 2 Y 1 4 3 Charles 
Center Director 3 Y 5 1 1 Howard 
Center Director 4  1 1 1 Howard 
Center Director 5 Y 3 4 1 Howard 
Center Director 6  3 3 1 Howard 
Center Director 7 Y 3 4 2 Montgomery 
Center Director 8  1 4 2 Montgomery 
Center Director 9 Y 3 4 2 Montgomery 
Center Director 10  1 4 2 Montgomery 
Center Director 11 Y 2 4 1 Montgomery 
Center Director 12  3 4 1 Montgomery 
Center Director 13  1 4 3 Prince George’s 
Center Director 14 Y 2 4 3 Prince George’s 
Center Director 15 Y 3 4 3 Prince George’s 
Center Director 16  2 4 4 Prince George’s 
Center Director 17 Y 3 4 3 Prince George’s 
School-age provider 1 Y Mostly 3, 
new 
centers 1 
  – 
School-age provider 2 Y 1–3, 
mostly 3 
  – 
School-age provider 3 Y 1–2, 
mostly 1 
  Multiple 
Corporate provider 1 Y 1–5, 
mostly 3 
  Multiple 
Note. – indicates the provider may have been able to be identified if its county was named. EXCELS 
levels are from the time of the interview, from September–November 2018. Subsidy quartiles are from 
January 2018. For the Center Directors, the lines demarcate centers in the same zip code. The subsidy 
density quartiles are as follows: 25%, 0.030; 50%, 0.083; 75%, 0.243. The poverty quartiles are as 
follows: 25%, 6.9; 50%, 14.3; 75%, 23.3. 
 
Interview Procedures and Analysis 
I prepared for the interviews by examining the providers’ overall EXCELS 
ratings, CCSP longitudinal data, and the provider’s website. I conducted the focused 





started, I asked respondents for signed consent to participate in and audio record the 
interview. Four center directors did not consent to be audio recorded. For directors 
that did not consent to being recorded, I took notes during the interview and 
immediately typed up my notes into an electronic version of the interview protocol. 
For directors that consented to being recorded, I took minimal notes during the 
interviews, instead spending my energy listening to the center director. On the same 
day as the interview, I wrote general impressions, emergent themes, and key 
takeaways from the recorded interview. For all recorded interviews, I transcribed the 
interview into an Excel document with one column per protocol question and one row 
per respondent. I did not share my transcripts or detailed notes with the interviewees 
as a “member check” that would have enabled the interviewees to correct any 
misunderstandings (Cho &Trent, 2006). After transcribing the interviews, I coded the 
responses and copied responses by theme from the Excel document and pasted them 
into a thematic outline based on the interview protocol. I analyzed the qualitative data 
for consistencies across all providers and among providers with shared 
characteristics, such as subsidy density, poverty of the zip code in which the center 
was based, school-age providers, whether the provider was part of a large or small 
franchise (or neither), and EXCELS rating. 
Summary 
This chapter discussed my sequential explanatory equal status mixed methods 
study to answer the research question, Does Maryland’s tiered reimbursement system 
incentivize child care providers to attain a rating on Maryland’s QRIS that results in 





models, as well as the data included in the models. The chapter also described my 
interview sample and interview procedures. The next chapter will discuss findings for 
each of the two stages of my study and the final chapter will integrate the findings 






Chapter 5: Results 
 This chapter presents results from descriptive analyses on EXCELS 
participation and ratings, descriptive analyses of dependent and independent 
variables, regression analyses, and interviews with center directors.  
Quantitative Results 
 To better situate findings from my regression analyses and interviews, it is 
helpful to understand how EXCELS participation and EXCELS ratings have changed 
over time. Following these descriptive data, I assess the differences in provider 
characteristics and differences in the zip codes in which providers are located for 
providers that did and did not participate in EXCELS and for providers that did and 
did not receive CCSP payments in January 2018. Finally, this section presents 
findings from my regression models. As mentioned in Chapter 4, results need to be 
presented separately for child care centers and family child care providers. Within 
each section, results for child care centers are presented before results for family child 
care providers, followed by a comparison of findings for child care centers and family 
child providers. 
EXCELS and CCSP Participation and Ratings 
 EXCELS payments only act as an incentive to providers that are enrolled in 
EXCELS, and only for those provider that serve children in the CCSP. This section 
discusses the trend in EXCELS participation over time, variations in CCSP 
participation across Maryland jurisdictions, and the trend in the percentage and 






Child care centers. 
Maryland EXCELS exited piloting and opened to all child care centers and 
family child care providers in July 2013. Recall that MSDE required all providers that 
served children in the CCSP to participate in EXCELS by July 2015. Between July 
2013 and July 2015, the percentage of participating centers increased from 9 percent 
to 63 percent. The increase in participation rate was much smaller over the next two-
and-a-half years, eventually reaching 72 percent in January 2018 (see Figure 2). Of 
the 1,954 centers that participated in EXCELS in January 2018, 52 percent of the 
centers received a CCSP reimbursement from MSDE in that same month (see 
Appendix Table A.5). EXCELS participation rates varied across Maryland’s 24 
jurisdictions, ranging from 34 percent of centers participating in St. Mary’s County 
(15 of 44 centers) to 100 percent of centers participating in Somerset County (9 of 9 
centers) (see Appendix Table A.5). Similarly, the percentage of participating centers 
that received a CCSP reimbursement from MSDE in January 2018 ranged from 23 
percent in Garret County (3 of 13 participating centers) to 84 percent in Cecil County 
(21 of 25 participating centers). In absolute terms, Montgomery County had the most 
licensed child care centers (497) and the most child care centers participating in 
EXCELS (310; Prince George’s was next with 308), while Prince George’s had the 
most centers receiving CCSP payments in January 2018 (181). In Baltimore City and 
Baltimore, Montgomery, and Prince George’s Counties, over 100 child care centers 
received CCSP payments and the participation rate into CCSP ranged from 45 percent 





participation rates indicate that centers were differentially inclined to participate in 
EXCELS and the CCSP program based, in part, on their county.  
Figure 2 
Percentage of Centers Participating in EXCELS, July 2015–January 2018 
 
 
 The goal of EXCELS is for all children to receive quality care, including those 
in the CCSP. Between July 2013 and January 2018, the percentage13 and number of 
participating centers that were higher quality increased fairly steadily from 4 percent 
(9 centers) to 27 percent (522 centers) (see Appendix Figure D.1). As shown in 
Figure 3, the number and percentage of centers that participated in EXCELS, received 
a CCSP reimbursement, and were higher quality also increased fairly steadily, from 5 
percent (6 centers) in July 2013 to 26 percent (257 centers) in January 2018. This 
increase resulted in 34 percent of CCSP center participants being served in centers 
                                                 
13 The percentages in Appendix Figures D.1 and D.2 used a denominator of all participating centers, 












































that were rated level 3 or higher in January 2018, an increase from 24 percent in July 
201614 (see Table 8). 
Similar to how EXCELS participation rates varied across Maryland’s 24 
jurisdictions, the percentage15 of centers that are higher quality ranges from 12 
percent (35 centers) of centers with published ratings in Prince George’s County to 80 
percent in Worcester County (8 centers; see Appendix Table A.6). Among providers 
that received CCSP payments in January 2018, neither of the two centers in Kent 
County were rated level 3 or higher and all six of the centers in Talbot County were 
rated level 3 or higher (see Table 9). In 11 jurisdictions, a higher percentage of 
providers that received CCSP reimbursements were higher quality compared with the 
percentage of all providers that were rated level 3 or higher.16 Seven jurisdictions had 
at least 13 higher quality child care centers that received CCSP reimbursements in 
January 2018 and 12 jurisdictions had fewer than five higher quality centers that 
received CCSP reimbursements. Almost one-quarter of all higher quality centers that 
received CCSP reimbursements were located in Montgomery County. Such 
differences between counties further justify the use of two-level model regressions, 
with providers nested within counties, to analyze these data. 
  
                                                 
14 The percentages do not include children served by providers that had not published an EXCELS 
rating. July 2016 is used as the comparison to allow providers one year to publish a rating after the July 
2015 requirement to participate in EXCELS. 
15 The percentages in Tables A.6 and 9 used a denominator of only centers with a published EXCELS 
rating. 
16 The 11 jurisdictions were Allegany, Caroline, Carroll, Frederick, Garrett, Montgomery, Prince 








Percentage and Number of Participating Centers Receiving Subsidies Rated 






Percentage of Children Receiving Child Care Subsidy, by Center Rating, July 
2016 and January 2018 
EXCELS Level 
Percentage of 
Children, July 2016 
Percentage of 
Children, Jan 2018 
1 66% 57% 
2 10% 9% 
3 19% 27% 
4 1% 3% 
5 3% 4% 
  Note. Only centers with a published rating are included in this table. 
  



































































































Allegany 3 0 1 2 1 7 4 57% 
Anne 
Arundel 
25 7 13 1 1 47 15 32% 
Baltimore 
City 
98 18 28 2 0 146 30 21% 
Baltimore 
Co. 
107 14 25 3 3 152 31 20% 
Calvert 10 4 1 1 1 17 3 18% 
Caroline 1 0 1 0 2 4 3 75% 
Carroll 14 2 8 2 3 29 13 45% 
Cecil 13 2 4 0 0 19 4 21% 
Charles 25 4 2 0 1 32 3 9% 
Dorchester 2 1 2 1 0 6 3 50% 
Frederick 19 1 10 0 4 34 14 41% 
Garrett 1 0 1 0 1 3 2 67% 
Harford 18 4 5 1 1 29 7 24% 
Howard 29 9 6 0 3 47 9 19% 
Kent 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0% 
Montgomery 53 18 45 7 9 132 61 46% 
Prince 
George's 
124 26 22 0 2 174 24 14% 
Queen 
Anne's 
2 1 0 1 1 5 2 40% 
Saint Mary's 2 0 1 0 0 3 1 33% 
Somerset 3 0 2 0 0 5 2 40% 
Talbot 0 0 1 0 5 6 6 100% 
Washington 6 9 2 1 4 22 7 32% 
Wicomico 10 3 4 4 1 22 9 41% 
Worcester 2 0 3 0 1 6 4 67% 
Total 569 123 187 26 44 949 257 27% 








Family child care providers. 
 Between July 2013 and July 2015, the percentage of participating family child 
care providers increased from 3 percent to 39 percent. One year after the July 2015 
requirement that providers who receive CCSP reimbursements participate in 
EXCELS, the participation rate fell to 37 percent, when some providers did not meet 
the requirement to publish a rating within one year of joining EXCELS. By January 
2018, the participation rate had climbed back to 42 percent (see Figure 4). Of the 
2,418 family child care providers that participated in EXCELS in January 2018, 44 
percent of the providers received a CCSP reimbursement from MSDE in that same 
month (see Appendix Table A.7). 
 EXCELS participation rates varied across Maryland’s 24 jurisdictions, 
ranging from 19 percent of family child care providers participating in St. Mary’s 
County (35 of 180 providers) to 85 percent of providers in Baltimore City (447 of 528 
providers) (see Appendix Table A.7). The percentage of participating family child 
care providers that received a CCSP reimbursement from MSDE in January 2018 
ranged from about 22 percent in Frederick County (17 of 79 participating providers) 
and Garret County (2 of 9 participating providers) to 69 percent in Baltimore City 
(310 out of 447 participating providers). In absolute terms, Montgomery County had 
the most licensed family child care providers (877), while Baltimore City had the 
most family providers participating in EXCELS (447) and the most family providers 
receiving CCSP payments in January 2018 (310). Baltimore and Prince George’s 
counties had, respectively, 161 and 151 family providers receiving CCSP payments in 





Between July 2013 and January 2018, the number of family child care 
providers of higher quality increased fairly steadily from 3 providers to 204 (see 
Appendix Figure D.2). Between July 2013 and January 2018, the percentage of 
family child care providers participating in EXCELS that were of higher quality 
increased from 2 to 8 percent.  
Figure 4.  
Percentage of Family Child Care Providers Participating in EXCELS,  




As shown in Figure 5, the number and percentage17 of family child care 
providers that received a CCSP reimbursement and were rated level 3 or higher has 
also increased fairly steadily, from zero providers in July 2013 to 9 percent in January 
2018. This increase resulted in 13 percent of CCSP family-provider participants being 
                                                 
17 The percentages in Figure 5 used a denominator of all participating family child care providers, 











































served by providers that were rated level 3 or higher in January 2018, an increase 
from 6 percent in July 201618 (see Table 10). Recall that 34 percent of CCSP center 
participants were served by a center rated level 3 in January 2018.  
Figure 5  
 
Percentage and Number of Participating Family Child Care Providers Receiving 




                                                 
18 The percentages do not include children served by providers that had not published an EXCELS 
rating. July 2016 is used as the comparison, to allow providers one year to publish a rating after the 
July 2015 requirement to participate in EXCELS. 































































































Table 10  
 
Percentage of Children Receiving Child Care Subsidy, by Family Child Care 




Children, July 2016 
Percentage of 
Children, Jan 2018 
1 87% 82% 
2 7% 5% 
3 3% 10% 
4 <1% <1% 
5 2% 3% 
 Note. Only family providers with a published rating are included in this table. 
 
Similar to how the percentages of centers rated level 3 or higher ranged across 
Maryland’s 24 jurisdictions, the percentage19 of family child care providers that were 
rated higher quality ranges from zero family child care providers (out of 13) in Talbot 
County to 29 percent in Dorchester County percent (3 providers; see Appendix Table 
A.8). Among providers that received CCSP payments in January 2018, none of the 
family child care providers in Calvert, Kent, or Talbot Counties were rated higher 
quality (see Table 11). In Caroline, Cecil, Dorchester, Garrett, and Somerset 
Counties, over one-quarter of the family child care providers that received CCSP 
payments were rated higher quality. In 12 jurisdictions, a higher percentage of family 
child care providers that received CCSP reimbursements were rated higher quality 
compared with the percentage of all providers that were rated level 3 or higher.20 
Three jurisdictions had at least 10 higher quality family child care providers that 
received CCSP reimbursements in January 2018 and 19 jurisdictions had five or 
                                                 
19 The percentages in Tables A.8 and 11 used a denominator of only family child care providers with a 
published EXCELS rating. 
20 The 12 jurisdictions were Allegany, Baltimore, Baltimore City, Caroline, Carroll, Cecil, Charles, 





fewer higher quality family providers that received CCSP reimbursements. Almost 40 
percent of all higher quality family providers that received CCSP reimbursements 








EXCELS Rating Distribution for Family Child Care Providers Receiving Subsidies, 



















Allegany 16 0 2 0 0 18 2 11% 
Anne 
Arundel 
48 1 0 0 2 51 2 4% 
Baltimore 
City 
253 17 22 0 2 294 24 8% 
Baltimore 
Co. 
128 10 6 1 8 153 15 10% 
Calvert 10 0 0 0 0 10 0 0% 
Caroline 7 1 2 0 1 11 3 27% 
Carroll 5 0 1 0 0 6 1 17% 
Cecil 5 0 2 0 0 7 2 29% 
Charles 28 1 1 0 1 31 2 6% 
Dorchester 10 1 4 0 0 15 4 27% 
Frederick 12 2 1 0 0 15 1 7% 
Garrett 1 0 0 1 0 2 1 50% 
Harford 39 2 2 0 0 43 2 5% 
Howard 18 2 1 0 2 23 3 13% 
Kent 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 0% 
Montgomery 59 3 3 0 8 73 11 15% 
Prince 
George's 
128 5 7 0 2 142 9 6% 
Queen 
Anne's 
2 2 0 0 1 5 1 20% 
Saint Mary's 12 0 1 0 0 13 1 8% 
Somerset 6 2 3 0 0 11 3 27% 
Talbot 6 0 0 0 0 6 0 0% 
Washington 20 1 3 0 2 26 5 19% 
Wicomico 22 1 6 0 1 30 7 23% 
Worcester 7 0 1 0 0 8 1 13% 
Total 844 51 68 2 30 995 100 10% 









A smaller proportion of family child care providers (42 percent) than child 
care centers (72 percent) participated in EXCELS in January 2018, though a similar 
number of both types of providers participated (1,066 family providers and 1,007 
centers). When compared with the percentage of child care centers receiving CCSP 
that are higher quality (27 percent), a lower proportion of family child care providers 
receiving CCSP are higher quality (9 percent) and the difference has widened over 
time. While the percentages of higher quality family child care providers were about 
half the percentages for child care centers in July 2015 (4 percent compared with 9 
percent for centers), by January 2018, over three times as many centers were higher 
quality. This results in a much higher proportion of children in the CCSP served by 
centers to be in higher quality care (about one-third of children), compared with 
children in the CCSP served by family providers (about 13 percent of children). 
Descriptive Analyses of Dependent and Independent Variables 
 Because EXCELS is a voluntary program for centers and family child care 
providers that do not receive CCSP payments, it is worth understanding how 
characteristics of providers differ depending on whether the provider participated in 
EXCELS and, if it participated in EXCELS, whether the provider received CCSP 
payments in January 2018. Among providers that received CCSP payments in 
January 2018 (i.e., the sample included in the regression analyses), this section also 







Child Care Centers. 
There were a number of differences between participating centers and non-
participating centers and centers that receive CCSP payments and those that did not 
(see Table 12). Specifically, centers that participated in EXCELS were more likely to 
be school-age programs (28 percent compared with 12 percent) and were licensed to 
serve more children age 2 and over (56 children compared with 45) and fewer 
children under age 2 (9 children compared with 15 children). Centers that participated 
in EXCELS were located in zip codes with greater poverty (15 percent of children 
under 5 in poverty compared with 11 percent) and unemployment (6.9 percent 
compared with 5.9 percent), higher percentages of blacks (33 percent compared with 
22 percent), lower percentages of Asians (6 percent compared with 8 percent), lower 
percentages of females with at least a bachelor’s degree (21 percent compared with 
24 percent), and fewer early care and education licensed slots per child under 5 (0.46 
compared with 0.54). There were no differences between the year the center was first 
licensed, and, by zip code, the percentage of Hispanics, the percentage of mothers 
with children under 6 in the labor force, and rurality. 
Differences between the 28 percent of centers that did not participate in 
EXCELS and the 72 percent of centers that participated seem to be primarily driven 
by characteristics of the half of participating centers that received CCSP payments. 
That is, differences similar to those discussed in the previous paragraph were found 
when comparing centers that did and did not receive CCSP payments in January 
2018. Centers that received CCSP payments were located in zip codes with higher 





unemployment (7.5 percent compared with 6.4 percent), higher percentages of blacks 
(39 percent compared with 27 percent), lower percentages of Asians (5 percent 
compared with 7 percent), lower percentages of females with at least a bachelor’s 
degree (20 percent compared with 23 percent), less rural (a mean of 10 percent of zip 
codes were rural compared with 13 percent), and fewer early care and education 
licensed slots per child under 5 (0.40 compared with 0.52).  
In contrast, while there were differences in licensed capacity for those that 
participated in EXCELS and those that did not, there was no difference in licensed 
capacity between centers that did and did not receive a CCSP reimbursement. 
Additionally, while school-age programs were more likely to be enrolled in EXCELS, 
school-age programs were less likely to have received CCSP reimbursements (21 
percent compared with 35 percent). This could be due to the fact that school-age 
programs are often part of large franchises that may choose to enroll all of their 
programs in EXCELS even if many of them do not typically serve children enrolled 
in the CCSP. Finally, there was also not a statistically significant difference between 







Means of Independent and Dependent Variables for Participating Centers and 




















Higher  Quality Provider (EXCELS 3–
5)   
0.280 0.255 
Year First Licensed 2009.0 2008.8 2008.6 2009.0* 
School-age programs 0.116 0.276** 0.347 0.209** 
Length of participation (6-month chunks)  6.78 7.17** 
Licensed Capacity Under 2 15.0 9.1** 9.4 8.8 
Licensed Capacity 2+ 45.2 56.0** 55.4 56.5 
Licensed slots per child under 5 in Zip 
Code 
0.54 0.46** 0.52 0.40** 
Pct Pov < 5 in Zip Code 10.96 14.83** 12.65 16.86** 
Pct Asian in Zip Code 0.075 0.060** 0.067 0.054** 
Pct Black in Zip Code 0.220 0.330** 0.268 0.388** 
Pct Hispanic in Zip Code 0.083 0.084 0.081 0.087 
Pct Female with BA+ in Zip Code 23.8 21.1** 22.5 19.7** 
Pct Mothers with kids <6 in labor 
force in Zip Code 
77.2 77.5 77.3 77.7 
Unemployment rate in Zip Code 5.85 6.98** 6.38 7.54** 
Pct rural 0.127 0.113 0.128 0.100** 
Note. Italicized numbers and asterisks indicate a statistically significant difference between not higher 
quality and higher quality providers. * indicates significance at the 0.05 level and ** indicates 
significance at the 0.01 level.  
 
There are a number of differences between the characteristics of centers that 
received CCSP payments in January 2018 that were and were not rated of higher 
quality, though few differences in the characteristics of their zip codes.21 Based on 
                                                 
21 Unlike in the descriptive analyses presented earlier in the chapter, child care centers that are 
participating in EXCELS, but not yet published, are included in this analysis (and the regression 
analyses) as centers that were lower quality. Additionally, four centers were dropped for the regression 





group-mean centered data used in my regression analyses, higher quality centers had 
higher subsidy densities, were older centers, had participated in EXCELS longer, had 
higher capacity, and were less likely to be school-age programs. Higher quality 
centers were located in zip codes that had higher percentages of females with a 
bachelor’s degree and were less likely to be in rural zip codes (see Table 13; see 
Appendix Table A.9 for differences in raw means between higher quality centers and 
lower rated centers). 
My regressions will test whether the different subsidy densities between 
higher quality (i.e., EXCELS ratings 3–5) and lower quality (i.e., EXCELS ratings 1–
2) centers remains after controlling for center and zip code characteristics. The 
finding that higher quality centers were older centers and had participated in 
EXCELS longer aligns with the fact that it takes time to progress in EXCELS. 
Although there were few differences in zip code characteristics—once using group-
mean centered data at the county level—it is still important to keep these variables in 
my regression models because, based on prior research and theory, they are often 









Means of Group-Mean Centered Independent and Dependent Variables, by 






Density -0.018 0.052** 
Year First Licensed 0.384 -1.127** 
School-age programs 0.026 -0.076** 
Length of participation (6-month chunks) -0.349 1.023** 
Under 2 licensed capacity -0.492 1.444* 
2+ licensed capacity -2.538 7.446** 
Licensed slots per child under 5 in Zip Code -0.002 0.006 
Pct Pov < 5 in Zip Code 0.161 -0.473 
Pct Asian in Zip Code -0.001 0.002 
Pct Black in Zip Code 0.003 -0.008 
Pct Hispanic in Zip Code -0.000 0.002 
Pct Female with BA+ in Zip Code -0.284 0.834** 
Pct Mothers with kids <6 in labor force -0.055 0.163 
Unemployment rate in Zip Code 0.104 -0.305 
Pct rural 0.104 -0.305** 
Note. Italicized numbers and asterisks indicate a statistically significant difference between 
lower quality and higher quality providers. * indicates significance at the 0.05 level and ** indicates 
significance at the 0.01 level. 
 
Family child care providers. 
For family child care providers, there were differences between providers that 
did and did not participate in EXCELS for all of the variables examined, except for 
the percentage of mothers with children under 6 in the labor force (see Table 14). 
Family child care providers that participated in EXCELS were slightly newer 
providers (with a mean year first licensed of 2010.0, compared with 2009.4) and 
licensed to serve slightly more children under age 2 and slightly fewer children age 2 
and older. Providers that participated in EXCELS were located in zip codes with 
greater poverty (19 percent of children under 5 in poverty compared with 12 percent) 





blacks (41 percent compared with 26 percent) and Hispanics (8.9 percent compared 
with 8.3 percent), lower percentages of Asians (5 percent compared with 6 percent), 
lower percentages of females with at least a bachelor’s degree (19 percent compared 
with 21 percent), less rural (a mean of 10 percent of zip codes were rural compared 
with 16 percent), and fewer early care and education licensed slots per child under 5 
(0.36 compared with 0.40).  
Similarly, there were differences in the characteristics of participating family 
child care providers that received CCSP payments in January 2018 and those that did 
not receive CCSP payments, though there was not a statistically significant difference 
between the percentages of providers that were higher quality. Family child care 
providers that received CCSP payments were older providers (with a mean year first 
licensed of 2009.5, compared with 2010.4 for providers that did not receive CCSP 
payments), had participated in EXCELS longer (6.6 6-month time periods compared 
with 5.8 6-month time periods), and were slightly smaller. Providers that received 
CCSP payments were located in zip codes with higher poverty (22 percent of children 
under 5 in poverty compared with 16 percent) and unemployment (8.9 percent 
compared with 7.2 percent), higher percentages of blacks (49 percent compared with 
35 percent), lower percentages of Asians (4 percent compared with 6 percent) and 
Hispanics (8 percent compared with 10 percent), lower percentages of females with at 
least a bachelor’s degree (17 percent compared with 20 percent), less rural (a mean of 
8 percent of zip codes were rural compared with 12 percent), and had fewer early care 








Means of Independent and Dependent Variables for Participating Family Child Care 
Providers and Providers Receiving CCSP Payments 
 
Family Child Care 
Providers 
Of Participating Family 
















Higher Quality Provider (EXCELS 3–5)   0.077 0.094 
Year First Licensed 2009.4 2010.0** 2010.4 2009.5** 
Length of participation (6-month chunks)   5.80 6.60** 
Licensed Capacity, Under 2 3.11 3.17** 3.23 3.10** 
Licensed Capacity, 2+ 1.74 1.67** 1.71 1.61** 
Licensed slots per child under 5 in Zip Code 0.395 0.364** 0.373 0.354* 
Pct Pov < 5 in Zip Code 11.6 18.6** 15.6 22.3** 
Pct Asian in Zip Code 0.063 0.052** 0.062 0.040** 
Pct Black in Zip Code 0.260 0.410** 0.350 0.485* 
Pct Hispanic in Zip Code 0.083 0.089* 0.099 0.077** 
Pct Female with BA+ in Zip Code 21.7 18.8** 20.1 17.1** 
Pct Mothers with kids <6 in labor force 77.6 77.6 77.7 77.3 
Unemployment rate in Zip Code 6.19 7.93** 7.18 8.87** 
Pct rural 0.162 0.099** 0.115 0.080** 
Note. * and italicized numbers indicate a statistically significant difference, at the 0.05 level. 
  
Based on group-mean centered data used in my regression analyses, there 
were fewer differences between the 9 percent of family child care providers receiving 
CCSP payments that were higher quality and the 91 percent of providers that were 
lower quality. Higher quality family child care providers had higher subsidy densities, 
had participated in EXCELS longer, and had higher under 2 capacity. There were no 
differences in zip code characteristics (see Table 15; see Appendix Table A.10 for 
differences in raw means between higher quality centers and lower quality family 







Means of Group-Mean Centered Independent and Dependent Variables, by Family 






Density -0.022 0.213** 
Year First Licensed 0.067 -0.651 
Length of participation (6-month chunks) -0.198 1.931** 
Under 2 licensed capacity -0.030 0.291** 
2+ licensed capacity -0.006 0.058 
Licensed slots per child under 5 in Zip Code 0.000 -0.003 
Pct Pov < 5 in Zip Code 0.023 -0.225 
Pct Asian in Zip Code -0.000 0.001 
Pct Black in Zip Code -0.001 0.005 
Pct Hispanic in Zip Code -0.000 0.002 
Pct Female with BA+ in Zip Code 0.022 -0.214 
Pct Mother's with kids <6 in labor force -0.076 0.742 
Unemployment rate in Zip Code 0.015 -0.148 
Pct rural 0.003 -0.034 
Note. Italicized numbers and asterisks indicate a statistically significant difference between 
lower quality and higher quality providers* indicates significance at the 0.05 level and ** indicates 
significance at the 0.01 level. 
  
Summary. 
 For both child care centers and family child care providers that participated in 
EXCELS, a similar percentage of providers (within provider type) that did and did 
not receive CCSP payments in January 2018 were higher quality. Also, similar across 
the types of providers, providers that received CCSP payments were slightly older 
and were located in more disadvantaged and less rural zip codes with fewer licensed 
slots per child under 5. For both types of providers that received CCSP payments, 
using group-mean centered data at the county level, higher quality providers had 
higher subsidy densities and had participated in EXCELS longer. While none of the 





status, higher quality centers were located in zip codes that had higher percentages of 
females with a bachelor’s degree and were less likely to be in rural zip codes. My 
regressions will test whether the different subsidy densities between higher quality 
and lower quality providers remain after controlling for center and zip code 
characteristics. The finding that higher quality providers had participated in EXCELS 
longer aligns with the fact that it takes time to progress in EXCELS. Although there 
were few differences in zip code characteristics it is still important to keep these 
variables in my regression models because they are often associated with center 
quality.  
Regression Results 
 This final section to the quantitative results discusses the findings of my two-
level regression analyses and robustness checks. Model (1) does not include any 
covariates, model (2) includes provider covariates, and model (3) includes provider 
and zip code covariates. Models (4) and (5) are extensions of model (3). Results are 
presented as odds ratios (OR). Unless otherwise noted, only statistically significant 
results (at least at the 0.05 level) are characterized as “associations.”   
 Child Care Centers. 
 Model (1) is a two-level model, with centers nested in counties, that only 
includes the independent variable of interest, subsidy density. Without any provider 
or zip code characteristics, a higher CCSP density was associated with a decreased 
likelihood of a center being higher quality (OR=0.9) (see Table 16). However, once 
provider-characteristics were included in model (2), a higher CCSP density was 





quality (OR=3.5). That is, holding all provider characteristics equal within counties, 
the odds of being a higher quality center for a center with subsidy density of 1.0 (i.e., 
a center that serves a number of children enrolled in the CCSP equal to the center’s 
licensed capacity) were 3.5 times that of center with a subsidy density of just over 0.0 
(i.e., a very large center that serves 1 child enrolled in the CCSP). Model (3) adds zip 
code characteristics to model (2) and found that a higher CCSP density was 
associated with an increased likelihood of a center being rated higher quality 
(OR=4.9). Model (3) is preferred over model (2) because it is based on theory and 
research that the level of disadvantage in a zip code is associated with the quality of 
care.  
Model (4) extends model (3) by including variables for subsidy density by age 
band, as the two age bands have different EXCELS payment rates. Model (4) found 
that the subsidy density of children 2 and older was statistically significant (OR=3.5), 
while the subsidy density for children under 2 was not statistically significant, though 
the odds ratio was still greater than 1.0 (OR=1.3). When included as a continuous 
variable, poverty was not associated with the likelihood of a center being higher 
quality. Model (5) analyzed whether the effect of having subsidy density in the top or 
bottom half of the distribution differs whether poverty is in the top or bottom half of 
the distribution. Model (5) found that, compared with centers that had a subsidy 
density in the bottom half of the distribution (i.e., subsidy density less than 8.3 
percent) and were located in relatively low-poverty zip codes (i.e., child poverty less 
than 14.3 percent), centers with higher subsidy density located in high-poverty zip 





had a low subsidy density located in low-poverty zip codes, centers with low subsidy 
density in high-poverty zip codes or centers with high subsidy density in low-poverty 
zip codes were no more likely to be rated higher quality. 
Results from robustness analyses produced similar results, with odds ratios 
ranging from 4.5 to 6.7 when measuring subsidy density in various ways (see 
Appendix Table A.11). Specifically, model (6) capped subsidy density at 1.0, which 
reduced the subsidy densities of 21 child care centers and found that the odds ratio 
increased to 6.7. This finding indicates that findings from the preferred model (3) 
were influenced by those 21 centers and those centers reduced the likelihood that a 
center with high subsidy density would be rated of higher quality. Model (7) averaged 
the subsidy density of six months between July 2015 and January 2018 and found an 
odds ratio of 4.5, similar to the odds ratio of 4.9 from model (3). Model (8) capped 








Odds Ratio Estimates for Centers 
Independent 
Variable 
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
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density 
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(0.451) 
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2-level model X X X X X 
Note. * indicates significance at the 0.05 level and ** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. n=1003. Rho is statistically significant at the 0.05 level for all models. For model (1) rho=0.102; 






A final set of robustness checks used the natural log of the center’s total CCSP 
receipt (not including EXCELS payments). While odds ratios of the natural log are 
more difficult to interpret, model (9) used data from January 2018 and found an odds 
ratio of 1.3 and model (10) used data averaged over July 2015 and January 2018 and 
found an odds ratio of 1.2. Results from models (9) and (10) indicate that centers that 
receive more CCSP funds (controlling for the licensed capacity of the center, among 
other variables) were more likely to be higher quality. Finally, results from model 
(11) were almost identical to those of model (5), indicating that, compared with 
centers that received CCSP dollars in the bottom half of the distribution and were 
located in relatively low-poverty zip codes, centers with higher CCSP dollars located 
in high-poverty zip codes were more likely to be higher quality (OR=1.8).  
Across the various models, few covariates were statistically associated with 
higher quality centers. The length of EXCELS participation and the percentage of 
females with at least a bachelor’s degree were positively associated with higher 
quality centers. Licensed capacity for children 2 and older was statistically associated 
with higher quality centers, but not meaningfully, as the odds ratios ranged from 
1.004 to 1.007. Considering few of the zip code covariates differed between centers 
that were higher quality and those that were lower quality, it is not surprising that the 
zip code covariates were not associated with a center’s higher quality rating in the 
models. While most provider characteristics did differ between centers that were 
higher quality and those that were lower quality, their associations were no longer 







Family child care providers. 
Without any provider or zip code characteristics in model (1), a higher CCSP 
density was associated with a decreased likelihood of a family child care provider 
being higher quality (OR=0.4) (see Table 17). However, once provider-characteristics 
were included in model (2), a higher CCSP density was associated with an increased 
likelihood of a provider being higher quality (OR=1.5). That is, holding all provider 
characteristics equal within counties, the odds of being a higher quality family child 
care provider with subsidy density of 1.0 were 1.5 times that of provider with a 
subsidy density of just over 0.0.22 Model (3) adds zip code characteristics to model 
(2) and found that a higher CCSP density was associated with an increased likelihood 
of a center being rated higher quality (OR=1.5).  
Model (4) extends model (3) by including variables for subsidy density by age 
band, as the two age bands have different EXCELS payment rates. Model (4) found 
that the subsidy density of children 2 and older was statistically significant (OR=1.1), 
while the subsidy density for children under 2 was not statistically significant, though 
the odds ratio was still in the same direction (OR=1.5). Finally, Model (5) found that, 
compared with providers that had a subsidy density in the bottom half of the 
distribution (i.e., subsidy density less than 60.0 percent) and were located in relatively 
low-poverty zip codes (i.e., child poverty less than 19.9 percent), providers with 
higher subsidy density located in high-poverty zip codes were more likely to be 
higher quality (OR=2.4). Compared with centers that had a low subsidy density 
                                                 





located in low-poverty zip codes, centers with low subsidy density in high-poverty 
zip codes or centers with high subsidy density in low-poverty zip codes were no more 
likely to be rated higher quality. 
Results from robustness analyses produced similar results, though key 
independent variables were not statistically significant for models (8) and (10) (see 
Appendix Table A.12). Model (6) capped subsidy density at 1.0, which reduced the 
subsidy densities of 230 family child care providers and found that the odds ratio 
increased to 2.6, from model (3)’s odds ratio of 1.5. Similar to the results from child 
care centers, this finding indicates that model (3)’s results were influenced by those 
230 family child care providers and, holding all else equal, they were less likely to be 
of higher quality than providers with a subsidy density of 1.0 or lower. Model (7) 
averaged the subsidy density of six months between July 2015 and January 2018 and 
found an odds ratio of 1.5—the same as the odds ratio for model (3). Model (8) 
capped the average subsidy density of 252 family child care providers and subsidy 
density was not significantly associated with the likelihood of being higher quality, 
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A final set of robustness checks used the natural log of the provider’s total 
CCSP receipt. While odds ratios of the natural log are more difficult to interpret, 
model (9) used data from January 2018 and found a statistically significant odds ratio 
of 1.5. Model (10) found that the natural log of total CCSP receipt averaged between 
July 2015 and January 2018 was not statistically associated with the likelihood of 
being of higher quality, though the odds ratio was similar in magnitude. Finally, 
results from model (11) found that, compared with family child care providers that 
received CCSP dollars in the bottom half of the distribution and were located in 
relatively low-poverty zip codes, providers with higher CCSP dollars located in high-
poverty zip codes were more likely to be higher quality (OR=2.4).  
Across the various models, few covariates were statistically associated with 
higher quality providers. The length of EXCELS participation, time since first 
licensed, licensed capacity under 2, and percentage of a zip code that is rural were 
positively associated with higher quality family child care providers. Considering few 
of the zip code covariates differed between family providers that were higher quality 
and those that were lower quality, it is not surprising that the zip code covariates were 
not associated with a center’s higher quality rating in the models.  
Summary. 
 Results from my quantitative research found that for both child care centers 
and family child care providers, a greater subsidy density was associated with a 
greater likelihood of a provider being rated higher quality and eligible to receive a 
tiered child care payment. Additionally, for both types of providers, the subsidy 





higher quality, while the subsidy density of children under age 2 was not statistically 
associated with the likelihood of being of higher quality. Together, these quantitative 
findings indicate that Maryland’s tiered child care reimbursement system appears to 
be incentivizing providers that serve a higher proportion of children on child care 
subsidy to become higher quality providers, and that the incentive is largely due to 
the subsidy density of children 2 and older. Child care centers typically serve many 
more children that are 2 or older, so it makes sense that the subsidy density of older 
children would be the driver of increased quality. 
 In general, odds ratios were much larger for child care centers than for family 
child care providers, likely because there is a much larger possible spread of subsidy 
densities for child care centers than family child care providers. Family child care 
providers had a maximum licensed capacity of 7, with 82 percent of family child care 
providers being licensed for four or five children in January 2018. Additionally, 
compared with child care centers, a much smaller percentage of family child care 
providers were higher quality, and 40 percent were located in Baltimore City and 
Baltimore County. The clustering of higher quality family child care providers in 
these two jurisdictions likely was the cause of rho not being statistically significant 
once zip code demographic characteristics were added in model (3)—there was 
simply not much variation between higher quality providers once these characteristics 
were included. 
While the findings supported the theory of tiered reimbursement, I briefly 
wanted to note a few specific findings and their relation to prior research or theory. 





funding and QRIS ratings in North Carolina, I expected that centers with below 
average subsidy densities that were located in high-poverty areas would be less likely 
than centers with below average subsidy densities that were located in low-poverty 
areas to be higher quality. However, my research did not find a difference between 
the likelihood of being higher quality for a center (or a family child care provider) 
with low subsidy density based on the poverty of its zip code. The differing results 
may be due to Hatfield et al. (2015) using a more comprehensive measure of 
“concentrated affluence” (i.e., percentage of families with incomes $75,000 or higher, 
percentage of adults with a college education, and percentage of civilian labor force 
employed in professionals or managerial occupations) than my measure of poverty. 
Maryland’s tiered reimbursement system has higher tiered percentages for (a) 
in child care center, children under 2 compared with children 2 and over and (b) for 
children served in child care centers compared with family child care providers. 
Therefore, I hypothesized that a child care center’s subsidy density for children under 
2 would have a higher odds ratio and be more predictive of higher quality status than 
a provider’s subsidy density for children 2 and over. My results did not support my 
hypothesis, as I found that, for centers, the subsidy density of children 2 and older 
was statistically significant (OR=3.5), while the subsidy density for children under 2 
was not statistically significant. Additionally, I hypothesized that child care centers 
would be more sensitive to the incentives than family child care providers. My results 
supported my hypothesis and found a larger odds ratio for a center’s subsidy density 
variable (OR=4.9) than for a family child care provider’s subsidy density variable 





much smaller (about 8 children in lower quality centers and 10 children in higher 
quality centers; see Table A.9) than for children 2 and older (about 53 children in 
lower quality centers and 66 in higher quality centers), it is logical that centers 
reacted more to the subsidy density of older children.  
Qualitative Results 
While I intentionally interviewed directors of centers that varied by subsidy 
density and surrounding poverty, responses did not vary based on these 
characteristics. In the following results, I indicate whether respondents are child care 
center directors or from larger organizations and, when it seems like helpful context, 
the EXCELS rating of respondents. 
All of the interviewed center directors reported serving school-age children, 
though only one center that was not a school-age center reported a waiting list for 
school-age children. Aside from the school-age centers, all of the other centers served 
preschool children and two centers reported waitlists for these classrooms. Consistent 
with representative research, six of the nine centers that cared for infants had infant 
waitlists. One of the centers that had waitlists for infant and toddlers was the newest 
center in the interview sample, which opened in May 2016. 
Three child care center directors—all from centers with an EXCELS rating of 
3—reported their centers served especially vulnerable populations. Two centers 
served a relatively high number of children in foster care, which, reportedly, comes 
with additional monitoring visits from the foster care system and delayed payments. 
A third center reached out to shelters and partnered with the county to provide child 





provided almost 50 children with transportation between the child care center and a 
transit station, understanding that parents could not easily access the child care center. 
These center directors seemed to especially enjoy serving vulnerable populations, 
reporting that they provided diapers and winter coats to children and helped parents 
find food, housing, and electric assistance. One of the center directors owns three 
sites; she was especially proud of the center that served the neediest families. 
Parents’ Child Care Choices 
For the demand-side of QRIS to work, parents must be aware of EXCELS and 
use EXCELS to make decisions. As described below, center directors did not believe 
most parents were aware of EXCELS. Rather, directors thought parents learned of 
their center through word-of-mouth and made decisions on which center to choose 
based on personal recommendations or positive relationships they witnessed while 
visiting the center. 
Parents’ knowledge of EXCELS. 
Center directors did not believe EXCELS ratings (or the EXCELS website) 
factor into parents’ choice of child care. Directors reported that parents of children 
participating in the CCSP knew to ask if the center participated in EXCELS, but 
directors did not think parents knew what it meant for a provider to participate in 
EXCELS, beyond knowing that the provider could serve children in the CCSP. Two 
directors thought that well-educated parents were aware of EXCELS ratings even 
though they did not think the ratings were a factor into the decision to choose a 





before making a child care decision and the EXCELS rating is on the licensing 
website.  
Five directors (three at centers rated 3 and two at centers rated 2) routinely 
told prospective parents about their participation and rating in EXCELS. As one 
center director reported, parents seemed to like the idea of EXCELS once explained 
to them, but EXCELS did not factor into their decision making: 
I tell them I'm in Maryland EXCELS, level 3, and they’re like, “OK, 
what's that?” [laughs] I'm being honest. "What does that mean?" [I 
say,] “It's a quality rating program so it helps us know what we are 
supposed to do. It has great resources. It helps me take a look at some 
of the things I'm supposed to offer in the center. It makes me take a 
look at the things that the staff is doing to make sure we are doing 
what the kids need.” And they're like, "OK, that's good, but I just want 
to know if the kids are happy." I’m being honest with you. "All that is 
great, I'm glad you're participating, but are they happy?"  
 
A second of the five center directors reported always asking if prospective families 
were aware of EXCELS, but none ever were. She went on to say that, “We do it and 
we are proud to do it…but as far as parents recognizing it—once they are in here, 
they’re happy and they don’t care what your status is.” This director and one other 
stated that MSDE needed to do a better job of marketing EXCELS to parents. 
While the process differs by county, in general, school-age child care 
programs are required to compete for their spots in schools every few years. None of 
the individuals at the three central offices for the school-age child care programs 
thought that EXCELS ratings factored into winning their spots. When asked if 
EXCELS may be a factored into the decision, one respondent replied, “Absolutely 
not. School system principals and administrators have no clue.” Rather, individuals 





example, another respondent explained that her organization works hard to build good 
relationships with principals, so if a principal moves to a school that does not have 
their afterschool program, the principal may bring in the organization to run the 
afterschool program. 
Information parents used to make child care choices. 
Rather than using the EXCELS website to learn of centers, center directors 
over-whelming reported that parents learned of their centers through word-of-mouth. 
Only one center director of a corporate chain did not mention word-of-mouth as how 
parents learned of their centers. The corporate child care provider had a marketing 
department that included TV commercials, radio advertisements, and social media, 
such as individual Facebook pages for each center location. Three or fewer directors 
reported that parents learned of their centers through flyers, social media, and center 
websites. One center director enlisted a technology company to conduct a mobile 
campaign in which advertisements for the child care center would pop up if a user 
searched for “child care” and the city in which the center is located. The director 
reported that he has seen an increase in traffic to his website.  
Word-of-mouth and personal relationships also emerged as memorable 
reasons for why parents chose a center. Two directors recalled stories of parents who 
had prior relationships with their centers. A director with 20 years of experience at 
her center (with an EXCELS rating of 2) recalled that she had “parents tell me, ‘I 
remember when I was a child, I was with you, so I feel like bringing them to you 
again.’” One of the directors who cared for a lot of foster children noted that the 





center. Two other center directors relayed stories of parents that liked the 
relationships they witnessed or heard about while touring the center. In one instance, 
the director of a center with an EXCELS rating of 3 recalled: 
There was one situation where a parent toured…the fours classroom. The 
parent was impressed by the interaction her child had with another child. 
They automatically became besties. And, the parent said, “I think my child 
will like it here.” Boom. And they enrolled. It’s important that the child is 
happy.  
 
A director of a center with an EXCELS rating of 3 relayed a story about a prospective 
parent trusting the recommendation of a current parent at the center:  
I had one parent who came to tour and she didn't know [whether to 
enroll]. And as she was leaving, a parent was coming in and she said, 
“Hey, how long has your child been going here?” And the parent was 
just way over the top: “My child has been going there since he was 
born and they are great people. And [we] love it.” And she literally 
turned around and came back in and said she wanted to enroll. 
 
Finally, the same center director who had a media marketing campaign and believed 
that well-educated parents checked the licensing website before making child care 
decisions, thought that parents chose his center because of reviews on websites such 
as Google, Yelp, and Facebook. 
In addition to recommendations, center directors reported that parents chose 
their center because the center offered a safe and clean environment; had engaging, 
caring staff; and/or felt like a community or a home-away-from-home. Three center 
directors thought parents chose their center, in part, because of parents’ ability to 
check-in on their children, either through open door policies or through cameras 
installed throughout the center. One center director explained that she told 
prospective parents they did not need an appointment to visit the center, as the center 





parents chose their center because of the center’s curricular offerings: one center 
director thought that the curriculum (focused on play-based learning) was a second 
motivation behind the center’s nurturing environment and a second center director 
thought that English-speaking families liked that bilingual Spanish-speaking staff 
incorporated Spanish into the curriculum. EXCELS does not clearly have an impact 
on any of these factors, though licensing ensures a safe environment and required 
professional development may result in more engaged staff.  
Center directors also mentioned more practical reasons parents may choose 
their center, such as price and convenience. A director of a center with an EXCELS 
rating of 3 thought parents initially chose a center because of the price, though she 
noted that some parents would leave her center to save $20 a week and then end up 
coming back because their child was not receiving the same quality of care. This 
same director began offering part-time options after the 2008 recession and multiple 
families avail themselves of the part-time option. Providers of afterschool programs 
that were located in schools thought parents chose their program because of the 
convenience and affordability. Similarly, one center with an EXCELS rating of 2 was 
under-enrolled and the director attributed part of the enrollment drop to the local 
schools having cheaper options for school-age care.  
EXCELS Payments 
For EXCELS payments to act as an incentive to improve care, providers must 
be aware of the payments. In fact, all but one of the interviewed directors was aware 
of Maryland’s tiered reimbursement program, though one did not learn of it until she 





payments while working on the ERS with a QAS). The one center director that was 
not aware of the payments was rated a level 1 in EXCELS and, during her interview, 
asked me what “was the point of EXCLES” and whether the EXCELS rating matters. 
As she had waitlists for all of her ages, the EXCELS rating appeared not to “matter” 
to her clientele, many of which participated in the CCSP.  
Three interviewees affiliated with for-profit centers reported that EXCELS 
payments factored into their decision on what EXCELS level to reach or how quickly 
to reach it and none of the centers were singularly motivated by the payments. None 
of the four owners I interviewed reported being motivated by EXCELS payments. 
One director of a center that opened in 2016 and is in the 3rd quartile of subsidy 
density learned of EXCELS payments through a discussion with a QAS who used a 
monthly CCSP invoice to explain exactly how much additional money the center 
could receive. The director remembers thinking, “Hey, let’s try to do that” and 
reported that the payments were a “major motivation” to increase her EXCELS rating 
and within two-and-a-half years of opening, her center was rated level 3. However, 
the director also reported that her original goal was to become an accredited center, 
indicating that the EXCELS payments may have been only part of the motivation for 
improving in EXCELS. A second center director in the 3rd quartile of subsidy density 
had recently experienced a decrease in the number of children participating in the 
CCSP, and she reported that she would like to achieve a level 3 to receive additional 
money through the EXCELS payments. However, this center has been a level 2 for 
over two years so it does not appear that the incentive is very motivating. Finally, one 





of the reason the chain decided on a goal of level 3 for all of its centers, with the other 
reason being a level 3 was the highest a center could go without working towards 
accreditation. Interestingly, across all centers of this corporation, fewer than 3 percent 
of children receive child care subsidies. In contrast, three other interviewees 
specifically reported that they wanted to reach an EXCELS level 3 (or higher) to “do 
the right thing for children” or because of “a passion that all kids have a right to good 
quality child care. They didn’t get to choose what their parents’ income was going to 
be.”  
With the exception of one afterschool provider, all directors of centers rated 
EXCELS level 3 or higher were appreciative of the EXCELS payments. Directors 
most commonly reported spending their EXCELS payments on supplies, such as toys 
and books. One director reported spending her EXCELS payments on staff 
incentives, such as staff dinners or gift cards for holiday door decorating contests. 
Another director spent her EXCELS payments on enrichment activities with outside 
instructors, such as yoga or music, for which most child care centers charge parents 
extra money. This same director—in the third quartile of subsidy density—expressly 
noted that she did not use EXCELS payments on staff salaries because the bonuses 
were not a reliable source of income. None of the directors reported used the 
EXCELS payments to offset the cost of child care for families receiving a subsidy. 
The one afterschool provider that did not appreciate the EXCELS payments was a 
government agency that found it difficult to account for the additional payments to 
the accounting department. She said she would opt out of the EXCELS payments if 






Changes Due to EXCELS 
Almost all directors reported that they participated in EXCELS because it was 
required to serve children receiving child care subsidy. One school-age provider with 
multiple locations said she hated that MSDE tied subsidies—which were already a 
“real pain”—to the voluntary EXCELS program. The provider felt that all of her 
centers were already of high-quality so she did not see the immediate benefit to her 
program. In fact, all of the locations entered EXCELS at a level 3. This provider’s 
annoyance with EXCELS was atypical. More commonly, responses were similar to 
the following, from a provider rated level 3:  
If I can be candid, we were required to [participate]. Since we were 
required to, we dived right into it. I think it does showcase our centers, 
our staff qualifications…it is time consuming. It’s a lot of 
documentation. I found it kind of rewarding at the end. It kind of 
opened—peeled our layers back to let the public know what our 
policies are for discipline. It kind of made us think about some of the 
stuff. Stuff that was always there, but to actually document and get it 
into policy. 
 
Though directors may have initially participated in EXCELS because it was 
required, about half of the center directors reported that they participated in EXCELS 
to improve their program. And, almost all directors reported making changes to their 
programs due to EXCELS, especially around their curriculum and staffing.  
Curriculum. 
Four directors reported making changes to their curriculum to meet higher 
EXCELS standards, two reported improving their learning centers, and one stopped 
watching TV on Friday afternoons. To reach EXCELS level 2 (or 3), a center’s lesson 





center must demonstrate “implementation of a curriculum that is aligned” with certain 
curricula (a sub-set of those for levels 2 or 3). And, to reach EXCELS level 5, a 
center must implement a state-recommended or recognized curriculum (a sub-set of 
those for level 4).23 Two directors, at centers rated levels 2 and 3, reported that they 
each had originally developed their own curriculum and EXCELS helped them get a 
more organized curriculum. An after-school provider with multiple locations (rated 
levels 1 and 2) throughout Maryland spent several weeks in the summer of 2018 
revising its curriculum to meet standards. The provider was very intentional and 
workgroups of program directors (who oversee the site directors) worked carefully to 
ensure the curriculum aligned with EXCELS standards.  
Finally, a director of a faith-based center reported that she was experimenting 
this school year with a particular curriculum that MSDE had recently added to its list 
of recommended or recognized curricula. The newly added curriculum has optional 
faith-based lessons and she reported it was the first state recommended or recognized 
curricula with faith-based options. If the director decides to continue with the 
curriculum, she plans to try to improve in EXCELS from a level 3 to a level 4 or 5. 
The director reported that she and her staff really liked the curriculum, so far, and felt 
that it helped build language and had helpful parent engagement aspects. 
Staffing. 
                                                 
23 Developmentally Appropriate Learning and Practice standard 4 states that for level 2 or 3, “MSDE 
Health Beginnings: Supporting Development and Learning from Birth through Three Years of Age, 
Maryland Model for School Readiness (MMSR), or state recommended or recognized curriculum 
guides the lessons planning process.” Level 4 states, “Implementation of a curriculum that is aligned 
with the MMSR and/or sate-recommended or recognized curriculum.” Level 5 states, “Implementation 





Four directors reported being more aware of whether potential new staff were 
enrolled in Maryland’s credentialing program or were willing to be. The Maryland 
Child Care Credential Program is a voluntary “quality incentive program that 
recognized child care providers for exceeding the requirements of State licensing 
regulations. It is a career ladder that directs an individual to build knowledge and 
skills in a cumulative manner from introductory training to advanced level education” 
(MSDEc, 2018). The EXCELS staff qualifications standard is tied directly to the 
Maryland credential program.24 Two directors of EXCELS level 3 centers were 
focused on finding staff with the right credentials: one reported that when someone 
quits, she immediately checks their credential level to know what credential level she 
will need to find as a replacement. The second was trying to find staff that are already 
credentialed, instead of having to train them, but she acknowledged that it is hard to 
find credentialed staff. A director of an EXCELS level 5 center explained that she 
looks for staff with a degree in early childhood education (or willing to go back to 
school) and that are part of Maryland’s credential program (or are willing to 
participate). Finally, the afterschool provider who was unhappy that EXCELS was 
tied to CCSP acknowledged that EXCELS encouraged her to add a 3 percent bonus 
for staff that are credentialed. She reported that participation in the credential system 
                                                 
24 Specifically, 60 percent of staff at an EXCELS level 2 program must hold a Maryland Child Care 
Staff Credential at Level 2 or higher; 60 percent of staff need a Level 3 credential in an EXCELS level 
3 program; 60 percent of staff need a Level 4 credential in an EXCELS level 4 program; and 60 
percent of staff need a Level 4+ credential in an EXCELS level 5 program. Credential Level 3 requires 
90 clock hours of child care training, while a Level 4 requires 135 clock hours of training broken down 
very specifically by category (or a National Child Development Associate degree), and Level 4+ 





has helped her hold staff accountable for training and professional development (as 
credentials require annual training for renewal). 
 
Continuous improvement. 
Two program directors reported focusing on “continuous improvement” quite 
intentionally. To achieve an EXCELS level 3, a center must conduct a self-
assessment with the ERS and create a process for continuous quality improvement, 
informed by the ERS. While the ERS is only required to be conducted once, one 
program director of a level 3 center reported that she continued to refer to the ERS 
training books to “see where we are and what we still need to do. I sit in the 
classroom and observe. How can I help my teachers get better? I use the books just as 
an everyday tool.”  
An interviewee at a corporate child program reported that she conducted the 
ERS for all of the center locations, presented the results to the CEO, and used the data 
to determine which centers needed to be refurbished: 
Because Maryland EXCELS is saying that this [ERS] is a good 
platform to use to determine quality, we did it and I can literally sit 
and tell him [the CEO] exactly what numbers we’re getting in room 
arrangement [and] in space and furnishing. And because our numbers 
were all pretty low, we went and had a huge initiative…I spent the 
entire year refurbishing 15 centers. And we put in $1 million to go 
through and refurbish the centers. Because I am coming back to the 
CEO and he is saying, “Why are these numbers so low?” And, I'm 
saying “Because they don't have materials.” “What do you mean they 
don't have materials?” “They don't have musical instruments. In 
science, there is one magnifying glass and...kids play with things, or 
things go home in pockets, or things get broken or you miss one puzzle 
piece and the whole puzzle is gone.” So because Maryland EXCELS is 
saying this is a process we want you to do, we have then been able to 





the centers that needed it the most. And we spent a great deal of time 
and a lot of money bringing those low centers up to a higher quality. 
 
The interviewee reported that the corporation is planning to refurbish all of the 
school-age programs and she plans to conduct the ERS twice each year in each 
center. 
Five interviewees specifically mentioned how much they appreciate the 
EXCELS program and how it has helped improve their quality. For example, one 
director of an EXCELS level 3 provider said, “You learn so much from EXCELS—
things you wouldn't even think about. It’s, literally, crazy how much you actually 
learn. I think although we may have the amount of kids we have, I may not feel as 
successful if we didn’t start EXCELS—not successful but more confident in our 
program.” The interviewee at the corporate child care program reported that she has 
the benefit of traveling to national child care conferences and “when you say you are 
from Maryland, people are like, ‘Oh!’ I think that nation-wide Maryland is seen as 
one of the pinnacles of quality programming and it’s because of EXCELS and our 
accreditation.” 
Summary. 
Though directors may have initially participated in EXCELS because it was 
required, almost all directors reported making changes to their programs due to 
EXCELS, particularly around curriculum, staffing, and continuous improvement. 
Changes around staffing included ensuring that new staff were credentialed at the 
same level of departing staff. As will be discussed in the section on challenges, 







Supports for EXCELS  
QAS were instrumental in helping directors understand EXCELS standards, 
decide upon a goal for an EXCELS level, support directors in moving up EXCELS 
levels, and, ultimately, for providing a positive experience with EXCELS. All of the 
directors appreciated the work of QAS (and some mentioned the CCRC staff) and 
their trainings, workshops, and individual support. Directors reported that the 
workshops were offered at convenient times and locations. One interviewee 
commented that, “The training they provided was excellent. You can read the website 
and read the materials, but having someone break it down as to how it benefits the 
associates and how it benefits the centers. Eye-opening—that aha moment—now I get 
it!” Another director reported that without the “great support team,” she would have 
“stayed away a little bit longer.” Echoing what the QAS reported about their role, one 
director reported that the QAS “wanted us to be successful. ‘I’m going to help you do 
this’—almost to the point—'if I have to come sit at your center.’ They were very 
motivated to get you in.” Another director recalled that a QAS motivated her to reach 
EXCELS level 3 because she quickly reached level 1. Similarly, one director of a 
center rated level 1 recalled that, because she was not very good with computers, a 
QAS helped her with the initial application. She also appreciated the reminders to re-
publish and help she received when she did not re-publish in time. Finally, she was 






One center director and two after-school providers with multiple locations 
reported they required staff to attend EXCELS trainings to better understand the 
EXCELS standards and process and scholarships available to staff to improve their 
qualifications. One center director reported that her staff benefited from hearing about 
quality from an impartial trainer: 
Then they come back and say, “OK you really were telling us the 
truth….” Because sometimes they think that we are making up stuff for 
them to do. But, once they hear it from someone else—they learn the 
proper way to do a lesson plan, how to set up your classroom, quality 
things you should be offering, how to talk to a parents, less screen 
time, the importance of doing things that meet a child's needs and that 
every child is not on the same level. 
 
One after-school provider required all of the site directors to attend a training in the 
summer of 2014, so the directors knew what was going to happen over the coming 
year as the centers enrolled in EXCELS. A second afterschool provider that was 
trying to move centers up from levels 1 and 2 required that all staff attend EXCELS 
training over the summer of 2018. The training included information on EXCELS and 
scholarships available for staff to further their education. The director reported that 
the staff were “really excited” about the scholarship opportunities. 
 Two directors reported using the scholarship funds to receive their own 
Associates’ degree in prior years. One of the directors encouraged her staff to use the 
funds and get their degree. She believed the scholarship raised “our teachers’ 
awareness of the importance of what they do. Also, when they are going to school, 
they are motivated, so their classrooms are being run better, and they are putting into 





their whole job here.” She hoped that MSDE would continue to offer the scholarship 
funds. 
 
Challenges to Improving EXCELS Rating 
While center directors were appreciative of MSDE-provided supports to 
improve their EXCELS rating, directors reported a number of challenges to 
improving ratings. Directors reported that it was challenging to move beyond a level 
3 in the staffing and accreditation domains. Additionally, directors of centers not 
affiliated with large chains experienced challenges finding the time to complete 
EXCELS requirements. 
Staffing. 
While some staff were reportedly excited about furthering their education, the 
majority of center directors reported that staffing requirements were a barrier to 
moving beyond a level 3 in EXCELS. While one director noted that her staff loves 
trainings and credentialing is not a challenge in moving beyond level 3 (her current 
level and her goal is a 5), three center directors and all three afterschool providers 
noted a lack of interest or passion among staff to attend trainings and increase their 
credential level. As one director explained, her staff do not have the same passion she 
had when she entered the child care field: 
I think we have to figure out a way to get them trainings so they don't 
have to give up their weekends. Because working with children, you do 
need your downtime. But you have to end up giving up some of your 
weekends because parents hate when you close to do trainings…. It's a 
different generation then when I came into child care. When I came in, 
I had passion for it, I liked it, I said this was my livelihood so if I had 
to go on the weekends, I didn't grumble about it, I went. But, this is a 





saying it in a bad way, but that's the way it is. Me, I enjoyed going to 
trainings and meeting people because this was my passion. All of 
them, this is not their passion and they grumble and complain. They 
like what they do, but it's not their passion. And, then you have moms 
that are single. 
 
Another director reported that his staff had the training to be credentialed, but 
the staff did not complete the paperwork to get credentialed. He felt they were 
“being lazy” and did not become credentialed because “it doesn’t excite 
them.” A third director of a center at EXCELS level 2, had staff that had been 
working with her for 15 or 20 years and she did not expect them to go back to 
the school to earn college credit or a degree. This director’s concern with 
staffing may show a misunderstanding of the credential program, as she 
mentioned that her experienced staff have 90 hours of training—indicating 
that they would probably qualify as a Credential Level 3, which is what is 
required to move to a level 3 in EXELS. The director of the newest center in 
the interview sample was confused, in general, by the credentialing 
requirements. 
 The interviewee at the corporate child care center noted that the credentialing 
requirement is “what’s going to keep some accredited centers from being a level 5.” 
She went on to explain the supports the corporate center provides to the staff:  
We're trying to do everything we can to support our teachers to 
become the highest level they can. So, we go around and talk to 
them about the child care professional development fund. We 
will pay for it. Here at [corporate center], we have a tiered 
program. If you get this highest level, you get bonuses. We 
have gold, silver, and bronze. I think we try to match 






Similarly, one of the afterschool providers offers a “nice raise” to staff that earn 
Associate’s degrees and the provider pays for their staff to earn the degree. However, 
the interviewee was not happy with the uptake rate. She noted that some of the 
afterschool locations had the physical space to serve more children, but the locations 
had waitlists simply because they did not have enough qualified staff.  
Similarly, other afterschool providers felt their challenges to securing trained 
staff were even greater than typical child care centers, as school-age child care 
requires a split shift (e.g., from 7–9 am before school and 3–6 pm after school), and 
none expected their sites to be able to advance beyond a level 3 in EXCELS. Two 
afterschool providers noted that their staff were relatively young, perhaps trying to 
decide if school-age care (as opposed to caring for younger children) is the right fit 
for them or passing the time for “a couple months and then something else comes 
down the pike.” One afterschool provider noted that the qualifications for an 
afterschool teacher and director are similar except for one additional course 
requirement for a director. She thought that some teachers appreciated the opportunity 
to move up in the child care field, but she still dealt with a lack of qualified staff and 
staff turnover. 
Another challenge mentioned by five interviewees was the challenge of 
keeping qualified staff—what one director referred to as a “cost-benefit analysis.” 
One director noted that soon after a staff member earns a bachelor’s degree (which is 
beyond what is required by EXCELS), she would leave for the public school system 
where her pay vastly increased. This director and a second director noted that it is 





parents of the children they serve cannot afford higher tuition: “We are the balancing 
act. Parents have their parameters, government [has] their parameters, and we are in 
the middle trying to find great people who will work with kids for a little bit of 
money.” Another director noted the challenge of keeping qualified staff in his 
Baltimore County locations when he believed a center in Howard County could offer 
higher pay, in part due to Howard County centers receiving a higher reimbursement 
rate for children on child care subsidy compared to Baltimore County centers. Finally, 
the corporate child care center interviewee noted that her corporation participates on 
the board of the Maryland State Child Care Association, which lobbies the Maryland 
legislature for higher wages for child care professionals, with the goal of having a 
more stable workforce. 
Accreditation. 
Three interviewees reported that accreditation was a challenge to increasing 
EXCELS levels, with two directors expressly mentioning the challenge in paying for 
accreditation. One director at a level 3 center noted that, “accreditation requires you 
to have a lot of stuff. And a lot of stuff costs a lot of money. And we do not charge a 
co-pay, so we base our finances off what the county gives us…. We are working 
through it; [it is] just taking longer.” One afterschool provider noted that accreditation 
standards were too difficult for the sites to meet, as the sites are located in school 
buildings and some accreditation requirements (e.g., temperature, windows, art work) 






Five of the eight child care center directors not affiliated with large child care 
providers reported that the time required for EXCELS was burdensome, as did one of 
the center directors that was part of a national chain. The center director that was part 
of a national chain did not receive any assistance from the corporation for EXCELS, 
perhaps because her corporate coordinator only oversaw one center in Maryland and 
was not familiar with EXCELS. In contrast, the corporate provider and the three 
afterschool providers included in my interview sample all had a staff member in the 
central office who was responsible for uploading EXCELS documents, such as staff 
and parent handbooks, into the EXCELS system. For three of the large providers, the 
central office exclusively worked in the EXCELS system, though in one of the large 
providers, site directors entered site-specific information, such as staffing, into 
EXCELS. The four large providers appreciated that all of their sites’ materials were 
reviewed by a single QAS, which helped ensure consistency across sites. An owner of 
three centers was aware of the assistance the large corporations provide, and he noted 
it was much more difficult for him to find the time for EXCELS: “What I've noticed 
is these big daycare centers, they have hundreds of centers and they have a special 
team to help their centers get to a 5. They can afford that. We cannot even finish up 
the workload that we have here: vouchers, invoices, payments, balance sheets, 
complaints, child health, teachers calling out.” 
Instead of relying on central staff, center directors of small franchises worked 
with their franchise colleagues to develop EXCELS documents, such as staff and 
parent handbooks, so the documents are consistent across sites. One owner of three 





documentation for the three centers. Another owner of three centers (who thought his 
staff were “lazy” for not getting their credentials) recently contracted with a former 
credentialing specialist to assist his staff in getting their credentials. A third director 
who was not technologically-savvy relied on a relatively young staff member to help 
with EXCELS and she acknowledged that if she did not have this staff member to 
help, she would have had to hire someone else. 
Three of the directors who noted the time burden of EXCELS also reported 
they were frustrated by the redundancy of the requirements as EXCELS levels 
increased. For example, moving up an EXCELS level for a specific standard may 
require additional specificity in the staff handbook and these directors wished the 
standard would have required that specificity in the lower levels, when they were first 
revising their policies: “Kind of seems like a waste of time if we met this in level 2 
and 3 and all you need for 4 and 5 is to add an extra sentence.” 
Finally, one director of a center rated level 2 was frustrated with the amount 
of time it took for MSDE to review uploaded documents in the EXCELS system. 
While she understood that “they have a lot of centers, not only me,” she was 
frustrated because “if I started working on EXCELS today, or this week, I don’t want 
to work on EXCELS next week. I took this week to do it.” As a director of a small 
center, she has other work to do and it is hard to find the time to devote to EXCELS. 
Three months prior to our interview, a QAS canceled a visit to help conduct the ERS 
and the director has not made the effort to contact the QAS to re-schedule, as she 






Directors reported that it was challenging to move beyond an EXCELS level 3 
in the staffing and accreditation domains, partly due to resource constraints. One of 
the challenges with staffing was the ability to find quality staff willing to work for the 
low wages typical of the child care workforce. Similarly, a challenge to gaining 
accreditation was the cost involved with improving a center to meet accreditation 
standards and the cost of accreditation itself. Finally, directors of centers not affiliated 
with large chains experienced challenges finding the time and capacity to complete 
EXCELS requirements.  
Accuracy of EXCELS Ratings 
About half of the interviewees felt their EXCELS ratings were an accurate 
representation of their quality. For example, a provider with multiple locations that 
ranged from EXCELS levels 1–5 thought that EXCELS appropriately differentiated 
the center locations. Two center directors of level 3 centers explained they tried very 
hard to ensure their center met all of the EXCELS standards, so, therefore, their 
ratings were valid. The responses of these two center directors indicated they believed 
that EXCELS validly measured quality. 
In contrast, an afterschool provider whose locations were all EXCELS level 3 
(except for new locations, that were EXCELS level 1) felt that some of the level 3 
centers with new directors were probably not providing care that she thought was 
indicative of a level 3 center. Two center directors did not feel that their EXCELS 
rating of 3 accurately captured their (high) quality, and both were working to improve 
their rating. Similarly, another afterschool provider with centers rated levels 1 and 2 





EXCELS was just a paper-based system. This interviewee’s concern about EXCELS 
being a paper-based system echoes concerns from MSDE and technical assistance 
providers. Additionally, four interviewees indicated that EXCELS could benefit from 
increased monitoring, including two afterschool providers who felt like the 
relationship component of child care was not accurately measured by EXCELS. The 
afterschool provider with centers rated EXCELS 1 and 2 stated that,  
Paperwork does not measure quality…. We make paperwork to fit the 
standard. That's not a measure of quality, because I can put the 
documents together. It’s really seeing how the parents are engaged, 
how the children are engaged, how the associates and teachers are 
engaged with the program. What are the outcomes of the projects we 
are doing. That's the measure of quality. Not this piece of paper that 
shows I am checking the box to meet this particular standard. [You] 
have to be in the program to see that. 
 
A center director at a level 3 center was also concerned about the relationship 
component of quality: “The quality of care you have to feel when you come through 
the door, the quality of teachers.” This director and another were also concerned that 
the EXCELS level 1 providers may not take the EXCELS standards seriously and 
their programming may not reflect care that is any higher than the licensing standard. 
Summary 
Results from my qualitative research found that center directors did not 
believe that EXCELS ratings factored into parents’ choice of child care, supporting 
my assumption. Importantly, all but one of the interviewed directors were aware of 
the EXCELS payments—a prerequisite for an incentive program to work—though 
one director did not learn of the EXCELS payments until she was almost finished 
with her level 3 requirements. Few center directors reported that EXCELS payments 





and none of the centers were singularly motivated by the bonuses. Interestingly, one 
interviewee in a large corporate chain reported that the EXCELS payments were part 
of the reason the chain decided on a goal of level 3 for all of its centers, with the other 
reason being a level 3 was the highest a center could go without working towards 
accreditation. However, across all centers of this chain, fewer than 3 percent of 
children receive child care subsidies. All directors, except for the director of a 
government-run afterschool program, were appreciative of the EXCELS payments. 
Directors most commonly reported spending their EXCELS payments on supplies, 
such as toys and books. One director in the third quartile of subsidy density expressly 
noted that she did not use EXCELS payments on staff salaries because the bonuses 
were not a reliable source of income. 
Maryland is one of seven states that requires that child care centers participate 
in EXCELS to serve children receiving child care subsidy. Perhaps not surprisingly, 
almost all directors reported that they decided to participate in EXCELS because it 
was required to serve children receiving child care subsidy. Directors reported that 
QAS were instrumental in helping directors understand EXCELS standards and 
decide upon a goal for an EXCELS level and supporting directors in moving up 
EXCELS levels. Directors were very appreciative of the support provided by QAS 
though trainings, workshops, and individual support. Though directors may have 
initially participated in EXCELS because it was required, with the support of the 
QAS, directors reported making numerous changes to their programs to improve their 
EXCELS levels, especially around their curriculum and staffing. Staffing was the 





Other challenges included accreditation and the time needed to complete EXCELS 
requirements. About half of interviewed program directors felt like their EXCELS 
rating was an accurate measure of their center’s quality. Four directors thought that 
the EXCELS program could benefit from increased monitoring. 
Summary 
Results from my descriptive analyses found that 52 percent of child care 
centers and 44 percent of family child care providers that participated in EXCELS 
received a CCSP reimbursement from MSDE in January 2018. When compared with 
the percentage of child care centers receiving CCSP that are higher quality (27 
percent), a lower proportion of family child care providers receiving CCSP are  
higher quality (9 percent) and the difference has widened over time. This results in a 
much higher proportion of children in the CCSP served by centers to be in higher 
quality care (about one-third of children), compared with children in the CCSP served 
by family providers (about 13 percent of children). For both types of providers, the 
percentage of CCSP recipients served by higher quality providers has increased over 
time. For both child care centers and family child care providers that participated in 
EXCELS, a similar percentage of providers (within provider type) that did and did 
not receive CCSP payments in January 2018 were of higher quality. For both types of 
providers that received CCSP payments, using group-mean centered data at the 
county level, higher quality providers had higher subsidy densities. 
Results from my quantitative research found that for both child care centers 
and family child care providers, a greater subsidy density was associated with a 





tiered child care payment. This result indicates Maryland’s tiered reimbursement is 
working as intended, though most children served by the CCSP are still in lower 
quality care. However, the results of my qualitative research did not provide the same 
results. While all but one of the interviewed directors were aware of the EXCELS 
payments, few center directors reported that EXCELS payments factored into their 
decision on what EXCELS level to reach or how quickly to reach it and none of the 
centers were singularly motivated by the bonuses. Rather, directors reported being 
intrinsically motivated to improve EXCELS ratings or motivated by QAS. Possible 
reasons for the convergent findings and implications for policy and future research 






Chapter 6: Discussion 
 
 My research used a mixed method study to understand if Maryland’s tiered 
reimbursement system incentivized child care centers and family child care providers 
to reach a level of quality on Maryland EXCELS (a QRIS system) that resulted in a 
tiered payment and, for child care directors, why the system was or was not an 
incentive. My research on Maryland’s tiered child care reimbursement system greatly 
expands upon the minimal research on tiered child care reimbursement programs. 
This chapter integrates the quantitative and qualitative findings, discusses limitations 
in the study design, suggests future research, and discusses policy implications.  
Integration of Results 
The results from my quantitative analyses show that, for both types of 
providers, serving a higher proportion of children in the CCSP was associated with an 
increased likelihood of reaching EXCELS level 3 and receiving an EXCELS 
payment. This result indicates Maryland’s tiered reimbursement is working as theory 
predicts. However, the results of my qualitative research did not provide the same 
result: few child care center directors reported being motivated by the EXCELS 
payments. Rather, directors reported being self-motivated to improve quality or were 
motivated by QAS. I frame the discussion of these divergent findings around the four 
possible reasons identified in Chapter 1 that the tiered reimbursement system may not 
work as intended: (1) providers are not aware of the tiered payments, (2) the incentive 
amount is too small, (3) providers lack capacity to meet the higher quality standards, 
and (4) providers have intrinsic motivation to meet higher quality standards. As the 





discussion focuses on the fourth identified reason a tiered reimbursement system 
could potentially not work. 
Providers Unaware of Tiered Payments 
For EXCELS payments to act as an incentive to improve care, providers must 
be aware of the payments. As described in the previous chapter, all but one of the 
interviewed directors were aware of the tiered reimbursement system, though one did 
not learn of it until she was almost through all of the requirements to achieve a level 
3. QAS reported spending time with center directors and family child care providers 
to calculate the exact EXCELS payment they would receive if they reached EXCELS 
level 3. One of the directors I interviewed recalled a QAS using a monthly CCSP 
invoice to explain exactly how much additional money the center could receive. The 
director remembered thinking, “Hey, let’s try to do that!” Thus, the qualitative data 
showed that providers were aware of the tiered payments—a finding that is an 
alignment with the overall quantitative findings. 
Incentive Amount Too Small 
 None of the four center directors that were rated EXCELS level 1 or 2 or the 
central staff of centers with multiple locations stated that the incentives were too 
small. Two directors of programs rated EXCELS level 3 mentioned the amounts of 
their EXCELS payments during the course of the interviews. One interviewee 
correctly identified exactly how much her EXCELS payments were for each CCSP 
participant, while the other one (incorrectly) stated, “maybe they [MSDE] added a 
dollar to each voucher or something like that.” Both indicated that they did not view 





reported being motivated by the EXCELS payments to reach level 3. Both of these 
center directors, as well as many others, were appreciative of the EXCELS payments 
and tended to spend the payments on supplies. The limited qualitative data on the size 
of the incentive indicates that center directors may view the incentives as small, but 
helpful and worthwhile—indicating alignment with the quantitative findings. Another 
way to understand the relative size of an incentive is think about the effort needed to 
earn the incentive, to which I will now turn. 
Lack of Capacity 
Five of the eight child care center directors not affiliated with large child care 
providers reported that the time required for EXCELS was burdensome, as did one of 
the center directors that was part of a national chain. In contrast, the corporate 
provider and the three afterschool providers all had a staff member in the central 
office who was responsible for uploading EXCELS documents, such as staff and 
parent handbooks, into the EXCELS system. An owner of three centers was aware of 
the assistance the large corporations provide, and he noted it was much more difficult 
for him to find the time for EXCELS. To provide assistance in moving beyond a level 
3 in EXCELS, he had recently contracted with a former credentialing specialist to 
assist his staff in completing paperwork requirements for their Maryland child care 
credentials. Another owner of three centers hired an administrator who devoted much 
of her initial time to EXCELS documentation for the three centers.  
There was even less capacity among owners/directors of single centers. Of the 
three center directors I interviewed that were rated EXCELS level 1 or 2, two were 





of the owners was not proficient with computers and relied on a young staff member 
to help with EXCELS. The owner and her assistant experienced challenges with 
getting organized and finding time to complete the documents to move from a level 2 
to a level 3. Another owner/director of a single center reported that she was motivated 
by the EXCELS payments to reach level 3. However, she has had a difficult time 
finding the time to devote to the paperwork and ERS needed to move to level 3 and 
she has been a level 2 center for two years. 
A final indication that lack of capacity may be a challenge in reaching 
EXCELS level 3 is that five of the seven non-participating center directors I 
contacted for interviews were from centers rated 1 or 2. Some refused to participate 
because they did not have time for an interview. One owner noted that his director 
just left, and she was the one who dealt with EXCELS. It seems likely that centers 
that did not consent to an interview had even less capacity than those whose directors 
could make time for an interview. 
The qualitative findings indicate that directors found it difficult to spend the 
time on EXCELS that is necessary to reach a level 3. While owners of franchises may 
have the resources to hire someone to assist with EXCELS, owners/directors of single 
centers are unlikely to have the resources to hire help. My quantitative models did not 
control for whether a center was part of a franchise or a national chain. However, 
larger centers had a statistically significant slightly increased likelihood of being 
higher quality (OR=1.005 for the continuous variable capacity ages 2 and older). 





Together, these results suggest that lack of capacity could keep some centers from 
reaching level 3, regardless of the size of the tiered payment. 
Intrinsic Motivation  
 The qualitative findings indicate that, instead of being motivated to improve 
quality to earn an EXCELS payment, center directors had intrinsic motivation to 
provide the best care they could. For example, three center directors reported that 
they wanted to reach an EXCELS level 3 (or higher) to “do the right thing for 
children” or because of “a passion that all kids have a right to good quality child care. 
They didn’t get to choose what their parents’ income was going to be.”  
The qualitative findings are not surprising, considering relevant organizational 
psychology theories. Under the theory of person-vocation fit, an individual will 
choose a vocation (i.e., a broad occupation) that fits with his or her skills, needs, and 
beliefs (Kristof, 1996; Vogel & Feldman, 2009). Grant’s (2007) job impact 
framework proposes that certain jobs enable people to make a prosocial difference. 
Among other propositions, the framework proposes that “the greater the frequency, 
duration, physical proximity, depth, and breadth of contact with beneficiaries 
provided by the job, the stronger the employee’s affective commitment to 
beneficiaries” (p. 402) and “the stronger the employee’s motivation to make a 
prosocial difference, the greater the employee’s effort, persistence, and helping 
behavior” (p. 404). Child care is not a well-paying field (Thomason et al., 2018) and 
child care center directors are likely drawn to the field out of their personal beliefs 
and interest. In fact, a random sample of teachers (not directors) in child care centers 





calling” (Torquati, Raikes, & Huddleston-Casas, 2007, p. 266). For people eager to 
make a prosocial difference, child care offers the ability to directly impact the 
development of young children. For centers that serve infants, directors will watch 
many of the infants grow into young children, knowing their center helped nurture 
and shape the children. Knowing the impact their center has, it would not be 
surprising if center directors were intrinsically motivated to provide the best quality 
care they could.  
The question remains, however, if center directors were intrinsically 
motivated, and not motivated by the incentive payment, why would providers with 
higher subsidy densities be more likely to reach EXCELS level 3? As already touched 
upon, perhaps all providers are similarly internally motivated, but providers that serve 
few children in the CCSP simply do not have the capacity to reach level 3. Another 
possibility could be that providers who are the most internally motivated to provide 
care to disadvantaged children are also the providers who are the most internally 
motivated to provide higher quality care. In that case, subsidy density would be a 
proxy for the intrinsic motivation to make a prosocial difference.  
Another possible explanation is that the center directors were, perhaps 
unconsciously, providing socially desirable answers (Paulhus, 2002). I tried to 
minimize this possibility by asking directors why they settled on an EXCELS rating, 
why they are (or, are not) currently working to improve their EXCELS rating, and 
then asking if the director was aware of the EXCELS payments. The three 
interviewees that reported that EXCELS payments motivated them to improve in 





For some of the other directors, after asking the protocol questions, it was natural to 
ask if EXCELS payments were a motivation to improve their EXCELS rating. When 
asked outright, all of these directors said that EXCELS payments were not a 
motivation for improving their EXCELS rating.  
While I have included a number of hypotheses as to why the divergence 
between the quantitative and qualitative findings occurred, further research (discussed 
below) is needed to better understand how intrinsic motivation relates to monetary 
incentives to reach EXCELS level 3. Fortunately, there is little reason to think that 
monetary incentives would crowd out intrinsic motivation (Cameron, Banko, & 
Pierce, 2001; Shaw & Gupta, 2015) and EXCELS payments may even be an additive 
incentive in that they validate the hard work that providers are doing to provide 
quality care (Cameron, Banko, & Pierce, 2001).  
Limitations 
 A key limitation of using administrative data for my quantitative analysis is 
that I could not determine why the incentives were associated with higher density. For 
example, the quantitative analysis could not account for whether providers were 
aware of the incentive payments or how intrinsic motivation may have contributed to 
the outcomes. A benefit of mixed methods research is that I have qualitative data for 
child care center directors on these topics. The interview results also confirmed prior 
research that parents are not using the QRIS to select care, thus confirming my key 






However, a limitation of my focused interviews is that center directors of 
lower quality providers were less likely to agree to speak with me.. As already noted, 
the center directors that participated in the interviews tended to have higher EXCELS 
ratings than the directors who did not participate and likely would have had different 
experiences with EXCELS and the tiered reimbursement system. Additionally, my 
interviews were confined to center directors. This design succeeded in securing a high 
participation rate among center directors (59 percent), compared with a 10 percent 
participation rate that Hallam et. al (2017) achieved for focus groups with family 
child care providers’ experiences with QRIS in Delaware and Kentucky. However, 
given that a lower proportion of family child care providers that serve children in the 
CCSP are higher quality (9 percent compared with 27 percent for child care centers), 
family child care providers likely have quite different experiences and thoughts about 
EXCELS and EXCELS payments. In fact, the regression results indicate that the 
tiered reimbursement system is not as much of an incentive for family child care 
providers, as compared with child care centers. 
Future Research 
 These limitations and my findings make clear that additional research is 
needed on how tiered reimbursement systems function. Ideally, interviews should be 
conducted with family child care providers and more directors from lower quality 
child care centers to better understand why these providers are not reaching EXCELS 
level 3 and the supports that may result in improvement. To attempt to unpack the 
processes by which Maryland’s tiered reimbursement system may improve the quality 





child care providers on their understanding of EXCELS payments (including their 
amounts), motivation, and capacity. These data, when combined with administrative 
data, would allow an analysis of how motivation and capacity moderate a provider’s 
quality status.  
Additional data that should be collected from providers via survey include 
enrollment and (for centers) auspice (i.e., for-profit, not-for-profit, or government-run 
status). Auspice would allow an analysis of whether for-profit status is associated 
with a larger response to incentives; the three interviewees who reported that 
EXCELS payments were (somewhat) motivating were all affiliated with for-profit 
centers. Enrollment data would enable an analysis of the association between a 
provider’s open capacity (i.e., licensed capacity minus enrollment) and their response 
to incentives. Enrollment data would also allow for a more accurate “subsidy density” 
independent variable. 
Future research could also examine whether subsidy density, motivation, and 
capacity are associated with separately reaching EXCELS levels 3, 4, and 5. As the 
vast majority of higher quality providers in January 2018 were rated at level 3, there 
were too few providers at levels 4 or 5 to permit a quantitative analysis. As Maryland 
EXCELS matures, more providers will reach these higher levels. 
 Maryland is a rather unique state to study in that all providers that receive 
CCSP payments are required to participate in EXCELS and tiered payments are not 
earned until a provider reaches level 3. While my research is the first to examine a 
state-level tiered reimbursement system, future research should examine states with 





an incentive to participate in their entirely voluntary QRIS. The underpinning theory 
of such a system is quite different from the theory underpinning Maryland EXCELS 
and its tiered reimbursement system.   
Finally, one of the findings from my qualitative research was that finding 
credentialed teachers was especially challenging, resulting in difficulty in increasing 
EXCELS levels. Maryland’s credentialing program offers one-time and annual 
monetary incentives, depending on the credential level. Future research on incentives 
should examine whether Maryland’s credential bonuses actually incentivize staff to 
undertake the additional effort required to increase their credential level.  
Policy Implications 
The findings from my quantitative and qualitative research should give pause 
to any state that does not currently have a tiered reimbursement system and is 
considering implementing one. Before implementing such a system, a state should 
conduct focus groups and surveys to better understand why providers are not 
currently receiving high ratings on their state’s QRIS. If capacity constraints are a 
concern, the state should consider if funds could be better spent on technical 
assistance, rather than tiered payments. Recall that some child care center directors 
reported that the QAS were instrumental in providing support and encouragement to 
increase EXCELS levels. If staff qualifications are a concern, the state should 
consider if funds would be better spent on career ladders and supports. 
For states that already have a tiered reimbursement system, my research 
suggests those states should examine their systems to assess whether they work as 





change what they are doing. Even if both my quantitative and qualitative research had 
indicated that the system was not functioning as an incentive, states would have to 
think carefully about how to revise their system without “taking away” from higher 
quality providers. Whether or not Maryland’s tiered reimbursement system caused 
providers to become high-quality, providers appreciated the EXCELS payments once 
they earned them. As with all policy, providers would not like to lose their benefit—
especially when they feel they are a higher quality provider who earned their 
payment. 
Finally, while my quantitative results indicate that the tiered reimbursement 
system works as theory predicts, most children participating in the CCSP are still 
being served by lower quality providers. and incentivizes providers to attain an 
EXCELS rating of 3 or higher, most children participating in the CCSP are still being 
served by lower quality providers. Additionally, most of the children participating in 
the CCSP in higher quality providers are in “marginally” higher quality providers. 
Specifically, 27 percent of child care centers serving children in the CCSP (with a 
published EXCELS rating) are higher quality, and 73 percent of higher quality 
centers were rated level 3 in January 2018. Even more pronounced, only 10 percent of 
family child care providers serving children in the CCSP are higher quality, and 68 
percent of higher quality family providers were rated level 3. If a state’s goal is to 
provide all disadvantaged children with high-quality care, a state must understand that 
a tiered reimbursement system—and its associated QRIS—cannot be the only avenue 





consider, at minimum, providers’ capacity to improve and career ladders to address 
staffing challenges.  
My findings have some specific implications for how Maryland implements 
its tiered reimbursement system. EXCELS payments are a percentage of an individual 
child’s CCSP payment. CCSP payment rates vary across the state, based on the cost 
of living in the area, especially the cost of rent and the cost to staff the location. 
However, directors reported spending their EXCELS payments on supplies, such as 
toys and books, whose prices are not sensitive to the location of a center. 
Additionally, though the EXCELS payments are over twice as large for child care 
centers serving children under 2 compared with children age 2 and older, the subsidy 
density of children 2 and older was associated with a center being high-quality, while 
the subsidy density for children under 2 was not. Given these findings, Maryland 
should consider providing three levels of identical bonuses to providers across the 
state, regardless of type, location, or age. 
Between FY 2018 and FY 2022, Maryland intends to increase its subsidy 
reimbursement from meeting the 11th percentile of the market rate to meeting the 60th 
percentile of the market rate. By no longer tying the EXCELS payment amounts to 
the amount of the child care subsidy, Maryland could provide more technical 
assistance through QAS to improve quality, monitor more child care centers to ensure 
quality, and undertake a more effective marketing campaign to ensure that parents are 
aware of EXCELS. Maryland should consider setting the EXCELS payment, for each 





in FY 2019 or setting a uniform EXCELS payment at a lower rate, but ensuring that 
no provider received less than they did in FY 2019.  
Summary 
 My research is the first in-depth study of a state’s tiered reimbursement 
system and greatly expands the limited research base. My mixed method research 
found that Maryland’s tiered reimbursement system produces outcomes as theorized, 
but I was unable to identify exactly why the results occurred. Center directors did not 
report that the EXCELS payments were especially motivational. Rather, some center 
directors reported they were intrinsically motivated to provide high-quality care. 
Further survey research is needed to understand how intrinsic motivation may 
moderate the outcomes derived from tiered reimbursement systems in Maryland and 






Appendix A: Supporting Tables 
 
Table A.1  
Descriptive Statistics for Raw Key Independent Variables for Centers 
Variable Minimum 25% 50% 75% Maximum Mean SD 
Density 0.003 0.030 0.083 0.243 4.455 0.199 0.313 
Under 2 Subsidy 
Density 0.000 0.000 0.154 0.500 2.600 0.314 0.415 
2+ Subsidy Density 0.000 0.025 0.077 0.233 3.916 0.189 0.288 
Density-Capped 0.003 0.030 0.083 0.243 1.000 0.188 0.241 
Average Density 0.001 0.022 0.070 0.256 4.242 0.192 0.316 
Average Density-
Capped 0.001 0.022 0.070 0.256 1.000 0.181 0.238 
ln Subsidy Amount 3.82 6.21 7.23 8.22 10.73 7.28 1.31 
Average ln Subsidy 
Amount 2.86 6.13 7.20 8.32 10.56 7.14 1.57 
Note. n=1,003 for the following variables: Density, Density-Capped, and ln Subsidy Amount. n=551 
for Under 2 Subsidy Density. n=981 for 2+ Subsidy Density. n=865 for Average Density and Average 
ln Subsidy Amount. 
 
Table A.2 
Descriptive Statistics for Group-Mean Centered Key Independent Variables for 
Centers 
Variable Minimum 25% 50% 75% Maximum Mean SD 
Density -0.459 -0.111 -0.058 0.038 4.245 0.000 0.285 
Under 2 Subsidy 
Density -0.713 -0221 -0.073 0.105 1.887 0.000 0.360 
2+ Subsidy Density -0.561 -0.110 -0.056 0.038 3.731 0.000 0.258 
Density-Capped -0.427 -0.103 -0.053 0.052 0.891 0.000 0.208 
Average Density -0.505 -0.114 -0.054 0.040 4.019 0.000 0.286 
Average Density-
Capped -0.439 -0.101 -0.051 0.059 0.840 0.000 0202 
ln Subsidy Amount -3.316 -0.903 -0.010 0.822 3.577 0.000 1.216 
Average Subsidy 
Amount -4.491 -0.854 0.106 0.996 3.542 0.000 1.477 
Note. n=1,003 for the following variables: Density, Density-Capped, and ln Subsidy Amount. n=551 
for Under 2 Subsidy Density. n=981 for 2+ Subsidy Density. n=865 for Average Density and Average 







Descriptive Statistics for Raw Key Independent Variables for Family Child Care 
Providers 
Variable Minimum 25% 50% 75% Maximum Mean SD 
Density 0.143 0.250 0.600 1.000 8.000 0.777 0.721 
Under 2 Subsidy 
Density 0.000 0.000 0.200 0.333 4.000 0.259 0.339 
2+ Subsidy Density 0.000 0.500 1.000 2.500 20.000 1.882 2.072 
Density-Capped 0.143 0.250 0.600 1.000 1.000 0.601 0.317 
Average Density 0.024 0.267 0.569 1.042 6.278 0.746 0.666 
Average Density-
Capped 0.024 0.267 0.569 1.000 1.000 0.587 0.344 
ln Subsidy Amount 3.02 6.13 6.74 7.33 9.43 6.70 0.87 
ln Average Subsidy 
Amount 3.77 6.03 6.81 7.34 9.81 6.64 0.99 
 Note. n=1,066 for the following variables: Density, Density-Capped, and ln Subsidy Amount. n=1,063 
for Under 2 Subsidy Density. n=1,049 for 2+ Subsidy Density. n=882 for Average Density and 




Descriptive Statistics for Group-Mean Centered Key Independent Variables for 
Family Child Care Providers 
Variable Minimum 25% 50% 75% Maximum Mean SD 
Density -1.081 -0.400 -0.154 0.217 6.967 0.000 0.683 
Under 2 Subsidy 
Density -0.382 -0.244 -0.013 0.143 3.654 0.000 0.331 
2+ Subsidy Density -3.444 -0.965 -0.368 0.632 16.555 0.000 1.906 
Density-Capped -0.588 -0.242 0.016 0.268 0.615 0.000 0.297 
Average Density -1.245 -0.376 -0.116 0.253 5.211 0.000 0.607 
Average Density-
Capped -0.735 -0.256 0.015 0.223 0.656 0.000 0.305 
ln Subsidy Amount -3.655 -0.551 -0.006 0.639 2.644 0.000 0.838 
ln Average Subsidy 
Amount -3.477 -0.529 0.120 0.653 2.810 0.000 0.924 
 Note. n=1,066 for the following variables: Density, Density-Capped, and ln Subsidy Amount. n=1,063 
for Under 2 Subsidy Density. n=1,049 for 2+ Subsidy Density. n=882 for Average Density and 








Number and Percentage of Centers Participating in EXCELS and Serving Children 
















Serving Children on 
Subsidy 
Allegany 22 17 8 77% 47% 
Anne 
Arundel 
236 155 51 66% 33% 
Baltimore 
City 
303 247 154 82% 62% 
Baltimore 
Co. 
385 287 161 75% 56% 
Calvert 50 38 18 76% 47% 
Caroline 10 7 4 70% 57% 
Carroll 83 70 33 84% 47% 
Cecil 36 25 21 69% 84% 
Charles 72 53 33 74% 62% 
Dorchester 12 9 6 75% 67% 
Frederick 114 82 34 72% 41% 
Garrett 15 13 3 87% 23% 
Harford 87 66 30 76% 45% 
Howard 179 130 50 73% 38% 
Kent 7 5 2 71% 40% 
Montgomery 497 310 141 62% 45% 
Prince 
George's 
385 308 181 80% 59% 
Queen 
Anne's 
17 11 6 65% 55% 
Saint Mary's 44 15 6 34% 40% 
Somerset 9 9 5 100% 56% 
Talbot 18 13 8 72% 62% 
Washington 61 39 22 64% 56% 
Wicomico 40 34 24 85% 71% 
Worcester 19 11 6 58% 55% 









EXCELS Rating Distribution for Centers, by County, January 2018 










Allegany 9 0 1 2 3 15 6 40% 
Anne 
Arundel 
62 16 52 2 7 139 61 44% 
Baltimore 
City 
154 26 41 2 4 227 47 21% 
Baltimore 
Co. 
172 24 57 4 11 268 72 27% 
Calvert 16 11 4 2 3 36 9 25% 
Caroline 2 0 3 0 2 7 5 71% 
Carroll 31 7 15 2 10 65 27 42% 
Cecil 16 2 5 0 0 23 5 22% 
Charles 39 5 4 0 3 51 7 14% 
Dorchester 3 1 2 1 2 9 5 56% 
Frederick 41 9 11 5 8 74 24 32% 
Garrett 5 1 1 0 5 12 6 50% 
Harford 31 14 11 1 7 64 19 30% 
Howard 69 25 13 1 13 121 27 22% 
Kent 2 0 0 1 2 5 3 60% 
Montgomery 130 39 87 12 17 285 116 41% 
Prince 
George's 
196 57 32 0 3 288 35 12% 
Queen 
Anne's 
6 1 0 1 2 10 3 30% 
Saint Mary's 6 2 2 0 1 11 3 27% 
Somerset 4 0 3 0 2 9 5 56% 
Talbot 2 1 1 0 7 11 8 73% 
Washington 12 15 3 1 7 38 11 29% 
Wicomico 19 3 4 4 2 32 10 31% 
Worcester 2 0 4 0 4 10 8 80% 










Number and Percentage of Family Child Care Providers Participating in EXCELS 



















Allegany 53 35 19 66% 54% 
Anne 
Arundel 
492 146 60 30% 41% 
Baltimore 
City 
528 447 310 85% 69% 
Baltimore 
Co. 
815 339 161 42% 47% 
Calvert 102 40 10 39% 25% 
Caroline 73 30 12 41% 40% 
Carroll 132 31 8 23% 26% 
Cecil 90 33 8 37% 24% 
Charles 206 80 36 39% 45% 
Dorchester 50 27 16 54% 59% 
Frederick 331 79 17 24% 22% 
Garrett 14 9 2 64% 22% 
Harford 283 104 45 37% 43% 
Howard 329 97 27 29% 28% 
Kent 19 4 2 21% 50% 
Montgomery 877 332 78 38% 23% 
Prince 
George's 
797 354 151 44% 43% 
Queen 
Anne's 
77 18 5 23% 28% 
Saint Mary's 180 35 15 19% 43% 
Somerset 22 17 11 77% 65% 
Talbot 39 15 7 38% 47% 
Washington 175 76 27 43% 36% 
Wicomico 97 53 31 55% 58% 
Worcester 31 17 8 55% 47% 









EXCELS Rating Distribution for Family Child Care Providers, by County, January 
2018 










Allegany 29 0 2 0 0 31 2 6% 
Anne 
Arundel 
88 8 5 1 9 111 15 14% 
Baltimore 
City 
368 24 26 0 4 422 30 7% 
Baltimore 
Co. 
259 19 8 1 9 296 18 6% 
Calvert 29 2 2 0 3 36 5 14% 
Caroline 17 2 5 0 1 25 6 24% 
Carroll 19 3 2 0 1 25 3 12% 
Cecil 24 2 3 0 0 29 3 10% 
Charles 54 3 1 0 2 60 3 5% 
Dorchester 16 1 7 0 0 24 7 29% 
Frederick 52 7 3 0 2 64 5 8% 
Garrett 6 0 1 1 0 8 2 25% 
Harford 83 5 4 0 2 94 6 6% 
Howard 68 10 3 0 3 84 6 7% 
Kent 3 0 1 0 0 4 1 25% 
Montgomery 217 22 6 2 36 283 44 16% 
Prince 
George's 
272 17 14 0 5 308 19 6% 
Queen 
Anne's 
9 2 2 0 1 14 3 21% 
Saint Mary's 26 0 1 0 0 27 1 4% 
Somerset 12 2 3 0 0 17 3 23% 
Talbot 12 1 0 0 0 13 0 0% 
Washington 50 3 6 0 4 63 10 21% 
Wicomico 36 3 6 0 3 48 9 19% 
Worcester 11 2 1 1 1 16 3 19% 















Density 0.189 0.228 
Year First Licensed 2009.5 2007.8** 
School-age programs 0.232 0.141** 
Length of participation (6-month chunks) 6.76 8.32** 
Under 2 licensed capacity 8.30 10.15 
2+ licensed capacity 53.40 65.86** 
Licensed slots per child under 5 in Zip Code 0.393 0.419 
Pct Pov < 5 in Zip Code 17.13 15.82 
Pct Asian in Zip Code 0.051 0.064** 
Pct Black in Zip Code 0.419 0.304** 
Pct Hispanic in Zip Code 0.084 0.096 
Pct Female with BA+ in Zip Code 19.06 21.17** 
Pct Mothers with kids <6 in labor force 77.8 77.37 
Unemployment rate in Zip Code 7.78 6.87** 
Pct rural 0.092 0.117 
Note. Italicized numbers and asterisks indicate a statistically significant difference between 
not high-quality and high-quality providers.* indicates significance at the 0.05 level and ** indicates 









Means of Raw Independent and Dependent Variables, by Family Child Care 






Density 0.756 0.978** 
Year First Licensed 2009.6 2009.0 
Length of participation (6-month chunks) 6.39 8.61** 
Under 2 licensed capacity 3.08 3.38** 
2+ licensed capacity 1.60 1.71 
Licensed slots per child under 5 in Zip Code 0.353 0.357 
Pct Pov < 5 in Zip Code 22.03 23.49 
Pct Asian in Zip Code 0.039 0.043 
Pct Black in Zip Code 0.490 0.438 
Pct Hispanic in Zip Code 0.077 0.077 
Pct Female with BA+ in Zip Code 17.11 16.61 
Pct Mother's with kids <6 in labor force 77.39 76.78 
Unemployment rate in Zip Code 8.92 8.52 
Pct rural 0.077 0.098 
Note. Italicized numbers and asterisks indicate a statistically significant difference between 
not high-quality and high-quality providers. * indicates significance at the 0.05 level and ** indicates 







Odds Ratio Estimates for Centers, Robustness Analyses 
Independent 
Variable 
Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) Model (9) Model (10) Model (11) 
Subsidy density – 
capped at 1.0 
6.724** 
(3.015) 
     
Avg. subsidy density  4.501** 
(1.672) 
    
Avg. subsidy density 
– capped at 1.0 
  6.311** 
(2.999) 
   
ln subsidy dollars    1.273** 
(0.099) 
  
ln avg. subsidy 
dollars 
    1.181* 
(0.085) 
 
Low subsidy dollars, 
high poverty 
     1.286 
(0.536) 
High subsidy 
dollars, low poverty 
     1.287 
(0.383) 
High subsidy 
dollars, high poverty 
     1.767 
(0.536) 



































































Licensed slots per 




























































Females with at least 



















































2-level model X X X X X X 
Note. * indicates significance at the 0.05 level and ** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. Standard errors are 
in parentheses. For models (6), (9), and (11), n=1,003. For models (7), (8), and (10), n=865. Rho is statistically 
significant at the 0.05 level for all models. For model (6) rho=0.148; for model (7) rho=0.163; for model (8) 






Odds Ratio Estimates for Family Child Care Providers, Robustness Analyses 
Independent Variable Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) Model (9) Model (10) Model (11) 
Subsidy density – 
capped at 1.0 
2.575* 
(1.077) 
     
Avg. subsidy density  1.539* 
(0.294) 
    
Avg. subsidy density 
– capped at 1.0 
  1.810 
(0.802) 
   
ln subsidy dollars    1.457** 
(0.220) 
  
ln avg. subsidy 
dollars 
    1.256 
(0.197) 
 
Low subsidy dollars, 
high poverty 
     0.631 
(0.292) 
High subsidy dollars, 
low poverty 
     0.802 
(0.286) 
High subsidy dollars, 
high poverty 
     1.857 
(0.764) 






















































Licensed slots per 




























































Females with at least 



















































2-level model X X X X X X 
Note. * indicates significance at the 0.05 level and ** indicates significance at the 0.01 level. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. For models (6), (9), and (11), n=1,066. For models (7), (8), and (10), 
n=882.Rho is not statistically significant at the 0.05 level for any of the models. For model (6) 
rho=0.084; for model (7) rho=0.046; model (8) rho=0.046; for model (9) rho=0.084; for model (10) 














Appendix C: Interview Protocols 
 




1) Please tell me your current role and how long you have been in that role. What 
other positions have you held related to early care and education? 
 
Tiered reimbursement system 
 
2) Maryland has had a tiered reimbursement system since 2001. Can you tell me 
why Maryland created a tiered reimbursement system in 2001? What was the 
theory and goal of the system? 
 
3) Tiered reimbursement systems vary quite a bit across states. Tell me how 
Maryland decided to create the system it created. Tell me about the process 
Maryland went through to create the system. For example, do you know how 
the rates were determined? 
 
4) Did Maryland consider revising the tiered reimbursement system when it 
created Maryland EXCELS? Why or why not? 
 
5) Do you believe the tiered reimbursement system is functioning as intended? 
Why or why not? 
 
History, theory, and use of Maryland EXCELS 
 
6) Tell me why Maryland created Maryland EXCELS. What is the theory and 
goal of the system? 
 
7) Quality Rating Improvement Systems vary quite a bit across states. Tell me 
how Maryland decided to create the system it created. Tell me about the 
process Maryland went through to create EXCELS.  
 
8) How has Maryland encouraged providers to participate in EXCELS? 
 
9) Tell me how Maryland decided to require certain providers, such as those that 
receive child care subsidies, to participate in EXCELS. 
 
10) How has Maryland encouraged parents to use EXCELS? How has Maryland 
worked with Child Care Resource and Referral Centers to help educate 









Provider engagement with Maryland EXCELS 
 
11) How does the EXCELS participation rate compare to Maryland’s 
expectations, say, five years ago? Are there certain types of providers that 
have participated at higher/lower rates than Maryland expected? To what do 
you attribute the differences in reality versus expectations? 
 
12) Are providers improving their EXCELS rating at the rate that Maryland 
expected? Are there certain types of providers that have improved at 
greater/lesser rates than Maryland expected? 
  
13) To what do you attribute the differences in reality versus expectations for 
EXCELS progression? Are there certain domains that have proved more 
challenging for providers/certain types of providers? How has Maryland tried 
to address those challenges? 
 
14) Are providers that serve children receiving child care subsides improving their 
quality as expected? Does the tiered reimbursement appear to be sufficient to 




15) If you had the opportunity to re-design Maryland’s tiered reimbursement 
system or EXCELS, what aspects of the systems would you consider 
changing? How so? 
 
16) Are there any additional challenges or successes to Maryland’s tiered 












1) Please tell me your current role and how long you have been in that role. What 
other positions have you held related to early care and education? 
 
Technical assistance to child care providers and child care provider engagement with 
Maryland EXCELS 
 
2) Tell me about the different types of technical assistance you offer to child care 
providers to improve their quality and, specifically, to improve their EXCELS 
rating. Are there certain types of providers that seek out your assistance to 
improve EXCELS ratings more than other types of providers? 
 
3) How does the EXCELS participation rate compare to your expectations? Are 
there certain types of providers that have participated at higher/lower rates 
than Maryland expected?  
 
4) To what do you attribute the differences in reality versus expectations for 
EXCELS participation? How do you encourage providers to participate in 
EXCELS? 
 
5) Are providers improving their EXCELS rating at the rate that you expected? 
Are there certain types of providers that have improved at greater/lesser rates 
than you expected? 
 
6) To what do you attribute the differences in reality versus expectations for 
EXCELS progression? Are there certain domains that have proved more 
challenging for providers/certain types of providers? What assistance do you 
offer to address those challenges? 
 
7) Tell me about the information you give to providers about Maryland’s tiered 
reimbursement system. 
 
8) Are providers that serve children receiving child care subsides improving their 
quality as expected? Does the tiered reimbursement appear to be sufficient to 
cover the expenses associated with improving in EXCELS? 
 
9) How do you think child care providers settle on an end goal for a Maryland 











10) Are there any additional challenges or successes to Maryland’s tiered 










1) Please tell me your current role and how long you have been in that role. What 




2) Tell me a little about your child care center’s enrollment.  
• What age children do you serve? Do you have a waitlist for children; if 
so, what ages? 
• Do you have a sense of how far most of the children travel to your 
center? For example, do you know if most parents live or work near 
your center? 
 
3) How do you think parents learn of your center and why do parents choose 
your center?  
• Do you think your Maryland EXCELS rating factors into their 
decision? What makes you think this way?  
• Can you share any specific stories of how parents choose your center? 
 
4) What is your estimate for the number or percentage of the children you serve 
that receive Child Care Subsidy/Purchase of Care vouchers?  
 
Maryland EXCELS experience 
 
5) Tell me about why you decided to participate in Maryland EXCELS.  
• When you first decided to participate, what was the highest quality 
rating you thought you’d reach?  
• How did your expectations change as you became more familiar with 
Maryland EXCELS? 
 
6) Tell me about your experiences to improve your quality rating. 
• How has your rating changed over time? 
• What challenges have you experienced in improving your Maryland 
EXCELS rating? 
• What training, technical assistance, or financial incentives have you 
used? Did these supports adequately address your challenges? How 
did you use the training or technical assistance that you received?  
 
7) How has Maryland EXCELS influenced your decision-making (e.g., staffing, 
training, curriculum)?  
 







EXCELS payments (formerly known as Tiered Reimbursement) 
 
9) Are you aware that Maryland offers EXCELS payments to providers receiving 
Child Care Subsidy/Purchase of Care reimbursements that have published at 
EXCELS levels 3, 4, or 5? If so, how did you learn of EXCELS payments?  
 
10) If you have received EXCELS payments, on average, what is your monthly 
EXCELS payment? On what have you spent the money? 
 
11) [If not already answered from the previous section] If you have not received 
EXCELS payments, are you interested in improving your Maryland EXCELS 
rating to a level 3? Why/why not? What do you need to do to improve your 




12) Do you think your Maryland EXCELS rating is an accurate portrayal of the 
quality of your center? If Maryland had not developed the EXCELS system, 
would you be working to improve the quality of your program? Why/why 
not? 
 
13) Given our discussion, is there anything else you’d like to share to help me 
understand your experiences with Maryland EXCELS and EXCELS payments 











Percentage and Number of Participating Centers Rated Level 3 or Higher in 





Percentage and Number of Participating Family Child Care Providers Rated Level 3 
or Higher in EXCELS, July 2013–January 2018 
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